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CHAPTER

I

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF

CIVIL LIBERTIES PROBLEMS
Statement of Purpose

Introduction
Analysis of the standards and concepts which a

community invokes to solve civil liberties problems are

usually found in the works of normative political
theorists, who in some fashion must deal with the

general problem of the relationship between the indivi-

dual and the state? and in the works of legal scholars

who scrutinize the practical resolution of these problems in courts of law.

Concern with liberty is cer-

given
tainly not new, but it is a concern which is not

uniform consideration.

There are, for example, literally

aspects
hundreds of academic works written on various

United States,
of civil liberties problems in the
attention
indeed, the enormous amount of scholarly
as
given to specific words and phrases, such
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"establishment of religion" or "abridging the freedom of
speech" in one particular amendment to the U. S.

Constitution, makes for an almost distinct category in
the academic study of public law in America,

writings

on the same problems in other nations, however, are not
plentiful.

Presumably the reason for this is not because

other nations either lack the desire to protect individual
liberty or that they offer perfect solutions to all civil
liberties problems.

Explanation is to be found rather in

the fact that civil liberties questions in most societies
do not emerge in the same legally-structured manner as
in the United States.

Another important reason for the

emphasis on civil liberties in the U. S. is that because
the problems are legally structured, resolution tends to

take place in courts; and American courts have a more
pronounced, or at least more visible, role in the poli-

tical process than do most.

All the various factors which

make American courts, especially the Supreme Court, so
intrinsically enmeshed in politics have also acted as
forces which help codify problems of what is essentially

democratic political theory in legal vernacular.

Attention

to civil liberties problems, therefore, has frequently

3

taken the form of an auxiliary category in
American

constitutional law, in which civil liberties issues
are
analyzed as a type of problem that besets a
particular
legal institution, usually, the Supreme Court.

The libertarian tradition in the United States
has gained much, at least since 1937,
identified with the Supreme Court.

from being so closely

But because the pre-

cise balance between liberty and order is the most

challenging and delicate normative problem facing any
democratic society, it would appear fruitful to look at
the ways in which other nations and institutions settle

such questions.

Since other nations have civil liber-

ties problems but not in the same codified form as in
the U. S., a comparative analysis must shift the focus

of attention from the context of a particular legal

institution to civil liberties problems as they are

dealt with in the total political process.

The most

convenient focus for comparative analysis of such problems
falls, therefore, on certain statutes in different poli-

tical systems which cause concern among libertarians.
In the hope that by broadening the context of

civil liberties controversies we can perhaps gain further

4

insight into the problem of protecting individual liberty,

an attempt will be made here to analyze the judicial and

administrative uses of certain sedition and obscenity
statutes in Great Britain and the United States.

Our

objective will not be to describe the nature, amount and
source of either espionage or pornography in each society

definitively but rather to ascertain what concepts,
institutions, customs and public attitudes in each

society enhance or detract from a libertarian solution
to those problems.

2

There is a popular tendency to approach such
problems as sedition and obscenity either with a sense of
fear, wherein the major concern is to protect government

and society from great evil; or with a sense of outrage
at the lack of flexibility and sophistication of the

established order and public opinion.

The former is an

attitude which only compounds the problem, and the latter
is,

at its best, an over- statement of the libertarian

case; at its worst the pursuit of ant i- libertarian goals

through the use of libertarian means.

In any case we

more
shall presume that the problems warrant something

useful than simple indignation.

5

Utility of a Coroparat ive
Analya is

An analysis of social conflict over the issues of
sedition and obscenity in two different societies has the
potential of providing three different types of useful
information.
Nortnat ive Standards

It could first yield some of the normative for-

mulas that individuals and institutions in other societies

use as a criteria for deciding the proper sphere of
individual liberty.

Inquiry into the beliefs of men in

differing legal structures and political systems would
appear justifiable, because this is one of the junctures
in politics where ideas clearly have consequences.

Even

before that Athenian court decided to sentence Socrates
to death for "corrupting the youth of Athens" with his

impious teachings, men were putting their intelligence

to the task of deciding when an individual's behavior was

dangerous to the community and when individual behavior
should be left unhampered in the name of liberty.

The

Athenian "court," which was really an admixture of a jury
and a town meeting, by a vote of 281 to 220 found Socrates

6

guilty.

3

If 31 citizens had chosen a different standard

for defining the liberties of a citizen, things might

have turned out differently for Socrates.

The concepts

Athenians used to dispose of this problem were of obvious
importance to Socrates, but they were also important for

other Greeks who might someday find themselves in the same

awkward position.

We shall in one sense be analyzing the

same types of concepts in Britain and the U. 8. which can

have the same awesome repercussions, but in a more compli-

cated setting.
There is a temptation, succumbed to by many who

concern themselves with judicial concepts, to make ideas
an explanation for all behavior in a society— as a cause

of behavior.
behavior.

Ideas emerge as both a cause and effect of

To explain political behavior only by

emphasizing the way men think tends to imply that all problems can be traced to a philosophical mistake— which
seems to contradict common sense.

On the other hand, to

ulterior
disregard all ideas as simply rationalizations for
the
motives has the difficulty Robert Dahl has labeled

"problem of mis- identification.""^

When, for example, a

Party program
worker in Britain votes for a Conservative

7

because he believes that the "upper classes

Icnow best/*

the "mis- identification" of material self-interest and the

worker's apparent incorrect perception of his social

position must be explained by Materialists as "bad
philosophy."
No attempt will be made here to weave a theory
about the precise relationship between ideas and institutions.

It should suffice to say that our concern with

ideas about civil liberties is simply one way to explore

certain kinds of conflict in society, not an attempt to

prescribe a greater role for ideas than they deserve.
It is also important to note that civil liberties

"doctrines" usually have arisen to meet the needs of

specific situations, and that a comparative analysis could

be useful in gaining not only new doctrine but old doctrine
as it is applied to new situations.

Because these questions

highly
must inevitably be resolved in the fluid history of
and
differing circumstances, the addition of "new" cases

what
situations can also help an analyst to anticipate
in the
may be some future civil liberties problems

respective societies.

8

Institut ional influences
Secondly, comparative analysis could aid in

ascertaining the effects of certain institutional arrangements and the resolution of these issues.

What, for

instance, of written and unwritten guarantees of liberty?

How important are judicial review and the courts?
role do political parties play?

What

obviously no total

assessment of the political system and civil liberties

can be given from an examination of particular problems.
But, the structure of civil liberties conflict as it

occurs in these controversies can tell us what kinds of

institutional devices may lead to a certain type of govern-

mental stance toward other civil liberties questions.

Cultural Aspects
Thirdly, such a comparative approach could give

information about factors in the general political culture

which may influence civil liberties.

Since normative

are
decisions do not take place in a vacuum, but instead
as
influenced by other non-normative factors as well
it is impornormative attitudes on non-political matters,

that create a
tant to ascertain which forces are present

9

certain response to civil liberties problems in one
society that are not found in another.

A problera peculiar to those who deal with civil
liberties issues, as we have already mentioned, is the

tendency to treat them solely as legal problems.
vein,

In this

would be well to heed the warning of John P.

it

Roche, who states,

what is important ... to note (is) the
.
.
danger in an excessively legalistic approach to
civil liberties which treats the issue as though
the only deprivations that occur are those which
get litigated in court. Long ago, Socrates was
invited by a friend to worship at the temple of
the sea god and see the wonderful gifts which had
been provided by those sailors saved from drowning
by the god's intervention. Socrates, who knew a
bad sample when he saw one, inquired, 'Where are
the gifts from those who drowned?
.

•

Most conflicts which would be construed as civil
liberties questions in a juridical context in fact never

enter a juridical situation, and depend on public opinion
and social sanctions for the way in which they are resolved.

Because of this, a study of civil liberties problems must
attempt to ascertain the social norms which influence

behavior on particular issues.

Our primary goal will be

to look at the norms used to solve these problems in a
legal context, but the political culture of a society has

10

much to do in the formulation and solution of such issues.
To a certain extent the legal dialogue is only a barometer
of the general conflict in the society, and an attempt to

point out the relevant influences of the political culture,

where possible, will take cognizance of the fact that
courts are only one technique for the protection of

individual liberty and perhaps not always the most
efficient.

Great Britain and
the United States

Comparison of the same problems as found in Britain
and the United States has several advantages which warrant
mention.

First, an especially important factor for com-

parison of civil liberties, both societies are highly
developed and, by most definitions, "democratic."

There

are cultural differences between the United States and
Britain, but these differences are not so great as to

become a juxtaposition of polar opposites.

In one sense,

both nations are part of the same "general" political
tradition, i.e.. Western-democratic, and have, relatively
speaking, similar political institutions.

The fact that

both nations have the same language and that much comparative

11
woric

on factors other than civil liberties exists also

adds to the practicality of using these two societies.
Also, since World W»r II, both nations have played roles
as major world powers, and both have had during this same

period a concern for internal security which necessitated
some introspection of the subject of individual rights

and national security.

Another reason for comparing Britain and the

United States is that there seems to exist a usually
unstated, but none-the-less firm conviction on the part

of American (and British) political scientists that Britain
is somehow "better on civil liberties questions.'

Whether

or not a more libertarian atmosphere prevails in England
is something we shall leave until later, but such a facile

conviction would appear to be at least a little overstated, if not incorrect, given the amount of evidence

that is usually cited.

The truly important question,

however, would seem to be not which nation offers greater

protection of civil liberty, but why it offers greater
protection.

The operative definition of civil liberty in two
such highly developed societies might seem a tangential

12

concern in a world where the most immediate problems are
military and economic.

The developing nations are a

constant reminder that bookish concerns for such subtleties
in Western democratic theory as freedom of speech and due

process of law do not offer solutions to all major problems.
In nations which have no tradition placing great value on

protection of civil liberties, the procurement of liberty
obviously depends upon the founding of such a tradition.
In such circumstances the task is to create the necessary
social and economic prerequisites for a democratic nation.^
In dealing with highly industrialized, complex societies

which are committed to democratic values, discussion of
liberty becomes more subtle and refined? and in certain
ways it is a credit to the society in which it takes

place because it can afford the luxury of precise inquiry
into ways of becoming a more democratic community.

Con-

cern with such delicate chains of logic about liberty are
important for several reasons.

The first is that even

though a certain stage of historical development is

usually thought necessary before democratic attitudes can
prevail, such a relationship is only a general correlation;

the existence of "modernized" conditions does not guarantee

1>3

democratic sentiment.

7

Thus underdeveloped nations have

something to gain from the comparative study of civil
liberties because it can indicate which aspects of moderni-

zation are hostile to individual freedom.
Secondly, analysis of civil liberties issues in

England and America is important precisely because these
are the two nations most closely associated historically

with the legal protection of liberty.

Libertarian ideals

have been part of an accepted political heritage of both
nations, but historical acceptance of certain principles

Robert

can also be a great burden for those principles.

Cordis, writing on the development of individual rights in
antiquity, has noted that, "in proportion as

.

.

.

words

and ideas have become the accepted heritage of the race,
later generations find them self-evident, if not

platitudinous."

.

.

.

This drift from viable principle to

meaningless platitude occurs on both sides of civil liberties conflict.

The reaction of the general public,

interested in establishing sufficient order to guarantee

them personal security, at times grants a rather relaxed
acceptance to dissent and opposition as part of the democratic political process.

Then new groups and new issues
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make government or the community feel threatened.

Those

who are overzealoue in their desire to bring about social
change get equally impatient with libertarian slogans.

The reconciliation of freedom and order is difficult when
government, as has frequently been the case in the past,

equates order with lack of opposition.

It will not be

easier if, in the future, opposition to governmental policy

takes on some of the characteristics of the New Left's

critique of tolerance.

In both England and the United

States, although it is a somewhat older phenomenon in

England, there exist political forces which express a

view of the democratic process, as some student demonstrators did recently at Columbia, in the strident rallying
cry, "Up against the wall Mother- fucker 1"

In both of the

democratic nations we will be dealing with, this slogan
expresses an attitude about political conflict held by a

much larger and politically diverse element in society

than just radical students in New York City.

9

Joseph A. Schumpeter has perhaps best isolated the
cause of this fleeting nature of the democratic commitment

when he observed,
There are ultimate ideals and interests which
the most ardent democrat will put above democracy.

.

.

.
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The reason why this is so is not far to seek.
Democracy is a political method, that is to say,
a certain type of institutional arrangement for
arriving at
.
decisions .
and hence
incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective
of what decisions it will produce,
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Def init ions and Assumptions

Civil Liberty
Conflict and Process
Ronald F. Bunn, in the introduction to his
Politics and Civil Libert ies in Europe recommends that

civil liberties problems be viewed as one manifestation of
"the two cultural tugs found in any political community:

consensus and cleavage."
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Such a theoretical model has

the advantage of promising a functional analysis of such
problems, which "transcend, without necessarily rejecting..."

such traditional categories as democratic and "authoritarian,"

and can thus be applied to any society.

The model is also

useful in identifying the problems as types of conflict
situations.

Bunn states that, "Consensus represents the

agreement upon which order and authority must ultimately
rest; cleavage refers to the disagreement that exists within

the consensual framework. "

But, civil liberties conflicts

are more than simply disagreements within a consensus.

A
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better formulation would view civil liberties problems
as sometimes disagreement about consensus.

Or, to turn

the formula around, certain civil liberties problems, such
as the tension between sedition and freedom of political

expression, force a society to arrive at a consensus about
c leavaqe .

The phrase "civil liberty" is used in many different
ways, both in law and political science.

A strict legal

construction sometimes distinguishes civil liberty on the
basis of who is imposing the actual restraint on an
individual.

Edwin S. Corwin, for instance, claims, "We

enjoy civil liberty because of the restraints which government imposes upon our neighbors in our behalf, and con-

stitutional liberty because of the constitutional restraints

under which government itself operates."

13

Politically,

civil liberties is frequently used as synonomous with

guarantees of the democratic process.

14

For comparative

purposes, we shall use civil liberties to refer to

guaranteed protection of the democratic process from
infringements on the part of both government and society.

To facilitate comparative analysis, it will be useconflict
ful to distinguish between general conflict and

17

over democratic guarantees.

What makes a problem of

interest to us is not the conflict per se but
the rela-

tionship between that conflict and normative
dictates about
rights and liberties.

Freedom of press, religion, assembly,

the right to a fair trial, etc., are all normative
concerns

similar to the concern for universal suffrage? that
is,

they are all attempts to keep the roajoritarian political
process "open."

This conception of civil liberty, which

owes much of its formulation to the American Supreme
Court

Chief Justice, Harlan F. Stone,

we shall not interpret

as a list of absolutes, but rather as the democratic

"interests" of a society which must, to be sure, be

balanced against society's interest in public order.
Libertarian Solutions

When we speak of "libertarian solutions" to a
problem, we shall simply mean that the decision about the

conflict has accommodated as much of this democratic
interest as is reasonably possible.

What is reasonable in

each case is not easy to determine and

roust

ultimately

rest on the application of norms to a factual situation.

The most fundamental underlying sentiment supporting the
commitment to an open process is probably the notion of

18

"self -responsibility."

gave

"

it is because John Stuart Mill

self -responsibility, " along with individual

excellence, such high priority that his Essay on Liberty

remains a classic defense of an open society.

Contemporary

political theorists such as Harold Lasswell have the same
pivotal value when they define civil liberty as the desire
to,

"

.

.

.

respect practices with regard to which there

is self-responsibility.

The individual has certain rights

and immunities; the power process relegates to him alone
the making of decisions with regard to certain practices." 17
Thus, a libertarian belief is almost a theory of what law

should be in a democratic system.

As a theory of law it

stipulates that only behavior which is demonstrably harmful to others is within the proper sphere of social control.

As applied to civil liberties conflicts, a decision is

libertarian to the degree that the maximum amount of
individual or group action is assumed to be as important a

factor as society's interest in order.

Such a definition

hopefully avoids some of the normative ambiguity which
surrounds attempts to define libertarian in

terras of

"natural rights" or some type of metaphysical fact.

19

Rights

When we speak of "rights" in connection with either
the general society or courts of law we shall adopt the

Holmes ian notion that a
stasis of a prophecy

"

.

—the

.

.

right is only the hypo-

imagination of a substance

supporting the fact that the public force will be brought
18
to bear upon those who do things said to contravene it."

Such a notion of rights is more useful for the descriptive

purpose of deciding what is actually talcing place when such
words are invoked and is more useful for normative purposes
in that it does not presuppose that a "duty" corresponds

to every "right."

19

In the words of Justice Holmes,

legal rights is the
No doubt behind .
fighting will of the subject to maintain them,
and the spread of his emotions to the general
rules by with they are maintained; but that
does not seem to me to be the same thing as the
supposed a priori discernment of a duty or the
assertion of a pre-existing right. A dog will
fight for his bone.^O
.

.

political Culture

Sociology and anthropology use the notion of
"culture" in a variety of ways, but the general meaning of

culture is usually the way in with a community solves its
problems.

Given a primary need of society, such as the

20

biological need for food, the means for the satisfaction
of this need are partially due to geographic and climatic
factors.

Physical and economic factors determine the

general range of food that can be eaten.

Such things,

however, as the choice of a particular food, how it is prepared, and whether it is eaten with a fork or chopsticks

are cultural phenomena.

Political scientists, such as Samuel Beer and

Gabriel Almond, use the concept culture in the narrower
context of "political culture."

For Beer political culture

is that aspect of a general culture that is concerned with

how a government ought to be conducted and what it should
do.

It is the values, beliefs, and emotional attitudes

that are components of a society's conception of authority
and purpose.

the

This use of political culture emphasizes

rraative ideas system of a given society about govern-

ment and comes close to what others might call the pre-

vailing "ideology" of a society.

Political culture for

Almond, on the other hand, refers to the

"...

patterns

politics
of individual attitudes and orientations toward

among members of a political system."

23

For Almond a poli-

categories.
tical culture can be subdivided into several

21

but it is essentially the "psychological orientation

toward social objects,"

24

Such an emphasis makes for a

difference in the way Almond and Beer use the same label.
But, while disputes in anthropology and political science

over the definition of culture will continue,

25

in the

interest of arriving at an operational concept, we will

stipulate that the social and cultural configuration forming
the bacl^ ground for civil liberties issues is made up of

conceptions .

That is, the ideas, beliefs, and attitudes

(both psychological and ideological) about what is and

what should be the process for resolving conflicts between
the individual and society.

Such a definition would

include both normative and existential propositions about

civil liberties as well as psychological reactions to

certain types of conflict situations.

26

Under the heading

of political culture we shall include such diverse things
as attitude studies of the populations in Britain and the

United States, and important differences in the historical
development of constitutional guarantees of liberty in
each society, to help ascertain the way each nation perceives its conflicts over "rights."
It is important to realize the usefulness of

22

"culture" as a tool for explaining the background of civil

liberties issues, but it is also equally important to

realize its limitations.
that

"...

Almond is correct in cautioning

a careful analysis of political culture still

provides no sure guide

.

.

behavior in a given case."

.

27

for prediction of individual

An analysis of the cultural

background of civil liberties will not lend itself to predicting the reaction of a particular judge, official, or
crowd to a specific civil

liberties issue, but it can per-

form a service equally as valuable in helping to explain

why particular issues are issues.

Much civil liberties

analysis, for instance, takes the form of an input-output
model, wherein the focal point is usually courts of law

and the output is a chain of decisions.

Political culture

would rarely determine, although it may influence, the
output of this system, but it can have much to do with

determining the input.
Seditious and Obscene
Speech

General prescriptions about liberty can have meaning,
problems.
however, only if they are related to concrete

of both
The category of "free speech" and the response

government and public to "free speech" issues would seem
to be the best single index of a society's commitment to

civil liberties « if for no other reason than that "free
speech" can be made almost synonomous with "civij. liberty,"

Conflicts over publishing, assembly, association, religion,
etc., as opposed to civil liberties problems relating to

criminal due process, for example, all necessitate some
general prescriptive standards, which are much the same
regardless of the specific nature of the issue.

The cate-

gories about freedom of expression which have developed in

American constitutional law because of enumeration in the
First Amendment are useful in the American context, but
for purposes of cross -national analysis it would appear

wise to divide free speech problems into categories

according to the rationale given for limitation

of speech

This rationale could be, for example, invasion of a
person's privacy (right of privacy v. free expression) or
injury to a person's character (libel).

Since we are

interested in speech as a social problem, it is important,
also, to determine

vrtio,

i.e., government or private groups

articulates the demand that speech be curbed.

With these

considerations in mind, two categories (or rationales)

24

which would appear to be good indices to a society's civil
liberties coniroitment are
2)

1)

seditious speech and

obscenity.

Seditious speech, or speech which is viewed as a
threat to national security or public order, raises questions in areas which have great consequences for both
social stability and the general climate of civil liberties.

Theories of civil liberty, i.e., general statements about
what constitutes permissible expression of opinion, are
most clearly and directly approached when the immediate

problem is security and/or order.

Sedition is a crucial

substantive problem in and of itself, but it is also important because many of the standards used to solve this pro-

blem carry over into the solution of other civil liberties
problems; and thus it is the most convenient font of liber-

tarian doctrine.

Seditious speech and the right of assembly,

although sometimes different problems requiring different

criteria of judgement, can, for our purposes, be treated
as the general problem of seditious speech if we presume

that assembly can be, although is not always, an "organized"

and "symbolic" expression of speech.

Both are problems

where there is a demand from government (usually) to inhibit

25

speech on a rationale related to public order .

Conflicts

between the individual and the social and political order
always rank as serious, but when the conflict takes on a

group dimension, as in the case of assembly, the "problem"
can become a crisis.
Obscenity, on the other hand, is a demand for

restraint of individual free expression with a rationale

related to sexual impropriety

.

The demand for such

restraint frequently comes from government, but also comes
from private associations.

Obscenity as a problem should

be much more subject to the dictates of public opinion and
the general social fabric than the rather technical dis-

tinctions that surround the problem of sedition,

obscenity

as a civil liberties issue, in this writer's view, borders

on the frivolous.

It is a type of problem, however, which,

because it lacks the gravity of questions such as sedition,
gives us a substantially different manifestation of the

problem of free speech, and in a different, and more
"

cu Itur a V context

We shall have to approach these two problems

through their statutory bases, which are the most obvious
be
source of governmental rationale, but this can sometimes

26

deceptive.

For the problem of seditious speech, as an

example, there is a cogent list of statutes which will be

our concern.

Such famous statutes as the Smith Act, the

Internal Security Act, and the Communist Control Act, are

relevant to our purpose, but so are some aspects of the

Selective Service Act, and the "burning" statutes con-

cerned with the destruction of draft cards and flags.

In

Britain the problem of sedition and free speech are found
in the application of the Incitement to Mutiny Act, but

also in the official Secrets Act and the Public order Act.

The problem of obscenity in the U. S. will necessitate
looking at some postal regulations.

It should be remembered

that in employing such categories as sedition and obscenity
the problem is defined not in terms of the form of speech,
e.g.

,

press, cinema, etc., but the rationale given for the

curtailing of speech.

Thus "D" notices (a form of press

censorship used by the British Government) will be
approached in this paper from the perspective of "seditious
speech" since the stated criteria of the government is a

concern for national security.

This is not to imply that

other forms of organizing these problems are not useful,

simply that for our limited purposes, the above-mentioned

27

framework is advantageous.

Such a schema, because it

deals both with a critical problem and a rather frivolous
one, and the response of both government and private

associations, should be a generally reliable index to the
ideas and problems of civil liberties in a society without

necessitating a catalogue of every confrontation between
the individual and society.

CHAPTER II

AMERICA Am> ENGLAND!

THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY IN TWO CULTURES

General Factors Inf luenc ing
Civil Liberties
In this chapter we shall look at some o£ the major

differences in the English and American political cultures

which have had a bearing on perceptions of civil liberties
in the two societies.

Many of the similarities between

the United States and Britain are, of course, obvious?

English is spoken in both nations, both are highly committed
to a democratic process when compared to most other nations,

they share the essentials of the common law system, and
historically one is the off -shoot of the other rather than
a nation with a distinctly different course of historical

development.

These similarities are important to bear in

mind, but in our treatment of the social and legal back-

ground of individual rights in the two cultures we shall

emphasize differences rather than similarities in order to

ascertain the way in which divergent cultural patterns can
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create different environments for the civil liberties

trad it ion.
Before describing the particular political culture
as it relates to civil liberties issues in each nation, it

might be valuable to indicate some of the more obvious
social factors which have been found by a variety of

authors to influence civil liberties in a "horizontal"
manner; that is, factors which are influential regardless
of particular circumstances, although the degree of influ-

ence may depend on the components of a particular political
culture.

These factors overlap, and no attempt will be

made to find any "causal" connection between them and
specific responses to civil liberties issues, but it is
important to separate the factors that condition civil
liberties in all societies so that they are not mistaken
for unique situations in either Britain or the United States,

Educational Factors

The degree and kind of education an individual
attireceives appears to have a significant bearing on the

correlation
tudes toward civil liberties, with the general

being that those with higher education exhibit more
tolerant attitudes toward unconventional opinion.^

It has
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also been found that those with a technical education

usually express less interest in, and a more restrictive
view toward, civil liberties problems than those with a
"liberal" education.

While the "Student Left" in both

the United States and Britain offers some obvious examples
that tolerance is not a necessary by-product of higher

education for all people, it would still seem that for
most a "liberal" education has "liberal" effects.

It is

important to note, however, that the liberal reaction to

education is simply a shorthand equation for young people's
response to a wide array of stimuli, of which curricula
and exposure to norms of toleration are only a small part.

Even with the Student Left the "tolerance for the unconventional" exists (sometimes to a point of total witlessness)

.

But the discovery of alternatives to parental

modes of thinking sometimes leads to unbounded feelings of
rectitude.

Thus tolerance for the unconventional becomes

the same, for some, as intolerance and disdain for all
things conventional.
least,

This is different, analytically at

from an aversion to things new and different simply

because they are new.

This is a contempt for the familiar

because it is familiar, and has probably always been a part

of the

"

intellegentsia's" desire for a belief system that

distinctly sets it apart from the common man.

There has

always been a tension in intellectual communities between
the norms of toleration and the norms of rectitude.

We

are viewing education as a horizontal factor which has

increased tolerance in both nations, and still does; but
it is equally important to realize that this relationship
is changing in both nations, perhaps more rapidly in the

United States, and, should rectitude prevail, education
may not be a factor increasing tolerance in the future.

Ecological Factors

Of much less certainty, but still a possible
horizontal influence on civil liberties, would be whether
a person lives in an urban or rural area.

Some would

claim, for instance, that the very isolation of rural

groups creates greater ethnocentric ism which, together

with less contact with ideological, ethnic and other forms
of conflict, creates a more restrictive view of legitimate

social conflict.^

Urbanization, on the other hand, is

usually thought to lead to the development of less restric
tive norms about legitimate conflict because conflict is

more an accepted part of life than in a rural environment.
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While the impersonality which some feel characterizes

urban life could conceivably cause frustration which in
turn could increase conflict, this increase in
"differences," whatever their source, leads to rules about
interaction.

According to Gerhard Lenski, for example,

attitudes of tolerance and secularism "inevitably arise in

urban situations," because of the close association which
necessitates cooperation.

"Eventually what began as a

modus Vivendi or temporary arrangement for specific situations," says Lenski,

'becomes generalized into a basic

value applicable to all kinds of situations.

..."

Economic Factors

Closely allied with, but ultimately not the same
as, an educational index is a person's economic position.

Economic standing, or at least an individual's perception
of his economic and social standing, have been shown to

have an influence on attitudes toward individual liberty.

Speaking on the phenomenon of "working-class" authoritarianism, Seymour Lipset claims:

The poorer strata everywhere are more liberal or
leftist on economic issues; they favor more
welfare state measures, higher wages, graduated
income taxes, support of trade unions, and so forth.
But when liberalism is defined in non-economic

—

terms as support of civil liberties, internationalism, etc. T- the correlation is reversed.
The TOO re well-to-do are more liberal, the
poorer are more intolerant.^

Contemporary student movements, both black and white, are
of course strewn with examples of upper-middle class

activism and intolerance.

The upperclass has always been

a spawning ground for "noblesse oblige" radicalism as

well as liberalism, and while there may be evidence showing
that such radicalism is more strident, it would be diffi-

cult to establish that it is more frequent than in the
past.

Even if upperclass rectitude is on the increase,

this does not destroy the utility of Lipset's notion of

working class authoritarianism, it simply establishes
that there can be more than one source of "ego insecurity,"
i.e., being young and from a "successful" family.

The

qualifications that the "Student Left" forces on Lipset's
explanation, while not destroying it, do demonstrate that
the relationship between any given value and a given socio-

economic status are determinations made at a particular

point in time and are therefore subject to change.

What

Lipset succeeds in doing is showing a difference in

response based on class.

Such a difference need not con-

importantly, need
tinue until the end of time, nor, more
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the content of that difference remain the same, especially
since a sense of class distinction is in part a recogni-

tion of different attitudes.

Attitudes which demonstrate

that one belongs to the better portion of society may in
time include a claim to understand the "Third World"

better than others.

Our only point is that it is not the

case yet, and that for purposes of cross-national analysis
one can expect libertarian attitudes to correspond to

higher socio-economic status.

These intolerant attitudes are not only the product of low income and the lack of education, but also,

according to Lipset, are reflections of "lower-class

perceptions of reality."
emphasis on the immediately perceivable
and concern with the personal and concrete is
part and parcel of the short time perspective
and the inability to perceive the complex possibilities and consequences of actions which often
result in a general readiness to support
extremist political and religious movements, and
a generally lower level of liberalism on noneconomic questions.^
.

.

.

Political ideology, in the sense of a rigid devotion to a
rather narrow political credo as well as extreme religious
fervor,

is construed

by Lipset as a product of this

working class mentality and the "ego insecurity" that makes
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members of lower economic groups "over-react" to
intellectual abstractions.

A British psychologist, H. J. Eysenck, found
significant relationships between those who were "toughminded" and those who were "tender-minded" in general

social outlook and their economic background.

The group

Eysenck classified as "tough-minded" tended to be intolerant
of deviations from the standard moral or religious codes,
to be anti-Negro, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic? while the

"tender-minded" were tolerant of deviation, unprejudiced,

and Internationa listic in outlook.

Eysenck, who did this

study in the context of political party identification,
found the correlation to be that middle class Conservatives,
Labourites, and Liberals tended to be more "tender-minded"

than their working class counterparts inside their own
party.

Similarly, a Gallup Poll index of anti-Semitism
in Britain revealed ant i- Jewish sentiment to be highest

among those who identified with the Labour Party, lowest

among those who identified with the Liberal party, with
the Conservatives falling in between, but with considerably
less anti-Semitic sentiment than the Labour.

Almost all
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Jewish members of Parliament are, however, in the Labour
Party, and are supported by constituencies which are not

predominantly Jewish, which would seem to imply that the
leadership of the Labour party and the ideology of the

Labour Party are egalitarian in sentiment and hence there
is more mobility for Jewish politicians.

The polling of

the ant i- Jewish sentiment of the rank and file of the

Labour Party would seem to demonstrate that working class

ethnocentric ism is not simply a product of one country or
culture, but can be found among people of similar economic

and social backgrounds in all count ires and cultures.

Religious Factors

Although religion as a factor which influences
civil liberties is probably more conditioned by its particular cultural environment than any of the other "horizontal
factors" mentioned so far, there have been suggestions

from some scholars, such as Lipset, that all things such
as social and economic class being equal, religious belief

can be a variable which influences attitudes toward civil
liberties.

Given the same middle class environment, for

instance, Protestants tend to take a more libertarian view

toward dissent and free speech than do Catholics; and
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Catholics, generally speaking, take a more libertarian

attitude toward race relations than do Protestants.

One

of the explanations for this can be found in the
"Weltanschauung" of these religions.

Lipset notes that

the absolutism of the Catholic church on matters of faith
and morals and such doctrines as the infallibility of the
Pope could make Catholics more conscious of "heresy," and
thus lead them to view unorthodox speech with more disdain

than Protestants.

On the other hand, the implicit

"universalism" of Catholicism may perhaps make Catholics
less conscious of "race" than Protestants.

Protestants,

perhaps because of their development as religious "sects,"
tend to be dissenting but also "exclusive" in social outlook.

This relationship between a non-exclusive view of

the world and racial attitudes is so enmeshed with class,

religion, and other social variables as to be almost

impossible to substantiate.

The relationship is probably

less one of the particular religious doctrine and more of

the individual's relationship to his religious group.

more highly involved an individual

is

in his church,

The
for

example, the more likely he is to favor integration, and

the more a person is involved in his subcomraunity the more
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likely he is to favor segregation.

Communal involvement,

according to Gerhard Lenski, seems to stimulate a "provincial" response

— that

is,

one which indicates a lack of con-

cern with problems with groups other than one's own.^
The relationship between certain religions and
civil liberties is, however, more pronounced,
a doctrinal sense,

in fact,

in

it is only on the subject of the Bill

of Rights in the United States that there seems to be a

relationship between religious "liberalism" in the sense
of doctrinal heterodoxy and political liberalism.

After

noting the distinct lack of any connection between liberal

creeds and liberality in foreign policy, race relations,
or welfare policy, Lenski says, "The one exception to this

general pattern occurs on the issue of free speech.

Here

there appears to be a modest relationship between political liberalism and religious liberalism.
Lenski found that in the United States Catholic

involvement in both the church and the subcomraunity was
linked with a very restrictive interpretation of the prin-

ciple of freedom of speech.

On each of four questions

dealing with criticism of presidential actions, speeches
attacking religion, and speeches espousing Fascism or
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Communism, these Catholics who were "more active in their

church more often expressed doubt that the Bill of Rights
permits these actions than did marginal members of the
group. "^^

Similarly those who were more involved in the

Catholic subcommunity (the less devout) were in favor of a
more strict interpretation of the Bill of Rights more often
than "those who had more extensive primary relations with
.

.

members of other subcommunities

.

12
"

Among Protestants

there was a more liberal interpretation of the Bill of

Rights which was strengthened by the involvement of the

person in the subcommunity.

13

In both the United States and Britain there seems
to be a relationship between "religious orthodoxy" and

conservative political attitudes, especially on racial
segregation.^^

The "devout," according to Lenski, think

in terms of the "oneness of life" and therefore apply

religious values to contemporary problems? the "orthodox"

on the other hand create a "compartmentalized type of
belief" where religion doesn't get confused with the non-

spiritual world.
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Lenski also found Jews to be the most consistently
civil
"liberal" in political attitudes on foreign policy,
liberties, economics and race relations,

and it would
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seem that this also is probably a horizontal factor opera-

ting in varying degrees regardless of the particular system
and culture.

Liberty as a
Constitutional
Guarantee

The constitutions of the United States and Great
Britain are usually cited as classic examples of two
archetypes:

constitutions which outline basic political

principles that define the locus, distribution, and legitimate use of political power in a written document; and

those which achieve the same ends byzielying on customs and
precedents.

Such a distinction is easily exaggerated

since the American Constitution, for all except the most
literal,

is an evolving set of judicial interpretations,

customs, and precedents.

But since the British Constitution

consists of historic charters, judicial decisions. Acts

of parliament, common law, social convention, established
custom, and just plain quirks of the 900 years of Anglo-

Saxon experience, the constitutional protection of liberty
becomes, theoretically, more complex; and institutionally

enumerating the constitutional protections to civil liberty

becomes more difficult than with the American Constitution.
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The British Constitution, frequently called "flexible"

when compared to the "rigid" American Constitution, is
committed to the protection of individual liberty, but
such a commitment goes through an endless maze of subtleties before it emerges in practice.
In the ultimate sense the notion of individual

liberty emerges in both Great Britain

17

and the United

States as a corollary to the notion that governmental

power should be in some sense limited.

In America, with

the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, part of

the written constitution of the land became a list of
things the federal government could not do.

This list,

phrased as a set of immunities held by citizens against
political power, contained very similar phraseology to the

English Bill of Rights of 1688, but the common vernacular
tends, according to John A. Krout, to obscure the fact

that the two documents rest upon somewhat different
assumptions.

Both to be sure are concerned with specific
potential threats to human liberty and with the
practical means of thwarting them. For the
English, however, the source of danger was the
unrestrained prerogative of the Crown; and the
defense was sought in the power exercised by a
majority in parliament. For Americans, the
danger seemed to lie in the will of the majority,
as expressed through its representatives in
Congress assembled. ^8
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Because the defense of liberty was viewed as
more

complicated in America, institutional protection
became
more complicated.

The Bill of Rights, the federal system,

and separation of powers can all be interpreted as
devices
to hinder government, be it democratic or autocratic;

this is why the American Bill of Rights often appears
as
an exercise in "constitutional negativism."

American constitutional framers felt it necessary
to institutionalize conflict so that power could not be

used arbitraurily, and in the process seemed to assume that
the polar opposite of arbitrary power was a fragmented

political system which made the execution of any type of
power difficult.

The liberties of English citizens, on the other
hand, developed not from a concentration on the locus of

power, but from the organized administration of that power.

The long historical process of imposing a certain routine
on subjects, which the monarch called law, was also to act
as an eventual check on the monarchy itself.

About this

subtle process of the routinization of power, Jhering was

to say.

Form is the sworn enemy of caprice, the twin sister
Fixed forms are the school of
.
of liberty.
discipline and order, and thereby liberty itself.
.

.
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It was the imposition of such form
upon the ministers of

the crown and finally upon the Crown that
was to establish
the supremacy of

law— the most important ingredient

in the

English "Constitution."^^
Constitutional commands in the United States certainly incorporate the general assumption that
what is not

declared illegal is legal, but much of the constitutional
dialogue as well as the specific language of the
constitu-

tion is concerned with ascertaining whether or not a
citizen
has a "right" as constitutionally enumerated or
understood.
In Britain, on the other hand, defense of liberty stems

from the principle that while no law guarantees the

liberty to write or print what one likes, it is assumed

that what is not specifically proscribed is permitted.
Lord Halsbury once used such a principle as the touchstone
of English Constitutionalism:

The so-called liberties of the subject are really
implications drawn from the two principles that the
subject may say or do what he pleases, provided
that he does not transgress the substantive law, or
infringe the legal rights of others, whereas public
authorities (including the Crown) may do nothing but
what they are authorized to do by some rule of
common law or statute. Where public authorities are
not authorized to interfere with the subject, he has
liberties. 2^
For Halsbury, a British subject could not possess
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••guaranteed" rights such as those enumerated in the written

Constitution of the U. S. because the ultimate principle
of the British Constitution is that Parliament is sovereign
But, "It is well understood that certain liberties are

highly prized by the people, and that in consequence
parliament is unlikely, except in emergencies, to pass
legislation constituting a serious interference with them."

As inviolate as the principle that Parliament is

sovereign is another fundaunental principle of British

constitutionalism

— the

rule of law.

statute, it is recognized by

While not defined by

Crown, Parliament and the

courts as a pervading principle of the Constitution.
A. V. Dicey, the most distinguished commentator on the

British Constitution, has claimed that the rule of law
means that no arbitrary power is legitimate, that every

man regardless of rank is subject to the law, and that
individual rights of the common law must be protected.

24

English constitutional ideas always opposed the

Continental and American propensity for written elaborations as mere "paper affirmations."

The liberties of

Englishmen were viewed as common law liberties that
resulted as the natural consequences of ordinary decisions
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in ordinary courts.
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As such, English liberties are

clearly subject to abridgement by parliamentary actions,
but more recent scholastic interpretations of the English

Constitution place much less emphasis on common law basis
of liberties.

Goodhart claims, for instance, that,

"...

under

the unwritten constitution there are certain established

principles which limit the scope of Parliament. "^^
It is true that the courts cannot enforce these
principles as they can under the Federal system
in the United States, but this does not mean that
these principles are any the less binding and
effective. For that matter some of them receive
greater protection today in England than they do
in the United States.

This view of the Constitution almost imposes a "natural
law' over statutory law, common law and equity, but that
is perhaps what most constitutional scholars do when

trying to explain the "essence" of the constitutional
system.

When Lord Justice Denning of the English Court

of Appeals described "the spirit of the British Constitution,"

he said it rests upon three main "instincts."

First,

there is the "instinct for justice," by which he means an
independent judiciary.

Secondly, there exists an "instinct

for liberty," which consists of commitment to freedom of

discussion and association.

What Denning labels as the
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third "instinct" of British constitutionalism is a

qualification which pulls the first two instincts down
from the realm of pure abstraction

— the

"practical

instinct which leads to the balancing of 'rights' with
•duties,

•

powers with safeguards, so that neither rights

nor powers shall be exceeded or abused."

28

"Throughout

all this," says Denning, "runs the Christian instinct and

with it a sense of the supreme importance of the individual
and refusal to allow his personality to be submerged in
an omnipotent State."
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This seems to be another way of

saying that power must be exercised in a reasonable
manner, and that part of the definition of "reasonable"
is that proper consideration is given to the individual

interest as opposed to collective interest.
In the final analysis, English law and the

Constitution fall back on an appeal to the common sense
of the people and the "reasonableness" of governmental

action.

Rights emerge from the British Constitution as

the consensus of what is reasonable in the situation.

Michael Stewart says.
In a trial, the prisoner's guilt must be proved
it is illegal to say
•beyond a reasonable doubt?
in public things so provocative that a 'reasonable'
man may fear they will cause a disturbance. To
•
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translate this idea into law such as courts can
declare and citizens obey is not easy and the
Constitution often appears a tangled maze; but
the clue to it is the idea of reasonableness
The written American Constitution is much more a

document outlining jurisdiction, rather than assessments
of "reasonableness

per se.

Even though doctrines

ra2iking

use of the "reasonableness" rule are frequently used to

determine the judicial presumption of constitutionality
or unconstitutionality, American judges have tended to

view the Constitution as grants and restraints on political power.

The American Constitution

is

primarily con-

cerned with whether government should be given particular
powers.

The English constitution, being much more inexact

and pliable, is concerned more with the way in which

power is used than the existence of that power.

Separation of Powers
and the Judicial Role
Some writers, such as Labor's Michael Stewart, who

has experience with the British system both as a political

analyst and practicing politician, claim that the ultimate

defense for British liberty lies in the separation of
powers in the organization of a government itself.

Legis-

lative, executive, and judicial functions, while certainly
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less distinct than in the United States are
still clear

enough to create checks on power.

The development of dis-

ciplined parties means that the separation between legislature and executive has been, in terms of ultimate
power,

bridged; but, as Stewart reminds us, "the bridge rests
on

good relations between the Government and the majority in
Parliament."
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As such, "Separation of these two powers.

.

is no longer a permanent principle of the Constitution;

it is a possibility, kept in the background and available

for use against a Government which fails to recognize the

Sovereignty of Parliament.
Separation of the judiciary from the other

branches of government is wider and more obvious, but
still not complete.

Since the seventeenth century judges

cannot be removed by the government of the day in England
and can pass down rulings which block governmental action

without the threat of immediate removal. 33

But the head

of the judiciary, the Lord Chancellor, as a cabinet

minister belongs to both the executive and the legislature.

The United States Supreme Court, for example, can exercise
the power of judicial review anddeclare an Act of Congress
or a state or municipal statute "unconstitutional."

No

.

.
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British court can so boldly overrule a legislature.

then does something become unconstitutional?

if,

How

for

example, the Prime Minister compelled a judge to resign,

such an action would be "unconstitutional" because it is

proscribed by the Act of Settlement.

To this extent the

British usage is no different than the American usage of
the term "unconstitutional" would be if the executive

branch violated the form enumerated in the U. S.

Constitution by not having judicial appointments approved

by the Senate.

If in Britain, however. Parliament chose

to dispose of the Act of Settlement, it could do

so,

and

the Prime Minister's action would then be constitutional,

whereas the constitutional procedures cannot be so

easily rearranged in the United States.

An act of Parliament can be unconstitutional in
two different ways.

The first is by open declaration of

the people that such action goes against their wishes

because

"...

the one really important part of the

unwritten Constitution

(is)

.

.

.

the assumption that the

purpose of the Constitution is to give effect to the will
democracy is the unwritten basis of the

of the peoples

Const itut ion .

34
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The second way an act of Parliament becomes
"unconstitutional" is more indirect, but more often used.

Even though the courts cannot strike an act of Parliament
as unconstitutional on its face (a power which while

spectacular is not even used too frequently in the United
States)

,

it can discover that the application of the law

contravenes "natural justice."
Since Parliament legally can do no wrong, it is

only good sense for the British to assume that if a
"wrong" results from an act of Parliament, the act must

have been misunderstood by those who applied it.

Because

Parliament can do no wrong it is only logical that they
would not offend natural justice.

The concept of "natural

justice" has been used in such a way as to achieve some of

the same results that are achieved by the Bill of Rights
in the United States.

As A.

L.

Goodhart explains.

What parliament says is binding on all judges,
and there is nothing more to be said about it.
Judges, however, usually manage to get their own
way. ...
By a convenient fiction it assumes
that parliament always intends that its statutes
will accord with natural justice; no statute will
therefore be construed to be retrospective or to
deprive a person of a fair hearing or to prevent
freedom of speech unless Parliament has so provided in the most specific terms.

Generally speaking, the concept of natural justice has been
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applied by the courts in Britain to insure that in
administrative conflicts, the subject is given a fair
hearing, or in criminal cases that the defendant receive
a fair trial.

"In many ways," says David Fellman, "the

concept of natural justice is comparable to the American

doctrine of due process of law." 37

The necessity of courts to interpret statutes and
the application of the concept "natural justice," along

with the courts' control and interpretation of common law
rules, create in England a type of de facto judicial review.

Edward McWhinney makes a distinction between 'direct
judicial review" and its "concomitant, the presence of a

rigid constitution changeable only by some extraordinary
process," and "indirect judicial review" or what is some-

times known as "judicial braking," which characterize

countrias with,

"...

flexible, uncontrolled constitu-

tions like the United Kingdom.

..." 38

English law

appears almost irrevocably "positivist" in the sense that

parliament is sovereign, and courts cannot overrule any
statute on its face,

judicial discretion is further

checked by the mechanics of stare decisis

.

However, the

nature of the judicial function itself creates, if judges
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are sufficiently imaginative, a role
in expounding the

fundamental principles of a society.

The English judicial

attitude on the binding force of precedents
is more
stringent than in the United States; until
1966, the

House of Lords was bound by its own decisions.

But, as

McWhinney has noted, even before the Law Lords declared
that too rigid adherence to precedent could lead to
Injustice,
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"...

the House of Lords itself had

developed to such a fine art the practice of "distinguishing"
as distinct from overruling, prior decisions, as to make

the limits of this rule rather amorphous in practice.

The nature and scope of judicial power is certainly

augmented by the acceptance of judicial review in the

United States.

But in a sense, even though it arose out

of judicial interpretation, it remains only a tradition

specifying the locus of power; not the use of that power.

The essential point for the legal protection of basic
liberties has less to do with the formal power to nullify

legislation than with the ability to censure, if only by
implication, the existing political authority.

As

McWhinney states,

...

it may not always,

in terms of end result,
matter too much whether or not a power of direct
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judicial review exists under a given constitution,
so long, at any rate, as the courts are conscious
of the possibilities of requiring legislative
majorities to give second thoughts to legislation
by harsh judicial construction in the process of
statutory interpretation.'*^

Legal and Social
Pluralism
The effect of such things as homogeneity and

cultural pluralism on civil liberties attitudes is a
subject about which there is little agreement.

For

instance, in a country like Britain, where political

leadership generally tends to have a higher educational
level than political leadership in the United States, we

might perhaps expect a more favorable climate for the

civil liberties tradition, since there is a correlation

between education and libertarian attitudes, and in
Britain "deference" would be to this educated elite,

or,

to phrase it differently, if "democracy" in Britain is

construed as less a matter of "mandate" than it

is in the

United States, we might find more protection of individual
rights, since frequently such rights conflict with the

"populist" demands of the community.
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While "homogeneity" is certainly a relative

terra

which can have little meaning unless it is used with a
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comparative referent, England is a more homogeneous
culture than the United States.

This homogeneity has per-

haps been over-used as a factor to explain all of those

phenomena which are indigenously English, which frequently
means the degree of English homogeneity is overstated.
But England, excluding Scotland and Northern Ireland which
are not part of this analysis,

is a

territory about the

size of New York State and as such has much less cultural

diversity than the United States.

Even if one underscores

that ancient antagonism between Welshmen and Englishmen
and the contemporary intensity of Welsh nationalism,

England has not had two factors which are usually used as
the base definition of a pluralistic culture;

differences in religion and color.

significant

Economic situations

in the Commonwealth since World War II have of course

created an increase in racial and religious differences
along with increased consciousness and reaction to "color."

Immigrants from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent

brought England's non-white population to 800,000 in 1965,
and with an alleged high birth rate projections indicate a

non-white population of well over a million.

Restriction

to immigration, competition for jobs and housing have of
course created white reactions, but the English reaction to
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color is in many ways a reflection of its
homogeneity.

The non-white population is still only about
two percent
of the total population, and the reaction,
including race
riots as intense, if not as large, as any in the
United
States, can be viewed as a homogeneous culture
reacting to

"differences."

Even as a culture defined by a common

language, England is much more homogeneous than the
United

States, and this, together with the fact of a long common

historical experience and centralization of political
power, makes English society an insular archtype when

compared with the American "melting pot."
Lipset has remarked on the phenomenon of a homo-

geneous culture's ability to accommodate peaceful political
change within the context of its existing institutions.
In noting the importance of historical continuity, Lipset

observes that 10 out of 13 nations which he would label
"stable democracies" developed as constitutional monarchies. 43

Others make the argument that a homogeneous culture creates
a type of "psychic security" which enables people to be

less concerned with diversion from cultural norms.

This

could be offered as a partial explanation, for instance, of

why there apparently has been more of a conception of
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"un-American- than the notion of "un-British"
leave out color)

.

(if we

American ethnic pluralism, some would

maintain, has enabled deraogogues to define "American" as
a belief system, or ideology, rather than a network of

historical experiences common to the entire racial and
religious group, and immigrant groups have responded by
"over- identifying" with this ideological construction of

nationalism.

From this point of view, cultural pluralism

because of its divisive effect tends to create a hostile
environment for ideological conflicts and hence a hostile

environment for civil liberties.
Other scholars, such as Carl Friedrich, claim that
a homogeneous culture helps to create an authoritarian

outlook.
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While a society of any significant size

probably could not be authoritarian simply because of its
homogeneity, some argue that homogeneity is related to
intolerance.

The argument is that a pluralistic society

has a functional need for tolerance, whereas such an

attitude is not necessary in a group with a great deal of
homogeneity.

The diverse ethnic groups in the United

States, so the argument goes, may not "like" each other,

but the necessities of day-to-day living demand that they
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cooperate,

a plurality of groups and interests
can help

to instill a spirit of compromise
in a political culture

that may otherwise be lacking.

Tolerance, in this type

of situation, comes not from a
belief system, but from
the mere fact of physical proximity,
and the functional

necessity for groups to cooperate on
certain levels.

An

example of this type of "functional
tolerance," even though
there may be a great deal of verbally
expressed ethnocentricism, would be the lack of an established
church in
the United States, which some scholars maintain
is not due
to the lack of sentiment on the part of the
founding

fathers for a national religion, but rather the
fact that

there were numerous rival religious sects that wished
to

be the established church, and the functional solution
to
the problem was to have none.

This view of homogeneity

implies that a political culture with a great deal of

fundamental consensus can create a hostile environment for
the civil liberties tradition, and that ultimately a cul-

ture which experiences group conflict is more "tolerant"

than one which has limited exposure to cultural diversity.

From this perspective, pluralism enhances civil liberties
because it structures and institutionalizes social conflict.
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The existence of a federal system
in the United
States is perhaps the single greatest
institutional

reflection of American pluralism, and
the existence of the
51 interconnecting legal and administrative
networks that

characterize government in America has
perhaps had great
effect on stability, but has not historically
been advantageous to the application of libertarian
principles.

The

statutes we shall be analyzing in reference
to sedition
and obscenity have a more universal application
in Britain

than in the United States.

Sedition and obscenity statu-

tes exist in almost all of the separate states and
are

usually framed and applied in a more restrictive manner
than federal approaches to these problems.

The pluralistic character of American law is pri-

marily due to the division of political power on the basis
of geography, a system which was adopted out of the fear of

centralized authority exemplified by the English monarchy,
and out of the necessities of compromise among the thirteen
colonies.

It was also due in some measure to the original

colonial status of America and the legal pluralism of

Great Britain.
Mark De Wolfe Howe, speaking of the "pluralistic
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character of the

lav/s

of England," says that even though

Lord Mansfield was to utter from the King's Bench in
1772 that, "The state of slavery is so odious, that

nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law,"
imperial Britain was quite willing to encourage slave

trade between Africa and her American plantations.
courts found that although the

"...

English

common law of

England and the law of nature condemn slavery, positive
law and the law of nations sustain it.""*^

This pluralistic inheritance has, i believe, a
greater significance in American constitutional
history than has commonly been recognized. .
What the Nation needed . . . was what the Nation
inherited a tolerance sufficiently generous to
allow slavery in the South and permit abolition
in the North.
,

.

—

For Howe the essential fact of legality in the United States
is that it contains only those elements provided

by the

Constitution and by the statutes enacted by Congress,
which before the Civil War preserved a "deep and silent
neutrality with respect to slavery."

47

The refusal of

English judges to apply common law to British colonies,
and the American federal system, combined to deny, according
to Howe, federal judges the capacity of curcumventing

slavery by applying the common law.

The effect of the
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"pluralisnv" which is partly the result of the federal

system and partly of the English assumption that common
law applied only to England, was to remove the national

government from crucial struggles over rights.
This Nation's commitment to silence on the largest
issue that confronted the American people was at
once a distinctive and a startling contribution to
the art of government. Though war, constitutional
amendments, and economic revolution have vastly
altered the structure and the content of American
law, the old commitment to national silence and
national disability still serves to make American
federalism a significant impediment to the fulfillment of civil rights.^®
As large an impediment to the application of the

Bill of Rights as federalism was and perhaps still is in

th« United States, it must yet be understood that it is

also the existence of a federal system that has given the
federal judiciary such an important role in the govern-

mental process.

Generally speaking the Supreme Court has

enunciated a pro-nationalist sentiment with regard to
states, and has construed the Constitution as a compact

between the federal government and the people of the nation,
rather than a simple agreement among the several states
and the national government.

In the process of enunciating

a nationalist conception of the Constitution, the Supreme

Court also carved out a unique role for itself in the
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political process.

Federalism, checks and balances and

the separation of powers, and the other divisive struc-

tures so popular with the architects of the American

Constitution, were attempts to keep power responsible by

keeping it divided and in conflict.

But such division

and the conflict that such divisions are supposed to

engender necessitate an arbiter, and in the United States
this role of arbiter of the federal system was played by
the federal judiciary.
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And it is the power of the

Supreme Court, and the judiciary in general in the United
States, which has played a crucial role not only in the

search for doctrines to solve problems in a libertarian
manner but also as a great vehicle for "popularizing"

debate over civil liberties questions.

The potential that

a written bill of rights had for the political education

and socialization of the people was one of the arguments

Jefferson used to support the inclusion of the first ten
amendments, and Jefferson's prophecy had great merit,

because the Bill of Rights became a convenient decalogue
that could be at least recited in American schoolrooms.
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Conceptions of Authority
in Two Polities
Deferential Polity
By way of contrasting and summarizing all of the

discrepancies between the two systems that we have mentioned, the most all- inclusive difference between the
two

systems is what could be called the conception of authority
in each society.

We must be aware, of course, that when

we posit two different conceptions of authority in each
nation, we are creating artificial analytic categories

which like the categories "homogeneous" and "pluralistic"
cultures, are based on interpretations of past behavior,

and as such form 'frozen descriptions."

in societies

where the rate of change at tiroes seems to outpace the

recognition of such change, such static pictures of the
nation have obvious disadvantages, but since our purpose
is not primarily to describe, but to discern the relation-

ship to civil liberties problems in both nations, we shall

have to be content with descriptions which seem to fit the

general time period of 1945 to 1968.

The conceptions of

authority in particular are interpretations of broad
historical patterns and the differences we shall set in
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bold relief re™.i„ differences
i„ degree ,„d emphasis
rather than kind.
L.

S. Amery,

for example, who has written
on the

dual nature of perceptions of
authority, distinguishes

between a British and a Continental
view of representative
government. The Continental view,
and for our purposes
the American view, conceives of
political power as a delegation from the individual citizen
through the legislature
and an executive dependent upon
the legislature,

m

Britain, according to Amery, "Parliament
is not, and never

has been, a legislature in the sense
of a body specially

and primarily empowered to make laws."^°

Parliament

has as its principal function the
articulation of dissent
and opposition, and acts as a check
upon government, but
does not itself govern.

Harry Eckstein characterizes the

same phenomenon as the Englishman's "ambivalent"
approach

to the democratic principle of mandate.
In most democratic countries the idea of representative government, if not its practice, involves
a simple set of principles; ultimate authority
lies
in popular will, which is expressed in the election
of candidates whose chief function is to enact the
policies for which they campaigned and to represent
the interests of their constituents,
in Britain
the matter is much more complicated. British ideas
of representative government stress not only the
derivative character of political authority (i.e.,
that authority lies in popular will) but also its
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independent character (I.e., that authority
is exercised over, or regardless of, popular
will)
These two ideas are of course inconsistent, but the British believe in both
nevertheless; indeed this very want of logic
explains why their conception of authority,
democratic though it is, leaves such inordinately
great room for leadership. ^"^
.

This tendency of British public opinion to expect
their political leaders to

represent

.

.

."

"

govern more than to

is phrased in a somewhat different ver-

nacular by Almond and Verba, who describe the syndrome of

British political attitudes as a "deferential civic
culture."
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Both Britain and the United States are des-

cribed as having "civil cultures," meaning that participants are positively oriented to the political structure
and that there is a balance between participation and
obligation, but in Britain the balance is weighted

differently.

According to these authors:

British political culture represents a(n)
effective combination of subject and participant
roles. . . the development of the participant
orientation in Britain did not challenge and
replace the more deferential subject orientations,
as was the tendency in the United States. Despite
the spread of political competence and participant
orientations, the British have maintained a strong
deference tg the independent authority of
^
government.
.

.

.

The causes of this deferential attitude are usually
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connected to the historical continuity of British political institutions and the general cultural homogeneity
of British society, together with class stratification,

and an educational system which enhances aristocratic

deference.

Suspicious Polity
In contrast to the British attitude toward

authority, one could submit, Americans have historically

tended to be suspicious of government per se.

American

preoccupation with the fragmentation of political power
in the form of federalism,

separation of powers, checks

and balances and "state's rights,' reflect an essentially

negative or "suspicious* conception of authority on the
part of Americans.

The historical conditions that engen-

dered this attitude are probably not similar enough to

European history to enable one to characterize this view
as Amery's "continental perception of authority," but an

attitude distinctly different from that of the British
emerges.

This negative view of governmental authority is

partly a manifestation of the dominant ideology of the
United States and partly a reflection of the lack of

homogeneity in American culture.

Laissez-faire liberalism.
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the Influence of Loclce, Jefferson, and so forth, plus the
fact that this industrial expansion could make use of an

ideology emphasizing individual rights against the state,

especially property rights, help to condition this negative view of authority.

But a factor equally as important

as ideology was the fact that the divisive factors of

American society, such as regionalism, religion and
ethnic differentiation, necessitated diverse political

power because of the lack of consensus inherent in a

pluralistic society.

Almond and Verba note that American political
culture has a larger "participatory" component than almost
all other political cultures.

In the specific measures of subject competence
expectations of consideration by bureaucratic and
police authority the Americans drop to third
place among our five countries, below Britain and
Germany. This cultural imbalance, we have
suggested, is a result of American historical
experience with governmental and bureaucratic
authority an experience that began with distrust and
revolution against the British Crown, and that has
been consolidated by the American tendency to subject all governmental institutions, including the
judiciary and bureaucracy, to direct popular
control. ^

—

—

The eaaential ingredient for protection of individual
liberty is that power be exercised "responsibly."

Responsi-

bility in a democratic state means two different, and
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sometimes, conflicting things.

Responsible can mean

being accountable to the dominant sentiment of the
polity, or it can mean maintaining an open political

process in spite of the dominant sentiment of the polity.

Governmental control emerges as both a threat to liberty
and a protector of liberty.

The political cultures of

Britain and the United States indicate two subtle, but
differing, "Gestalten" on the protection of individual
liberty, one emphasizing the "popular control" aspects of

the democratic formula, and at the same time attempting

to limit governmental jurisdiction; the other emphasizing

responsible leadership and an active role of government.
Both approaches can be constructive or destructive for
the libertarian tradition.

The specific effect each has

on civil liberties conflicts will be our next concern as
we turn to the problem of seditious speech in both nations.

CHAPTER III
SEDITIOUS SPEECH IN GREAT BRITAIN

Seditious Libel

While words such as "treason" and
"sedition" are
related and in many ways parallel
concepts, sedition is

usually a more inclusive rubric designed
to cover speech

which could have a treasonable effect if
left unregulated.
"Ill opinions of the government" had
always been a major

concern of the Crown, and the invention
of printing,
while a technological advancement from
some perspectives,

also magnified the problem of controlling
hostile opinions
of the Crown,

it was traditionally considered a royal

prerogative to approve or deny a license for the
printing
of particular works.

To publish works without an imprimatur

was a criminal offense under Henry Vlll, and under

Elizabeth an elaborate system of licensing acted as
effective prior restraint on publishing.

Purely verbal

attacks on the Crown were dealt with under the category
"libel."

The point of departure for the modern law of

criminal libel is Sir Edward Coke's report of a star

Chamber case of 1609 in which it was established that libel
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against a private person gains part
of its justification
from the fact that such libel
"provokes revenge and

therefore tends, however remotely, to a
breach of the
peace.

Since libel tends to a breach of the
peace, a

libel against government is an even
greater offense, "for
it concerns

...

the scandal of government

^

Subsequent

common- law courts developed seditious libel,
along with
blasphemous, obscene, and private libel, into a
far-

reaching restraint on free expression.

Seditious libel

in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
became a

major instrument for controlling the press. ^

in 1704 in

the famous Tuchin'a case Chief Justice Holt underscored
the necessity of the concept of seditious libel by

asserting that if people cannot be called to account for
possessing ill opinions of the government

"...

no

government can subsist." 4
Until the eighteenth century, however, the
difference between "treason" and "seditious libel" connoted

only the degree of punishment the Crown wished for a
hostile speaker.

Since by Statute 25 Edward ill (1352)

part of the definition of treason was "compassing or
imagining the King's death,"

5

a person who printed a book
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which endorsed the right of revolution, as did William

Twyn in 1663, could be sentenced for treason rather than
seditious libel because the scope of his attack on the

Crovm went beyond mere "scandal" of government.^

After

1720, however, the idea of treason as a crime unconnected

with some overt act beyond mere words died out.^

Fredrick

Seaton Siebert suggests that the government found the law
of treason too limited as well as too cumbersome to con-

trol the state of public opinion during the succession
Q

crisis preceding the Hanoverian line.

Seditious libel,

while a less spectacular charge than treason, had the

benefit of being easier to justify because of less severe
punishment.

It was also easier to get convictions because

the King's Bench limited juries to simple findings as to

authorship or printing, with the decision of whether a

given article or utterance constituted libel reserved for
the bench as a "matter of law."

As the center of political

gravity shifted away from the monarch and to Parliament,
the latter developed techniques to protect itself from

criticism and to take appropriate action without recourse
to the courts.

A "breach of the privilege of Parliament,"

in addition to preventing unauthorized reports of its own
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proceedings, was Parliament's device to prohibit personal
libel on a member, bad reflections on Parliament in

general, reflections on the government including asper-

sions on the King and his ministers, as well as certain

types of obscenity and blasphemy.

While breaches of

privilege were frequently used by members of one House to

punish members of the other House, the largest number of
prosecutions by the House of Commons involved newspaper
publishers, printers, etc., who were charged with creating

"aspersions on the King," and there was little difference

between the House's concept of a "bad reflection on
government" and the common-law definition of seditious
libel.

A long series of libel prosecutions, with convictions made easy by the requirement that juries establish

only publication, resulted in Fox's Libel Act in 1792, which
allowed the jury to decide if the sentiment expressed constituted libel.

Juries sometimes broke the chain of dis-

tinctions which shackled them to facta of publication
even before this Act.

In a 1744 prosecution of a printer

named Miller, for example, the government sought punishment
for an offensive letter which appeared in a newspaper.
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parliament had been unable, for
technical reasons, to
proceed against the author of the
letter or the publisher
of the newspaper, and so turned
to the printer. After

being fined and imprisoned for two
months by Parliament,
Miller was charged with "seditious
libel," and the jury
was instructed to decide
letter.

only if Miller had printed the

This fact was openly admitted by Miller,
but the

jury found him "not guilty" of printing
the letter.
It is interesting to note that as
authority

became more democratic, the concept of
"sedition" became
less "personalized" —that is,

less an attempt to blunt

criticism of, first the Crown, then Parliament—
and became
more an offense against the general public.

The Libel

Act of 1792 defined sedition as any intent to
incite

disaffection against the Crown, the Government, the Church,
or to "incite feelings of will will and hostility between

different classes.

.

.

."

This newer formulation of sedition

was narrower to the extent that the charge must pivot on
the concept "intent to incite," but broader because it

sought to prevent the causing of "ill will" among non-

governmental groups in society,

in 1866 a group of

socialists were prosecuted for seditious libel because
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their particular message was intended to excite
hostility

between classes.

The jury, however, refused to return a

guilty verdict.
Sedition and seditious libel gradually became
less a companion charge to treason and more directed

toward incitement to riot and what in the United States

would be called "group libel.-

Since World war li the

specific phrases "sedition" or "seditious libel" do not
appear as frequent charges,

in 1947 an editor named

Caunt was charged with seditious libel after he wrote
articles assailing British Jews for sympathy with

Palestinian Jews.

Justice Birkett told the jury in this

case that it was their burden to decide whether the articles

had the effect, or if Caunt had the intention, of pro-

moting

"...

non-Jew."

12

violence and hostility between Jew and

The jury acquitted Caunt.

In 1954 the phrase "sedition" was involved in an

appeal before the Judicial Committee of the privy Council.
Ebenezer Theodore Joshua was charged on two counts of
sedition and one count of public mischief following a
speech he gave in November of that year in the colony of

Saint Vincent.

(This committee has appellate jurisdiction
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in cases coining from the
colonies, and in this case they

were reviewing a judgment of
the Court of Appeal of the
Windward island, and the Leeward
Islands in the Saint
Vincent circuit.) Joshua, in his
speech, allegedly stated
that the police were scheming
politically and storing up
an arsenal at headquarters in
order to " . . . shoot down
people when they decide to fight
for their rights.

Evidence was also given at the trial
that there was no
truth to the allegation that the police
were storing up
arms.

On the specific charges of sedition the
jury
failed to agree on the first count and
Joshua was acquitted

on the second,

on the charge of creating a public mis-

chief, however, the trial judge directed the
jury that

they must as a matter of law find the appellant
guilty of
the offense if they found that he spoke the
words com-

plained of by the authorities.

The authorities argued

that Joshua did, by means of certain false statements
in
* public speech, "agitate and excite certain section (sic)

of the public against the police, to the prejudice and
expense of the community.
Joshua's counsel argued that comments about public
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officials, even if they are police, could not be
said to

create a public mischief.

The record indicated no action

taken by Joshua or anyone else against the police or any
other individuals.

The judges in the Court of Appeal,

in reviewing the case,

cited much common law precedent,

however, to the effect that offenses which tend to pre-

judice or which cause

"expense to the public" justify

charges of the common law misdemeanor of causing a public
mischief.
"

.

.

.

These judges also reasoned that it was

settled law that the question whether an act

might tend to the public mischief was for the judge, and
not an issue of fact on which evidence might be given. "^^

The Court of Appeals also held that no evidence of
"expense to the community" was necessary because the
offense could be constituted either by prejudice or by
expense.

In this case the word expense in the charge was

simply superfluous, and the heart of the offense was the
"prejudice" Joshua created against the police.
In reviewing this appeal the Judicial Committee of

the Privy Council, in an opinion by Lord oaksey, with the

concurrence of Lord Keith and Sir deSilva, side-stepped
the question of whether, apart from cases of conspiracy.
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there is any common law offense of
effecting a public
mischief.

This was an issue on which there was
much con-

flicting judicial opinion, but Lord oaksey.
felt the appeal

could be disposed of without reaching
this general issue.

Their Lordships chose instead to reverse
the Court of
Appeals on three less abstract grounds.
First, even assuming that the crime of
public

mischief exists, Oaksey stated that it is the
jury's
function to decide whether simple facts about words
spoken

constituted the offense.

While it is a general principle

of British law that in a trial by jury the judge's
role

consists of directing the jury on matters of law, and the
jury's role is to judge the facts, the Court of Appeal

construed "fact" incorrectly.

There are, the Committee

held, simple facts such as whether Joshua did say the words
in question, but there are also more complex "facts" as

to whether the simple facts constitute the crime alleged.
It was a misdirection to tell the jury they roust convict
if they found the defendant had spoken the words alleged

and the Committee held such directions to
the function of the jury."

"

.

.

.

usurp

17

Lord oaksey claimed that a second ground for
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reversal was the use of the charge of effecting
a public

mischief along with charges of sedition with respect
to
the same speech.

Oalcsey suspected that the "mischief"

charge was not substantively different from the sedition
charges, except that conviction was guaranteed as long as

the trial judge held as a matter of law that Joshua's

speech was an offense.

Acquittal on the sedition charges

should have also brought acquittal on the "mischief"
charge, according to Lord oalcsey, because the result is

that "the jury found the appellant not guilty of sedition

but guilty of effecting a public mischief by malcing a
speech the mischief of which was allegedly seditious in
nature .

A third ground for reversal was that when an
indictment charges that a person "agitated" certain

sections of the public, the jury must be presented with

evidence that agitation existed.

Since the prosecution

offered no evidence that the public was agitated or
excited by Joshua's speech, the indictment could fall,

according to Lord oaksey, simply on grounds of insufficient
evidence

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council

is,

of
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course, endowed with great latitude when
construing the

common law.

Even though, in this case, it retreated

from any statements about the offense, it did
lay down a

rule which could only have more libertarian consequences

by insisting that the jury decide the question of public
mischief on the basis of evidence that there was in fact
some agitation of the public.

The words "sedition" and "seditious libel" have
not appeared in other cases since 1945, but this by no

means should suggest that the conduct which the government sought to punish with such concepts has gone untouched.
Sedition, both in the sense of incitement to illegal

action and as "group libel," is spread throughout many

statutory provisions.

The attempt of government to con-

trol speech which could possibly inflame certain subjects
of the realm and thereby breach the peace, which is at

the heart of the rationale for "seditious libel," has

been given renewed sanctity.
The Public Order Acts
The Public Order Act of 1936, with its prohibition
of the wearing of political uniforms and "the
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militarization of politics," was aimed expressly at Sir
Oswald Mosley and the Elackshirts, but contains two provisions which were controversial from the standpoint of

affording a citizen

raaxiraum

scope of free expression.

The

first, which was objected to at the time of passage by

the National Council for Civil Liberties, was the pro-

vision which gave to the chief police officer in an area
the discretion to disallow processions if he had a

"reasonable ground" for expecting serious public disorder.

The act also stipulated that a police officer could apply
to local authorities for an order prohibiting all public

processions of any class for a period not exceeding three
months if the "situation warrants."

Libertarians objected

to the use of this provision in the East End of London in
the late 1930 's when all processions, not simply Fascist

processions, were banned.

The second controversial part of the Act was the
incorporation of what was commonly known as the "Breathing
Act," or the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839, which pro-

hibited "threatening, abusive or insulting words or
behavior whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be
occasioned."

20

This was the charge frequently used to

check "heckling" at open air meetings.
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The National Council of Civil
Liberties had a

tortuous love-hate relationship with
these two parts of
the Act of 1936—being generally
suspicious of the dis-

cretionary power vested in the police, but
subscribing
totally to the "insulting words" proviso,
especially with
reference to anti-Semitic statements,

m

the years

immediately following World war li the Council's
criticism
of the use of the Act was usually that it was
being applied

to all speeches and demonstrations, rather than
specifically

against Fascists.

The prevalent fear that Fascist groups would break

up meetings of which they disapproved— a fear shared by
the NCCL

—was

the rationale used to prevent groups from

renting both public and private meeting halls.

The logic

extended not simply to Fascist groups, but to opposing
groups which might attract Fascists,

in 1948 the NCCL

was refused the use of Central Hall, Westminster (one of

London's largest halls), when it wished to co-sponsor

along with the London Trades Council a discussion of the

growth of Fascist and anti-Semitic propaganda in the
country.

21

The Council could only obtain the use of a

smaller London hall by omitting the word "Fascist" from
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the title of the meeting.

The NCCL objected to the

refusal to rent halls to the Communist Party,
the Zionist

Federation and the Trades Council Movement, and was
critical of the police in London for breaking up
numerous openair meetings on the "pretext" of obstructing the
highway.

Physical violence by Fascists had taken place, however,
at meetings of the Labour Party, Communist Party,
Zionist

Federation, British-Soviet Society, and the Youth Movement
in 1948, and led the Council to criticize the police
for

failure to take action against anti-Semitic speakers.
In the NCCL Annual Report of 1949 the following incident

was reported:

The Council has been much concerned at the widespread increase of inflammatory ant i- Jewish
speeches from public platforms which have gone
on unchecked by police officers present at the

...
... A

time.

particularly shocking, but by no means
untypical, example is that of a woman speaker at a
Union Movement meeting in Marylebone who stated,
•Gas chambers are too good for the Jews.
Although
eight police-constables and two sergeants were
present no action was taken. This example was
given to the Home Secretary by a member of the
NCCL's deputation to him in June.
At another Union open-air meeting it was
reported to us that the speaker made a statement
to the effect that he would be glad to see gas
chambers built for some of his audience, and would
in fact, help in the building of them.
Again
although requested to do so by the individual who
sent us the report, the police refused to intervene.
•
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English libertarians and

"

provocative speech "

The Council attempted to justify police intervention in the above instances by claiming that, "Such statements are clearly an abuse of freedom of speech.

...

it

has never been permissible to use remarks of so provocative a character against any religious section in this

country other than the Jews." 24

The Council's position

involved more than simply a demand to give Jews as much

protection from invective as other religions have, however.
It involved the more general criteria of "provocative

speech.
It is clear that, however much self-control
is exercised by the religious section subjected
to abuse, sooner or later it must lead to dis In the past ... it has
turbances of public order
always been the practice when religious minorities
have been concerned for the authorities to stop
the abuse. Today no steps are taken to stop the
provocation, and when disturbances of public order
take place, the authorities tend to meet the problem
by restricting the liberties of all.
The NCCL has always held the view that it
should be illegal for such remarks to be made and
the deliberate propagat ion of race ^gtred and anti .
semitism should be prevented
.

.

.

.

The Council took the same attitude toward certain
proposed marches, as in its 1948 appeal to the Home

Secretary to stop a May Day march by Mosley in Hackney.
This was to be Mosley' s first outdoor meeting since 1940,
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and the Council claimed that he had chosen a
borough with
a large Jewish minority and that the
meeting and pro-

cession could -only be regarded as deliberate incitement
to trouble.

..." 26

The Council's prediction of "trouble"

turned out to be accurate, and even though 834 police
were assigned to the procession, fighting broke out and

resulted in 31 arrests.

The Home Secretary argued that

he did not have the authority to prevent any meeting from

being held, but that he could (and did) give consent to
the Commissioner of Police to use his discretion about

the political climate in general and the possibility of

civil disorder and to ban all processions for a period of
three months.

The Council objected to this general ban

by invoking two different arguments.

First, it claimed,

the "misuse" of traditional democratic rights of speech

and assembly by some led to the limitation of the rights
of all persons and groups.

Innocent groups which did not

create disorder, they argued,

v/ere

Fascist groups did create disorder.

being punished because
The Council's second

argument was that Mosley and his ilk desired a general

ban on all groups because their major objective was to
silence democratic expression.

27
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The standard the NCCL wished to have applied in
this kind of situation involved a prior assessment of the

probability of disorder.
Where a meeting is so provocative of the normal
sens ibi lit ies of its audience as to be calculated
to provoke disorder and in fact does provoke
disorder, the responsibility has been considered
to be on the police to prevent it by closing the
meet ing. ^®

This standard urged by the Council has several problems,
not the least of which is that it is anticipatory in

character and therefore must involve a prior assessment
of social disorder.

While there is certainly nothing

unreasonable about wishing to foretell disturbances in
order to prevent them, such an attempt at prediction

necessarily involves an increase in police discretion.
Since the NCCL annually assails broad grants of discretion
to the police, this seems to be a formula designed to

guarantee criticism of the police for either acting or not
acting against a speaker.

The Council, in the period

between 1945-60, was in the awkward position of urging
essentially a form of prior restraint against Fascist
marches and the application of "insulting words" to antiSemitic speakers, but in somewhat different contexts
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criticizing police for prior restraint and
"anticipating
problems."

m

1951,

for example, the Council was extremely

critical of the London police for stopping numerous
public speeches in traditional meeting places on
grounds
of traffic obstruction.

Frequently the police stopped

meetings before any of the crowd actually blocked traffic
and were scolded by the Council for "anticipating" traffic

congestion and instructed to act only if there actually
were traffic congestion,

if confronted with this incon-

sistency, the NCCL could perhaps respond by indicating

that the discretion involved in the traffic instances was

merely a "pretext" used by the police.

The essential

point, however, remains that if nnly a concrete instance

of something undesirable (such as traffic congestion) can
insure that police are not acting by subterfuge, the same

criteria ought to apply to other undesirable circumstances,
such as riotous meetings.

More important than any apparent contradictions
about the proper scope of police discretion in the NCCL's
standard, however, is the factor deemed most appropriate
for controlling the range of permissible speech.

If

police, or anyone else, are guided by the standard that
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speech -so provocative of the
normal sensibilities" is
not to be permitted, it would put
the audience, and per-

haps not even the intended audience,
in control of what is
said.

"Normal sensibilities" would presumably
vary

greatly from audience to audience, and
while such a situational criterion could be an asset in
terras of solving

real problems, it places the burden
of prediction on the
speaker.

Even if we assume that a speaker bears some

responsibility for the disorders caused by those
who disagree with him, the "normal sensibilities"
standard is
an attempt to isolate and evaluate not overt
behavior,

but rather the probable psychology of the listener.
In 1962, however, the Council was to criticize

the "insulting words and behavior" provision of the Act
of 1936 on the ground that it gave police the power to

prohibit processions not only on a particular occasion
but also "of a particular character.

In the 1960 's

the groups using strident language had changed, and the

Council complained that the Public Order Act was being used
in circumstances far removed from those of the Fascist

marches in the immediate pre-war years.

Even in the 1950 's

the NCCL objected to what it felt to be the improper
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application of the statute, such as the conviction
and
L50 fine of a person displaying a poster near
the U. S.

Embassy claiming that the Rosenbergs were being "framed
as part of the drive to silence fellow trade
unionists

and peace workers."

or the charge of "insulting behavior"

levelled in 1953 at a man who had witnessed what he

believed to be a wrongful arrest of another man and
demanded that police take his name as a witness for the
defense,

in the course of explaining his position the

individual shook his fist and resorted to "improper
language" which the police found insulting, but the

Magistrate dismissed the case because he felt the charge
was inappropriate.^^

The Council never complained of the

validity of attempting to regulate "provocative" speech

divorced from any instance of disorder.

Their objections

usually consisted of the request that the Act was designed
for, and by implication at least should be restricted to.

Fascist groups.
There can be several explanations offered for the

Council's concern to regulate Fascist demonstrations.
First, as is the case with libertarian groups in the

United States, the Council draws members from a constituency
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which overlaps the Jewish

coniraunlty.

Secondly, and this

is only a casual observation based on
the tone rather

than the content of some of the Council's
reports, the

NCCL perceives itself as somewhat more a member
of the
"Anti-Fascist Front" than groups such as the American

Civil Liberties Union.

But a more credible explanation

than either of the above, though they may be partial
influences, is the sensitivity in the NCCL, which is

also reflected in the press, public opinion, and the law,
to defamation and its consequences.

Legally this is

reflected in the much more drastic restraint the English
law of libel places on the press than American law.

The

guide editors must use is to question whether any item in

their columns will "tend to lower the individual to whom
it refers in the estimation of right-thinking persons

generally, or to bring him into hatred, ridicule, or
contempt, or to exclude him from the society of his fellow
men."
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Politically and socially it is reflected in the

enthusiasm of the press and the NCCL over the Race Relations

Act of 1965 which attempts to punish racial insults.
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English courts and

"

insulting/ speech
'

English courts, cannot, of course, strike
legislation, but they can alter the utility of
an act both by

interpretation of the act itself and by deciding
whether
the use of the statute is appropriate to
specific conditions.

In 1967, for example, the Oxford Magistrate's

Court dismissed charges against five picketers who
were
demonstrating their opposition to the racial exclusion
policy of a local hairdresser.

Police invoked the Public

Order Act by claiming that the picketers "displayed insulting signs whereby a breach of the peace was likely to

be occasioned."

The Magistrate, in addition to pointing

out the lack of evidence for actual "insults" scolded

police for inappropriate use of the Act on the ground that

what the police actually were attempting was the charge
of unlawful picketing through the use of the 1936 Act.

The question of the right to picket in Britain holds a
rather obscure position, with clarification actually

being a highly discretionary police function based on an
assessment of circumstances.

In the Trades Dispute Act

of 1960, for example, a picket is only lawful:

1)

"merely

for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating
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information," or

2)

"merely for the purpose of peacefully

persuading any person to work or abstain from
working."

The picketers could presumably be protected
by the Act's
permission to "communicate information," but the
NCCL
claims that the Act enables police to set severe
limits
on the number of picketers and makes effective picketing
•*

.

.

.

virtually impossible if the police decide to

clamp down."
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In two other cases, however, the application of

the Act and the meaning of "insulting words" was greatly

extended.

In Jordan v. Burgoyne the Queens* Bench reversed

the London Quarter Sessions Court and upheld a conviction
for "insulting words" in a case reminiscent of America's

Terminiello v. Chicago

,

except for the radically different

criteria employed by the Queen's Bench.

The facts in this

case stem from an address given by John Jordan before a

group of about 5,000 people at a public meeting in
Trafalgar Square in 1962.

in the front ranks of this

crowd there were reportedly between two and three hundred

young people.

This group, the court record states, con-

tained Jews, supporters of the campaign for nuclear disarmament, and Communists.

Jordan,

speech used the following words:

in the course of his
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more and more people every day . . . are
.
.
.
opening their eyes and coming to say with
us:
•Hitler was right.' They are coming to say
that our real enemies, the people we should
have fought, were not Hitler and the National
Socialists of Germany but world Jewery (sic)
and its associates in this country. 33

This statement by Jordan, while obviously impolitic, also turned out to be illegal because of the
activity

which followed, and the judicial assertion that such
activity was Jordan's fault.
George Burgoyne, Superintendent of the Metropolitan
Police, was in the vicinity of the speaker's platform and

was responsible for maintaining peace.

There was reportedly

heckling throughout the entire meeting in all parts of the
crowd, but the people immediately in front of the speaker's

platform made repeated attempts to attack the platform.

After Jordan made his statement about the wisdom of
National Socialist policy in Germany, there was complete
disorder and a "general surge forward by the crowd toward
the speaker's platform."

34

The police had great diffi-

culty in restoring order, and twenty members of the crowd
were arrested for breach of the peace.
under Section

5

Jordan was charged

of the Public Order Act of 1936 for using

"insulting words."

In the Bow Street Magistrate's Court

92

he was convicted and sentenced to
two months'
imprisonment.
I

On appeal to the London Quarter Sessions
the conviction was reversed on the ground that
Jordan's words

would not have led an "ordinary and
reasonable" citizen
to a breach of the peace.

The Quarter Sessions explained

that they allowed appeal against conviction
because, while

highly insulting, Jordan's words could only
result in
conviction if they led to a breach of the peace.

Quarter

Sessions claimed that Jordan's words preceded a breach
of the peace, but that the Public Order Act was
aimed at

incitement of an ordinary reasonable citizen, and, in

their view, Jordan's listeners didn't fall into either
category.

Quarter Sessions was essentially saying that

the words in Section

5

that read

"...

whereby a breach

of the peace was likely to be occasioned," should be con-

strued to mean

"...

likely to lead to a breach of the

peace by the ordinary and reasonable citizen. "^^

Burgoyne appealed to the Queen's Bench Division.
Lord Parker, with the concurrence of Judges Ashworth and
Winn, claimed he had great difficulty in "understanding

what Quarter Sessions was intending to convey."

For Lord
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Parker the lower court's
reference to "ordinary and
reasonable- citizens incorporates
into the statute a
"hypothetical audience."

The danger of interpreting
the

statute to include this
hypothetical audience, according
to Lord Parker, is that it
overlooks the special nature
of this crowd and assumes that
there was no one in the
audience intent upon breaking up
the meeting. This

criticism of Lord Parker's incorrectly
implies that
Quarter Sessions did not realize
the volatile nature of
the crowd, when in effect the lower
court was simply
stating that because the nature of
the crowd was not
•ordinary and reasonable," the disorder
was not Jordan's
fault.

The function of the hypothetical audience
for

Quarter Sessions was to shift culpability
for the disorder, whereas for Lord Parker the
predisposition of the

crowd toward violence places greater restraint
on the
speaker.

Even if one assumes. Lord Parker stated,
that

the "persons present are a body of hooligans,"
if the

words used "threaten, abuse or insult," then the
speaker
is guilty of the offense.
"

.

.

.

,36

them."

According to

r.ord

Parker

the speaker must take his audience as he finds
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Interpretation of the Act with
reference to the
synthetic, rational audience is
incorrect according to
the Queen'B Bench, but even using
that criterion. Lord
Parker claims that he cannot
imagine any reasonable
citizen, certainly one who was a
Jew, not being provoked
beyond endurance
Evidence that some menibers of the

"...

crowd wanted to stop Jordan from
speaking, which was the
factor which inclined the Quarter
Sessions to excuse
Jordan, was a factor which, for Parker,
added to the

wrongfulness of Ms action.

The police had successfully

prevented the people in the crowd from obstructing
the
speakers, but Jordan, in his opening statement,
according

to Parker, deliberately insulted the people
that the police

had successfully prevented from interfering with
him.^^
This alone, he stated, constituted a clear
contravention
of the Act.
Jordan, who acted as his own counsel in this case,

and did so according to Lord Parker "with great skill and
industry," had argued that police invocation of the Public

Order Act was an inroad into a citizen's freedom of
speech.

For the Queen's Bench the action did not curtail

any rights of free expression, because Jordan's words
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amounted to verbal assault.

Lord Parker explained:

A man is entitled to express his own views
as
strongly as he likes, to criticize his
opponents,
to say disagreeable things about his
opponents

and about their policies, to do anything
of that
sort, but what he must not do— and these
are the
words of the Act— he roust not threaten, he
must
not be abusive and he must not insult them,
•insult' in the sense of liit b^r words . ^

The Queen's Bench could have held with Quarter
Sessions on the same ground, or they could have upheld

even without the reasonable audience test, by claiming
that Jordan's speech did not constitute a verbal "hit."

The Quarter Sessions had essentially said that Jordan was
not guilty of "incitement."

Lord Parker was to rule that

"incitement" does not, alone, constitute the crime des-

cribed in the Act.

Speech which is a "hit by words" is

what the statute seeks to regulate, and Jordan was guilty
of several hits.
Once again, as in the case with seditious libel

when it covers group defamation, there is an obvious sense
in which people can be "hit by words"

— sometimes

pain as real and damaging as a physical blow.

with a

But as a

guide in delineating the permissible area of speech it

places ultimate authority for what is said on the listener.

This is perhaps of some value when the listener is not in
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a volitional situation, such as in sound
truck speech or

public speeches in areas not typically used for such
purposes and where the listener cannot easily get rid
of the

speaker by leaving the meeting or in some fashion "clicking
off" the message,

in the present situation the audience

was in no sense captive, and Jordan received a two-month

sentence for insulting people who were already insulted.

Since Lord Parker ruled out any abstract criteria which

would define "insult" with reference to the average man,
the "hit by words' must be related to the pain threshold
of Jordan's audience, which, one could submit,

vras

close

to zero.

The NCCL, not noticeably irate about the ruling
in the Jordan case, did express concern over a 1966 case
in which the insulting words provision was greatly extended.

This case concerned the prosecution in the Divisional

Court of Gwyneth Williams after she handed out leaflets
addressed to "American Soldiers in Europe" to American
servicemen outside a residential club in Lancaster Gate.

This leaflet criticized U. S. involvement in Vietnam,
using what the NCCL classified as "restrained and temperate
language."

The NCCL also claimed that the pamphlet was
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not designed to provoke passion.

The judges, however,

held the pamphlet to be insulting because it invited its

I

i

readers, if they accepted its arguments, to "consider
40
deserting."
The Council felt that the judges were in

I

1

I

effect saying that it was "insulting" to aak a soldier to
i

consider a certain point of view.

The argument used by

the defense in this case was that soldiers, as morally

responsible and rational persons, would not be insulted

by being asked to consider whether they had a higher duty
than their military obi ig It ion.

The judges were not

'

impressed, however, and the Council bitterly noted, "The

Nuremburg decrees established that every individual has a

I

duty to determine for himself the legality of his country's
actions.

But English law now forbids us even to ask

servicemen to consider this duty!"

41
|

i

In the 1950

's

the NCCL had been successful in

getting several charges under the Act dismissed, as in

!

I

1951 when a Magistrate dismissed a prosecution for

insulting words and behavior against a person collecting

signatures for a peace petition.

But in 1963 the Criminal

Court of Appeal extended the Act to include almost all
forms of actual and potential breaches of the peace.

i

I

i
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Police in Ramsgate charged John ward with
violating Section
5

of the Act when he was involved in a
family brawl,

ward appealed his conviction to the Kent
Quarter Sessions,
and at the end of the prosecution's case
that court stopped

proceedings and allowed appeal to the Court of
Criminal

Appeal because it understood the Public Order Act
was
"limited to conduct at political meetings and the
like
and in the course of political and similar processions
and could not be extended to disputes between
neighbors.

42
.

.

Lord Parker ruled that the Act did apply to

domestic disputes by arguing that even though it was quite

easy to demonstrate that it was not Parliament's intent
to cover neighborly disagreements under the statute, the
intent of Parliament is only judicially relevant when the

controlling and operative words of an act are ambiguous.

Section

5

was not ambiguous for Lord Parker.

Since it

was designed to preserve peace and order, both in the
sense of keeping the public orderly and keeping public

places orderly, he therefore saw no reason for "limiting
the operation

.

.

."of the

Act.

43

It is important to note here that the lower courts
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and Quarter Sessions made attempts
to restrict the Act
to a narrower class of behavior,
with the Queen's Bench

being reluctant to restrain the use
of the Act.

m

the

ward case the Quarter Sessions asked,
"Why invoke the
Public order Act?," and Lord Parker replied,
without much
judicial elaboration, "Why not?"

CND Deroonstr at ions
The MCCL and the CND
The increasing frequency of conflict between the

police and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the
"Student Left" became the focal point for English liber-

tarians in the 1960 's.

Problems were compounded by the

fact that after 1961 the CND became enthused with "direct

action" rather than more routine methods of express ion.

The NCCL took the position that resort to civil disobedience in order to gain support for a policy was not
justifiable because

"...

the people of a democratic

country should argue their policies rather than attempt
to impose them by force, even if the force is non-violent.'
It did, however, support many of the CND complaints about

police attendance at indoor meetings of the CND; police
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photographing deraonatrations (justified by some
local
police as private curiosity rather than professional
interest)

j

the deportation of an American student who

was a leader in the CND; as well as general support
of
the CND's claim that they were denied access over both
the
BBC and independent television.

It also supported com-

plaints about the refusal of public agencies, such as the
British Railways, to accept "political" advertising.

The CND has had problems obtaining meeting halls and has
claimed that bail is frequently excessive for its members.
It also claims that "binding over"

—a

process whereby a

person can be "enjoined" to keep the peace for a specified
period, even though no offense has been proven, and which,
if broken, can result in imprisonment without trial,

proof of offense, or appeal
against them.

— is

discriminatorily practiced

Most of the NCCL's concern, however, has

been with the prevention of over-reactions on the part of
the police to demonstrations which have both legal and

illegal aspects.

After publishing a special report

entitled "Public Order and the Police" which complained
of unnecessarily violent handling of sit-down demonstrators

belonging to the Committee of 100 in 1961, the NCCL began

101

to issue credentials to "observers" at demonstrations
in
the hope that their presence might discourage the
out-

break of violence.

These observers usually attempted to

prepare balanced reports after demonstrations which evaluated both the demonstrators and police.

Following a

Grosvenor Square demonstration in 1968, for example, the
Council criticized "minority troublemakers" and some
instances of the "provocative use of police forces," but

nonetheless complimented most police who, it felt, were
"admirably restrained considering the hostility of the
46
^
crowd."
According to the NCCL the relationship of the

police with the public deteriorated in the 1960 's,

especially with "particular groups such as young people,
colored people, demonstrators and motorists,

..."

The

deterioration, they are fond of noting, is much less

severe than in the United States (the most prevalent

complaint was the use of mounted police to break up
crowds, rather than "brutality").

The Council has also

expressed sympathy for police who fall victims of a situa-

tion provoked originally perhaps by one or two irritable
exchanges between officers and demonstrators.

Police,

the Council claims, by their mere physical presence at
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demonstrations, become a "target for
the pent-up frustra-

tions and a substitute for the
policies which are the

original object of the protest. "^^
Activities and the Police and Courts
The Public order Act, even though subject
to broad
judicial interpretation, was not usually
invoked against

the newer forms of propaganda and protest.

Attempts to

stop CND activities when no disorder was
involved included

the resurrection of the ancient Metropolitan
Streets Act
of 1867 which requires permission of the
Commissioner of

Police to advertise with handbills.

The Act was used

extensively in 1963 against the Committee of 100 for

distributing leaflets without the necessary permission.

The NCCL, noting that the only other time the statute had

been used politically was against suffragette organizations, claimed the London police were engaging in deliberate

harrassment of the CND.

The charge "willfully disregarding

the Commissioner's regulations" was also widely used and
is essentially failure to disperse when so ordered

police.

by the

This involves instructions at a demonstration

Which has been given approval, but which because of subsequent developments the Commissioner has decided to
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disperse.

Such a power is obviously necessary if the

police are to disband disorderly demonstrations.

Having

the discretion extend to meetings which might be
but are
not disorderly, along with the fact that prior
approval

has already been given, can lead to great confusion
and

even disorder.

Such a situation existed in 1966 when the

British Council for Peace in Vietnam obtained police per-

mission for a demonstration in Grosvenor Square (American
Embassy) which was promptly dispersed by the police when

the Committee of 100 arrived with the march.

Demonstrators

were informed of the Commissioner's decision verbally by
loudspeakers, and many claimed they did not hear the

instructions.

Those who did, seeing no disorder and having

followed all proper channels in the planning of the demonstration, viewed the police action as arbitrary.

Appellate courts in two instances passed down
rules which narrowed police authority with reference to

demonstrations.

The first involved the Divisional Court's

ruling in 1967 which eroded the famous "sessional order."

The sessional order is a House of Commons directive to
the police made at the start of each session to insure

that there is no disorder in the neighborhood.

Since 1839

104

the Comintssioner of Police, operating
under the mandate
of the sessional order, has formulated
regulations which
included the right to ban all processions and
assemblies
and "causes of obstruction" in the area
while Parliament
is sitting.

The operating formula used by police, and

generally believed by the public to be a ruling by
parliament itself, was that Parliament was insulated
by a

one-mile demonstration- free zone.

After a Bow Street

magistrate had convicted participants in a stationary
(and peaceful)

"vigil" at the juction of Whitehall and

Downing Streets, Divisional Court sent the case back to
the magistrate with the direction that the magistrate

must be satisfied, without hearing fresh evidence, that
the defendants were obstructing or could potentially

obstruct MP's or create a breach of the peace.
re-hearing, the defendants were acquitted.

On

The effect

of the Divisional Court ruling was to limit police power

severely in reference to peaceful demonstrations in central
London and to make justification for police intervention
swing on the behavior of the demonstrators, rather than

simply on some arbitrary zone around Parliament.
In 1963 the Court of Criminal Appeal reversed the
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conviction of George Clark in the London
Criminal Sessions

Court for inciting people to commit a public
nuisance by
unlawfully obstructing the highway during a
demonstration
against Queen Frederika in July of that year.

The Court

of Appeal, while undoubtedly influenced by
the severity
of the sentence (eighteen months' imprisonment),
stated

that for an obstruction to be unlawful it must
constitute

an unreasonable use of the highway, and that a "peaceful

demonstration is not prima fac ie unreasonable."^^
On charges arising from the same demonstration,

Peter Moule and Terrance Chandler were indicted for the

common law offenses of conspiracy and incitement to public
disorder.

These charges ^re dismissed, but the two were

imprisoned for four and nine months respectively on

charges of inciting people to commit a public nuisance.
It is with reference to Chandler that a vindictive motiva-

tion on the part of the government seems to emerge.

This

is not based on the frequency of conflict between Chandler

and the police, which was extensive (he was also convicted

under the Official Secrets Act, which we shall discuss
later) but rather his conviction under the Forgery Act of
1913.

This action would seem to reflect police impatience
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with his political activism because
he was convicted for
"counterfeiting" under the Act when he
was
found in

possession of two litho plates used to
make mock U. S.
"dollars."

The "dollars" contained political slogans
and

were of a color which clearly distinguished
real thing.

thera fro^i,

the

Chandler and six others were convicted and

conditionally discharged for three years.

The

IJCCL

objected strenuously to the use of Old Bailey and
••thousands of pounds of public money

...

in a futile

campaign to harass a few politically active young people. "^^
Political speech, of course, can take many more
forms than simply demonstrations and speaking before large

audiences,

since the form as well as the content of

political speech can be as varied as self-expression and
social interaction itself, the charges employed to regulate political speech can be highly varied,

if the form

of protest about the Vietnewj War is through paintings, it
can be subject to removal from an exhibit on aesthetic
grounds, as in Croyden in 1967.

it is, then, virtually

impossible to distinguish between supression of a political

point of view and suppression of bad art, though the NCCL
assumed the former.

34

Or if it is a play, such as
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"Macbird," a satire on President Lyndon
B. Johnson, the

Lord Chamberlain was formerly able, as he
did in 1967,
to refuse a license on the ground that "it
presents a

head of state of a friendly power in an
unfavorable light. "^^

The place as well as the medium can become important
in
determining the legality of the political speech, as
when
two persons were convicted of

"

indecency in church" after

they called the Foreign Secretary a hypocrite during his
reading of a sermon in a Methodist church service which
preceded the Labour party Conference in 1967.

The two

received two-month sentences under the 1860 Ecclesiastical

Court Jurisdiction Act, and their appeal was rejected by
the

Ijord

Chief Justice on the assumption that controversial

matters should not be raised in sacred places, and this

disturbance could be regarded as indecent within the meaning
^
of^ the
Act.

56

The libertarian issue becomes, in this

kind of case, whether the "other social interest" is
sufficiently real to avoid any indication of a simple
pretext to silence unpopular opinion.

The NCCL views

denial of soundtruck permits as such a pretext, but the
simple fact that permits are easier to obtain for official
electioneering, which they use to butreas their case for
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discriminatory police discretion, could
also be viewed as
a temporary relaxation of neighborhood
tranquility in the

name of the fairly infrequent demands
of electoral poli-

tics in a democracy.

The churc

i

incident is compounded

by the fact that party politics and religious
services
were not only mixed but involved the same
personnel.

Given an element which views anything public and verbal
as a legitimate forum for public debate,

it is perhaps

wise to remind people, in principle at least, that there
are some aspects of life which,
at least non-political,

if not "sacred,"

should be

a two-month sentence, on the other

hand, seems a harsh way to drive home a lesson about social

propriety, and there is some utility in distinguishing
(for purposes of punishment) between behavior which is in

bad taste and perhaps necessitates removal and that which
is

truly criminal.

Freedom of Expression
and National Security
Pol it ical Activities and Employment

Just as a libertarian interest in free expression
must be weighed against probable public disorder and

community tranquility, freedom of expression and political

1
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association are also, most would hold, subject
to some
restrictions when the people in question are
involved

with national security.

Their political beliefs and

association offer one kind of evidence as to their
ability
to maintain the degree of trust or "loyalty"
that such

positions require.

Even though Britain has never used

"loyalty oaths" for governmental employment, Britain
has

governmental security programs designed to protect against
infiltration and reinforce the necessary secrecy in matters
of national security.

This concern extends also to labor

unions, personnel in private corporations with defense

contracts, and aliens wishing to enter the United Kingdom.

Political parties are sufficiently disciplined tc make
their rulings about associations quasi-official, but

Britain cannot be viewed as having a counter -part to the

American Attorney General's list.

Major parties have lists

of "proscribed organizations," meaning that membership in

any of the listed organizations is "incompatible with

membership in the party."

But this list is shorter, and

more cautiously drawn than the American list, and of

course relates only to party membership.

Since 1946 the

Labour party's constitution has restricted membership to

those not owing allegiance to "political
organizations
abroad."

The Co-operative Party, an organization
of

independent co-operative societies affiliated
with the
Labour Party for political purposes, was faced
with the

problem of many Communists holding posts of secondary
importance and instituted what amroounted to a disclaimer

affidavit for members of the national cormnittee and the
central governing body. 57

Civil servants who are dismissed for security
reasons have recourse to an administrative tribunal which

makes the initial recommendation about an employee's reliability.

There

is

no counsel allowed in this procedure nor

any higher appeal since the tribunal only acts as an
advisory board for the minister, who takes ultimate
responsibility for dismissal.

This was instituted in

1948 in an attempt to "tighten" security measures, and

was "tightened" again in 1952 when people engaged in
secret work or handling of secret material were required

to answer a questionnaire and disclaim association in

Communist or Fascist groups.

The most important charac-

teristics of the governmental security programs are that

they are designed to effect only the possibly "disloyal"

Ill

in certain sensitive positions; efforts
are made to

transfer "risks' to areas where their
associations or

beliefs would not be inimical to security.^®

The security

program is therefore directed at the specific
objective of
insuring secrecy rather than a general denial
of govern-

mental employment to alleged subversives.

Designation of

a "sensitive" position is, of course,
not easy, and the

practical effect of security regulations was most felt
at the Ministry of Supply since virtually all war produc-

tion contracts, atomic research, etc., pass through its
jurisdiction.

The most controversial designations of

"sensitive areas" are probably the Ministry's concern over

telephone technicians.

However, one of the most cele-

brated cases concerned the absence of a sensitive designation before the Ministry of War's inclusion of couriers.

This was done after a one-armed messenger who delivered
dispatch cases and sold the Daily Worker while on the job
received great newspaper publicity.

The individual was

transferred to another ministry but was never told to
stop selling the Daily Worker

59
.

The problem of Communists in civil service unions
has also caused some controversy and led to a judicial
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inquiry under the leadership of
Lord Justice Radcliffe
in 1963.

The Radcliffe report, while not
suggesting that

any union official ever had obtained
secret information,
did suggest that the situation was
a possible danger.

After 1963 the government was empowered
to notify a union
that it considered an official unreliable
for security
reasons.
roan

The union official has recourse to
the three-

tribunal, and if not sustained, probably
(although

this remains somewhat obscure), is removed
from being an

official or the union is denied affiliation
with a governmental department,

in 1963 two conflicts arose in this

connection; one concerning a technician's union
(telephone) official who reportedly met in social
gatherings

with diplomats from Communist count ires, and the second
concerning an official of a manual worker's union who was
refused permission by the office of the Minister of Science
to enter the atomic research establishment at Aldermaston.
In the latter case the official was a member of the British

Communist Party but desired to enter only the canteen and
administrative block.

The rationale for the government's decisions about
security risks is usually not disclosed, and, as in the two
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instances above, the NCCL can only
speculate as to the

real reasons.

The rationale cannot even be gleaned
through

Parliamentary question periods,

in 1956, for example,

the Ministry of Supply had asked that a
chemical company

dismiss one of its solicitors on the ground
that he was a

security risk.

Since the firm could not be awarded govern-

ment contracts unless it could comply with
security
standards, the individual was dismissed, and because
he

was not a governmental employee he had no legal
recourse
or administrative appeal,

when asked by the opposition

in parliament for the charges against the solicitor,
the

Minister of Supply resorted to claims of ministerial
responsibility and "security" to avoid giving any answer.

Two years later the justification given by the government
(which the NCCL assumed to be the total justification)

was that the solicitor's wife, before marriage, had been
a member of the Communist party. 60

The notion of minis-

terial responsibility along with the cloak of security,
acts in the view of many, to reinforce governmental secrecy
in security dismissals.

Some, such as Harry Street, argue

that ministerial responsibility causes innumerable cases
of Englishmen being denied access to the Courts in
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situations where "judicial scrutiny
is standard practice
in the rest of the Western
World."^^ The government's
refusal to disclose their
rationale may, but need not
necessarily, imply that the action
is arbitrary,

m

fact

the secrecy surrounding the security
program can have, as
Wilson and Glickman have noted,
quite beneficial liber-

tarian effects.

Although the accused people have diffi-

culty getting reasons, there is also
no "trial by accusation" in the press, and the secrecy
of the government and

their standards can also make it
difficult for outside

groups to attack employees on loyalty
grounds.

The

government was noticeably unresponsive to a
plea from the

Evening Standard to dismiss a Communist who
was also
general secretary of the Civil Service Clerical
Association
and failed to heed the warnings of Common
Cause
Coraraunist

,

an anti-

organization's pamphlet which listed Communist

and "near-Communist" civil servants and called
for their
dismissal.

62

Secrecy in this type of case can make the

issue appear to the public as a technical decision
on the

part of the government, rather than stern warnings that

certain groups and certain associations will not be
tolerated in government.

The "style" in which the security
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program was both implemented
and justified created an
attitude much different than
the one which existed in
the
United States during the same
period. The attitude is

characterized by u>rd Chief Justice
Denning's assertion
that the government's concern
with Communism should not
be to deprive them of liberty,
but simply of access to

military secrets."

This attitude is also indicated
in

the Co-operative Party's explanation
of its ban on

Communist officials in its organization
as only a difference
in political faith, as not meant
to question the right of

Communists to hold, advocate, and secure
support for their
views, or to "dispute their sincerity. "^^

This attitude

reflects more than simply a penchant for
polite expression
of disagreement; it reflects an assumption
that Communism
is an incorrect political view but
that it is not a

"totally evil

.

.

.

the anti-Christ." 65

satanic world-wide conspiracy

m

...

or

an organization formed around

political principles, members may be dismissed if they
deviate from those principles.

However, this implies

only a difference in opinion, not that the dissidents are
totally unfit for any employment or that they are rejected
as fellow citizens.
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This attitude is also reflected
by the fact that,
while there have been controversies
about Coramunism in
education and the Middlesex County
Council did ban Communists
and Fascists from being appointed
headmaster, generally

speaking little impetus was marshalled
behind the proposi-

tion that communist teachers were
subversive by definition.

Britain has not been lacking in attempts
to ignite public
opinion on this subject, but such attempts
have been
noticeably unsuccessful.

The same has been true about the

general response of the public and the
government to
charges that something should be done about
disloyal

Englishmen in communications, entertainment, the professions, and religion.

Such incidents as the disclosure

of the Canadian spy ring and the cases of Alan
Nunn May,

Klaus Fuchs and Bruno Pontecorvo, aroused concern for

British security and support for a tighter security program.

The fact that Fuchs was uncontroversial and

escaped detection for five years caused some to speculate
about the utility of attempting to ascertain a person's

reliability on the basis of expressed attitudes and
associations.

Even with this increased sensitivity about

security, the distinction between speech and opinion on
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one hand and espionage and military
secrecy on the other
was preserved. 66 This perception
of Communism as a poli-

tical doctrine not necessarily related
to espionage and

therefore not a "loathsome contagious disease"
was also

widespread in the society, not just in
government.

A

post-war national poll by the British Institute
of Public

Opinion which sampled attitudes about making
Communist
party membership

incompatible with membership in the

Labour party revealed that 54 percent felt that
the Labour

party should not admit members of the CP, with
16 percent
feeling that membership should be open, and 30 percent

responding with "Don't Know."^*^
i» the rejection

Another dramatic example

by the British Legion, the counterpart

of the American Legion, of a proposal to prohibit

Communists from joining because most members of the British
Legion did not want membership to depend on a political
criteria.

This reflects the feeling that one can have

hopelessly erroneous political beliefs and still be a
worthwhile member of groups formed for social purposes
that one can be a Communist and still be English.
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The Official Secrets Act

The renowned Official Secrets Act which
is cited
in almost every English spy thriller
has also caused

occasional concern among libertarians.

The Act, passed to

prevent the reoccurence of Foreign Office
scribes giving
the contents of secret treaties to hostile
powers and the
press, as one did in 1878 as a gesture of
disenchantment

with the lower rungs of civil service employment,
has

occasionally been used in obvious non-security matters.
In 1938, for example, it was invoked when a Daily
Dispatch

reporter refused to reveal the sources of one of his
news
stories when police were seeking to stop a "leak" in their
own department. 69 it has also been used to prevent

publication of articles about prison conditions, as well
as genuine instances of espionage.

In February of 1962

the Act was to receive its most controversial application

when six members of the Committee of 100, including
Terrance Chandler, were charged and convicted on two
counts of conspiracy to commit breaches of the Act.

The

five male defendants were sentenced to eighteen months in

prison and the lone female defendant to twelve for their
part in a large-scale demonstration at Wethersfield Airfield
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in 1961.

Wethersfield was at the time occupied by squa-

drons of the United States Air Force assigned
to the

Supreme Commander Allied Forces, Europe, and was

chosen

by the demonstrators because of the alleged presence
of
nuclear weapons.

The intent of the demonstrators was

that a number of people should take positions outside
the

two entrances to the field while another contingent would,
if possible, enter the airfield and sit in front of air-

craft to prevent them from taking off.

The admitted

objective of such an action, at least on the part of the
six defendants, was to ground all aircraft and immobilize

the airfield or, as they expressed it, to "reclaim the

base for civilian purposes." 7

The government had

designated Wethersfield as a prohibited place within the
meaning of the Act, and the defendants were convicted for

conspiring to enter such a place and entering such a
place.

72

At the trial the jury was instructed that in

order to find the defendants guilty it was necessary for
the prosecution to demonstrate that they conspired together
and that the conspiracy was clearly either to enter a

prohibited place, and that the intent of such a conspiracy
was for a purpose "prejudicial to the safety and interests
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of the state."

The defendants freely admitted
the con-

spiracy, but chose to argue
vigorously over their intent,

on appeal to the Court of Criminal
Appeal, counsel for
Chandler put forth secondary arguments
to the effect that
the Act could only be used to
prevent mischiefs stemming

from espionage and the collection
and disclosure of secret
information.

Lord Parker quicKly dismissed these
argu-

ments by ruling that the Act empowers
the Secretary of

State to declare a place prohibited
on the ground that
the "destruction or obstruction

.

.

.

would be useful to

the enemy," and that the Act was not
therefore limited to

espionage. 73

More strenuously argued, however, was the plea
that
the defendants had no intent to prejudice
the safety or

interests of the state and that their action did
not in
fact prejudice those interests.

This argument focused

on the refusal of Judge Havers to allow questions
during

cross examination that were related to, or tried to
establish,

1)

the advisability of a nuclear deterrent

weapon in the United Kingdom;
dental detonation; and

3)

2)

the possibility of acci-

the "attraction" of such defense

installations for hostile attack by other nations.

The
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defense argued that unless they could get at
the "substance"
of the demonstration, i.e., the desirability
of nuclear

disarmament, the prosecution could not prove an
intent to

prejudice the interests of the state, nor could a
jury
evaluate whether the defendants' actions actually did

prejudice the interests of the state.

The prosecution

argued that intent could only be established by first

establishing that the defendants' actions were prejudicial,
after which their purpose could be inferred from such
actions.

The defense argued that an individual's "state

of mind" was relevant to prejudicial intent, even if the

actions were prejudicial.

Lord Parker sustained the

prosecution's point of view by contending that the
individual's state of mind was a different and irrelevant
issue with reference to establishing intent,

if the action

taken is prejudicial, then an intent to prejudice simply
means, for Lord Parker, a deliberate intention to take

such action.

The defendants' desire to explore their "state of
mind" at the trial reflected their wish to debate nuclear

disarmament on its "merits,'

This "intent" became pain-

fully obvious when Patrick Pottle, one the accused who
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conducted his own defense, asked
an Air Commodore during
the process of cross examination
whether he were "familiar
with all the facts on the nuclear
bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki; whether or not
there was any official order
from government that he would not
accept; and whether n
or not he would "press the
button."

m

a style of argu-

ment that is now familiar to student
activists, Pottle
asked the witness if he would "slit
the throats of all

two year old children in this country;"
quoted from a docurnent (which

the judge reminded him was not really
cross

examination) from Sir Winston Churchill to
the effect that

atomic bases in East Anglia made Britain
the target of

Soviet attack; and asked whether the witness
was familiar

with Adolph Eichraann's defense,

judge Havers invariably

instructed the witness not to answer, and Lord
Parker was

quick to note the larger "political motivation"
of the
defendants, and rule:
Insofar, therefore, as it was sought to
challenge the policy of the Crown, it seems to us
that cross examination and evidence to that end
were rightly excluded. Granted that the policy and
granted the use of the airfield within that policy,
it was of course open to the defense to show, if
they could, that the acts proposed would not
prejudice its operational effectiveness
the
emphasis of the appeallants* arguments, both at the
trial and before us, was concentrated on a
.

.

.

1
I
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challenge of policy rather than on
the issue
whether, within the policy, the acts
proposed
were prejudicial. Accordingly, we are
satisfied
that the learned judge did not exclude
any cross
examination or evidence which was adraissable
and
relevant, and there being no possible
criticism
of their summing up these appeals fall. .
."74
.

The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal
to
the House of Lords, however, because it felt
that the

case raised a point of law of general public
importance,

specifically the proper definition of the state's interest.
The Law Lords (in the House of Lords, before Viscount
Radcliffe, and Lords Reid, Hodson, Devlin and Pearce)

each wrote an opinion, but all were in favor of dismissing the appeal. 75

Lord Reid took essentially the

line of reasoning expounded by the Court of Appeal, arguing

that the disposition and use of armed forces was a govern-

mental matter and could not be questioned in the courts.

According to Reid it would be hardly "credible" that
parliament wished to entitle a person who had deliberately
interfered with the armed forces to submit to a jury that
the

"...

government policy was wrong and that what he

did was really in the best interest of the country." 76
Lords Hodson and Pearce and

iscount Radcliffe laid great

stress on the same point underlining the viewpoint that

I
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the wisdon. of nuclear weapons was not
a justifiable issue.

Lord Devlin reached the same holding,
but by

following a slightly different path.

For him, the issue

of what was prejudicial to the state was not
a question of
law but of fact, and should, therefore,
have been deter-

mined by a jury,

since he found it difficult to see how

a jury could have found actions
designed to obstruct a

policy supported by a majority of the population
as anything other than prejudicial to the state, he
concurred
in the holding, but resented the use of
"government" and

"state" as synonyms.

The government's argument through-

out all of the proceedings was that whatever was in the
interests of the government was necessarily in the
interests of the state, and by implication, all the people
in that state.

Lord Devlin found no evidence to suggest

that the testimony given by the government in the Chandler

case was in any way exaggerated or offered in bad faith;
he argued simply that a purpose which "appears to the
Crown" as prejudicial is not the same as the fact of a

prejudicial action.

Devlin deviated from the other Lords

only on the question of who is to decide what is prejudicial

Devlin appeared to agree with Lord Pearce when he insisted

1
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that "interests of the state" could not mean

"...

the

|

interest of the amorphous populace without regard
to the
I

guiding principles of those in authority."
must mean, according to Pearce,

"...

The phrase

I

the policies of

the state as they are, not as they ought in the
opinion
if a jury to be." 77

'

Devlin"s distinction between "the

'

state" as all legitimate authority and "government" as

simply the lessor implementor of sovereignty was designed
to avoid saying the interests of the Crown and the

interests of the state are the same.

Some writers, such

as Geoffrey Marshall, have claimed that in this case the

distinction was obliterated by giving the Crown the privilege of defining the "interests of the state."

i

While the
I

distinction was obliterated (because it was not accepted
i

by the majority of the Law Lords)

,

for Devlin the funda-

mental point is that the servants of the Crown are capable
of formulating policies which prevent the citizen from

doing something that they (the Crown) do not want him to
do, and it is a legitimate judicial function to prevent

the abuse of this prerogative.

Chandler case that suggested

to

There was nothing in the
Lord Devlin that such an

abuse existed, but the jury should have decided this.

For Devlin the Crown alone is able to give authoritative
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evidence as to the interests of the
state, but the "Crown's
opinion as to what i. or is not
prejudicial is just as
inadmissible as the appellants

Marshall's basic

argument was that if the Crown can
define its interests,
it can thereby determine

what is to count as prejudicial

to them, 79 but this need not be the
case.

The jury for

Lord Devlin should decide if interests
have been prejudiced, not what those interests are.

in this case,

the defendants spent much time arguing that
the normal

operation of Wethersfield Airfield was not an
interest
of the state.

For Lord Devlin neither the defendants nor

the jury can define "interest;" they must restrict
them-

selves to the question of what is prejudicial.

Such a

formulation of the problem avoids two dangerous alternatives!

having the Crown define both what is in the

interests of the state and what is prejudicial to those
interests, thereby restricting the jury to a determina-

tion of the actions alleged; or having the jury decide
whether Wethersfield is necessary to the "good life" in
England, and thereby solidifying sovereignty in twelve

impaneled subjects.

The first method is reminiscent of

old seditious libel charges, in which the jury cannot find
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a defendant innocent unless
it is willing to wink at

established fact.

The problem here is that the offense

,

which is not the same as the action
(of publishing or
entering an air base) is predetermined
by the government

because conviction necessarily follows the
action.

The

action is ascertained, but the action is
not evaluated

with reference to the offense charged.

The second alterna-

tive invests the jury with a novel sort of
ad hoc judicial

review power, which would encompass not only the
power
to dismantle specific laws, but even to change
foreign
policy.

Marshall, who views the Chandler case as unjus-

tified governmental harrassment of the CND, seems
oblivious to the consequences of allowing the propriety
of unilateral disarmament to

be a juridicial consideration.

Even if, as Marshall argues, the pivotal factor in this
case was the definition of interests, not the definition
of prejudicial, it is not sufficient to object to the

holding merely because it stipulates that the definition
of the national interest is a Crown prerogative.

The

elemental fact remains that the definition of national
interest is someone's prerogative, and when the apparent

choice is between the Crown and a jury, it seems folly
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to assume that the jury would be any
better a reflection
of the will of the nation than its
government.

The use of

the Official secrets Act to punish the
behavior in the

Chandler case creates some awkward problems,
but the
restriction of evidence about intent to a desire
to stop
the normal functioning of the

air

base, rather than a per-

sons' intent vis-a-vis metaphysical standards,
would

appear essential.

Nor is it really accurate, given the

past uses of the Act, to claim that it was being
used for
a purpose other than Parliament intended.

The NCCL felt

the sentencing in this case was "savage," using as the

point of comparison the penalty for •criminal" offenses,

which implies that Chandler's conduct was less criminal
than grand theft because his rationale takes
explain.

longer to

What the use of the OSA did achieve was a very

dramatic charge against the defendants which pointed out

unsavory political purposes rather than simply trespassing,
and it is perhaps a mistake for the Crown to have tried
to compete with the CND in dramatizing an issue,

it is

this drama which surrounds the Act that is an indication
that the government was interested in a "political trial." 80

The Act connotes espionage to the general public, and the
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CND activities do not fit in that category
as traditionally
defined.

However, the antics of the CND were close
enough

to espionage to shield the government from a
charge of

engaging in ruthless suppression of freedom of
speech.

There is presumably a difference between long-term
suppression and occasional outbreaks of vindictiveness.

Race Relations
Act of 1965
The Britton Case

The desire to protect subjects from speech which
is insulting received renewed emphasis in Section
6 of

the Race Relations Act of 1965 which states:
(1) a person shall be guilty of an offense
under this section if, with intent to stir
up hatred against any section of the public in
Great Britain distinguished by color, race,
or ethnic or national origin
(a) he publishes
or distributes written matter which is
threatening, abusive or insulting; . . . (b) matter
or words likely to stir up hatred against that
section on grounds of color, race, or ethnic or
national origin.
'publish* and 'distribute' mean
(2) .
publish or distribute to the public at large or
to any section of the public not consisting
exclusively of members of an association of which
the person publishing or distributing is a
member .
.

—

.

.

.

^

During the second reading of the Race Relations
Bill before the House of Commons in May, 1965, the NCCL
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objected to section 6 because it
omitted any mention of
religious groups and therefore was
not, in their view,

sufficiently extensive.

The reasoning here was that

much ostensible religious discrimination
against Hindus
and Muslims was really based on color,
which is certainly
true, but Section 6 is levelled at
"hateful speech," not

employment or accommodations.

The first use of the Act was in July of
1966 when
17-year old Christopher Britton was caught by
a member of

parliament (Bidwell) after he (Britton) had
broken a
glass panel of the M.P.

's

front door and inserted a

pamphlet entitled, "Blacks Not Wanted Here."®^
(who was,

Britton

if not drunk, at least drinking beer during
this

escapade) had littered several other pamphlets
expressing

the same point of view on the front porch and was carrying
a copy of a pamphlet entitled, "Do You Want a Black

Grandchild?"

The pamphlets originated from a London

group called the "Greater Britain Movement" which was
opposed to black immigration.

Britton explained that he

believed that Bidwell was responsible for bringing blacks
to Britain,

in Middlesex Quarter Sessions Britton was

charged and convicted for violating Section 6 of the Act
and was sentenced to a "period of reform school training."

1
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This conviction was reversed by the
Court of Appeal,
because, in the opinion of Lord Parker,
the antics of

Britton did not constitute "distribution"
within the

meaning of the Act.

According to Parker distribution to

an M.P. is not distribution to the public
at large, and

while the police may have had a case against
the publishers, they didn't have one against Britton.

Lord

Parker was also perturbed that the issue of distribution
was withdrawn from the jury (the trial judge held
there
was no contest about distribution) and based his reversal

on a narrow construction of "distribute."

dicta at the end of

his

But in some

opinion he scolded law enforcement

officials for the use of the 1965 act in this kind of a
case.

The police, he claimed, were invoking the Race

Relations Act because of the words used, and the crucial

consideration should not be the words or even the distribution, but the circumstances of distribution.

If the cir-

cumstances of distribution reveal an intent to stir up
hatred, the Act is appropriate, but in this case the

circumstances are far removed from intention to stir up
hatred.

Lord Parker's approach is interesting because,

in addition to establishing a formula which places the
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emphasis on circumstances rather than
on the words
used,

it is a rare instance of the
Court of Appeal narrowing

the application of an Act.

The rather specific instruc-

tions as to when the Act is applicable and
the open chiding
of the police is equally rare.

The Court of Appeal's

ruling in this case received an immediate
political

reaction when the House of Lords rejected a private
member
bill introduced by Lord Brockway that would have
closed
some "loopholes" of the Race Relations Act discovered
by

Lord Parker.

The government agreed that there was need

for "further action at the appropriate time," but felt

the Act was too new for amendment at that time.^^

Michael X
The first conviction to be sustained under the
Race Relations Act ironically involved the leader of the

British Black Muslims, Michael de Freitas, who adopted
the name Michael Addul Malik and Michael X when converted

to the Muslim faith after contact with American Black

Muslim leader Malcolm X in 1964.

Malik received a

twelve-month sentence for inciting racial hatred during
a speech he gave in Reading in 1967.

He was a substitute

speaker before an audience which had come to hear American
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Black Power Leader Stokeley Carmichael
and, according to

prosecutor Kenneth Jones, elaborated on
two themes.

The first consisted of an attack on white
people generally,
contending that they were vicious, nasty,
soulless,
savage, and guilty of degrading and oppressing
black

people.

The second, according to Jones, was an exhorta-

tion to black people to ignore the laws of tritain;
to
inspire terror among whites; to use violence against

enemies and even shoot, kick and if necessary kill thera.^^

The initial hearing, in which Malik was refused bail, was
a noisy encounter between Malik and the judge, complete

with the removal of some of Malik's supporters from the
gallery.

Malik was found guilty in Reading Quarter

Sessions, and ten days before the Court

cf

Appeal reviewed

the case, an article appeared in the Sunday Times which

Malik claimed made a fair appeal impossible.

The Court

of Appeal held that there was no possible effect on the

appeal since the article had no effect on the original
trial.

The Divisional Court, however, did find the

article sufficiently prejudicial to fine the newspaper
L5,000 for what it described as "a very serious contempt."
Malik, who conducted his own defense throughout
the proceedings, on appeal argued essentially that the

85
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meaning of the words he used meant
something different

to him as a West Indian and meant
something different to
his audience than they did to white
Englishmen.

Lord

Parlcer noted, however, that the issue
of possibly

differing -cultural contexts" had been presented
to the
jury, and since they did not recognize a
substantial

difference between West Indian English and Reading
English
a new trial was not in order,

i^ard

Parker also refused

to reduce the sentence handed out by the Reading
Court,

claiming that the propriety of any given punishment
should be related to the violence of the words used.

Since the maximum sentence for this type of offense was

two years' imprisonment and a fine of LlOOO, he saw no

reason to interfere in this sentence since Malik was

guilty of a "serious infraction" of the Act.®^
Neo-Fasciats

Colin Jordan, leader of the English Fascist movement, was given an eighteen-month sentence in 1967 for

violating Section 6 of the Act for racist statements made
at a public meeting.

Melvin

L. Wtilf,

legal director of

the American Civil Liberties Union, has noted that this
incident (which he describes as "intolerable by ACLU
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standards") received little attention,
and that the Race

Relations act itself had provoked
favorable comment" in Britain.

"...

hardly any but

The NCCL objected to the

use of the act against Malik but were
silent about its

use against Jordan.

The Council explained in 1968 that

while it welcomed the passing of the Act
in 1965, it "had
not bargained for the way in which it would
be enforced."

The Act was, in their view, designed to protect
minorities
and blacks in particular, and they expressed
concern

...

that colored people should have been the first

to feel the whip, when Fascist and racialist publications
continue to circulate with relative impurity."®^

The Thorn Case

There was one other attempt to apply the Act of
1965 when Dr. Carl-Theo Thorn brought a private suit

against the BBC for inciting racial hatred because of its

"anti-German propaganda."

The propaganda Thorn had in

mind was the television series "The Rat patrol" which he
sought to enjoin because of the use of "foul, abusive
and spiteful language, gestures, mimics and imitations,

when Germans or Germany were mentioned."

The Act speci-

fically states that no prosecution can be instituted under

its provisions except by or
with the consent of the

Attorney General.

Thorn had no such permission, but

relied on an 1880 case which held
that when a statute
creates a new offense there is a
remedy in equity by
injunction to protect against such an
offense.

The

action was dropped, however, when
the Chancery Division
ruled that the Act created no civil
remedy for an
individual.®^

Conclusion
Free Expression and National Security
What is perhaps

roost

significant and most lauda-

tory in our account of controversies about
seditious
speech are some things which did not happen,
especially

with reference to the post-war response to
domestic
Cciiiraunisro

and the Cold war.

There was no equivalent of

the Smith Act or a loyalty review board, no sensational

legislative investigations, and in general, no public

hysteria about an "enemy within."

The reasons for this

response are complex, involving factors in the political

and social system as well as aspects of political culture
The Communist Party in Britain, while never strong, did

have a larger per capita membership than the party in the
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The simple existence of more Communists,
together

with the existence of a political tradition
which included
a theoretical alternative to capitalism,
meant that the

CP had more respectability and was perceived
as less of
an "alien" influence.

Even this more relaxed public

opinion, however, cannot totally explain the
responsibility

exercised by political leaders in dealing with the
security
problem.

Wilson and Glickman have pointed out that much

credit is due the professional civil service and the

administrative good judgment exercised in implementing
the security program.

The general status which accrues

to the civil service, as well as the popular belief that
politics in general is a "respectable" endeavor (part of
the deferential political culture), creates an "institu-

tional self-respect which mitigates against irresponsible
conduct."

The existence of an "establishment" in a

genuine sense, not simply an epithet to describe any
suburbanite regardless of influence, can act to limit

participation on many levels of decision making and can
have, when the threat stems from inflamed public opinion,

libertarian consequences.

The same "insular" quality of

decision making can explain the lack of success in Britain
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of the issue about Communism
in education, since the

ordinary Englishman has never been
encouraged to brood
about the content of courses at
Oxford and Cambridge.
Since being a Communist was not
viewed as an action which

condemned one to eternal damnation,
being an ex-Communist
was also not viewed as instant
salvation, and in Britain
few people made careers out of past
political indiscretions.

English trade unions, where the threat of
Communist

infiltration was much more real than it was
in the U. S.,

usually managed to hold control; and the
press, with a
few ostentatious exceptions, did not
hammer away at the
evils of domestic subversion.

The insularity of decision making can also reveal
negative effects as when one attempts to ascertain
the

motivation behind a prosecution, such as the application
of the Official Secrets Act and the Forgery Act against
the CND.

Marshall, for example, had noted that long-

accepted political conventions such as cabinet responsi-

bility can immunize law enforcement officials from
undesirable political pressure, but can also inhibit on

occasion what may be justifiable political criticism.
This, together with typical judicial reluctance to embark
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on criticism of executive policy and
solid control of the
legislature by one of two major parties makes
it diffi-

cult to exercise effective control over
ministers even

when the opposition wishes.

When there is no such division

along party lines, the responsibility of law
enforcement

officials to Parliamentary-based policy makers
phous at best.

is

amor-

Advice given to police by the cabinet is

treated as confidential by the rules of the House, and
direct questions about such advice are out of order, as
are any questions which might prejudice a case pending.
This makes it difficult to ascertain whether the prosecu-

tions under the statutes we have mentioned were ministerial

decisions or promulgated at a lower level.

The immunity

which surrounds the entire process of criminal prosecution in England means that in some cases "accountability"

can be traced to the Attorney General (or the D.P.P. who
acts on his authority)

,

but it is not clear even then what

is a governmental decision since the Attorney General acts

as a legal officer of the Crown, which is theoretically

separate from the role of minister.

In most cases, as

Geoffrey Marshall is fond of pointing out, the charges
used against the politically unorthodox do not involve the

140

spectacular uses of the Official Secrets,
Race Relations,
or even the Public Order Acts.

Much more probable are

charges for petty of fenses— obstruction of
the highway
or police, disobeying local by-laws,
refusing to b«

bound over, and trespassing— which not only can be
used

by the government to cloak an evil intent, but can
even
be used by law enforcement officials to avoid
governmental
scrutiny.

Because most prosecutions in Britain are pri-

vate prosecutions brought by policemen as individuals,
the government theoretically at least, "does not start
_
ana cannot stop summary proceedings." 91

Marshall even

suggests that the more spectacular charges against Chandler

were probably not the product of direct initiative of

ministers collectively or the Home Office, but simply
police decisions.

92

Even if this were the case, the use

of the OS A at Wethers fie Id is not an extravagant use of

the Act.

In instances such as the Chandler case, the

Labour Party was quick to charge "political trial" and

criticize the government for its handling of the CUD in
other demonstrations,

pressure at this juncture is per-

haps instrumental in preventing any regime fro

n

using

prosecutions against political groups to glorify its own
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importance.

Although the same pressure would be
applied

in the opposite direction,
especially if the opposition
is looking for things with which
to eitibarass the govern-

ment and harpoons the ruling party for
inaction against
subversion.

This tactic was not used by the "out"
party

in Britain, which, in addition to
indicating differences
in political culture, also indicates
something about

English conservatism.
Free Expression and

"

insulting

"

Speech

On the negative side of the ledger is the favorable reception, in Britain, of the concept of
"insulting"
speech, which was bolstered in the Race Relations
Act of
1965.

While the Britton and Malik cases, along with

Thorn's abortive attempt, certainly do not constitute
cavalier application of the Act by the government, it is
important to note that none of the cases involved the

actual outbreak of violence or disruption, and the

pivotal consideration is the content of remarks rather

than the situation in which they are made.

True, the

Act itself makes a small "situational" rule by requiring
that the words be spoken in a context where they may be

heard by people who disagree.

Thus racist statements at

142

a closed meeting of racists would not be "insulting"

because there is no one present to be insulted.

Lord

Parlcer's suggestion that police look at circumstances

rather than words themselves in the Britton case cannot

be interpreted as a plea that the Act be used in cases
of actual incitement, or a logic similar to the Homesian

emphasis on circumstances rather than words spoken as
the pivotal issue to be evaluated.

Lord Parker's point

was that Britten's "speech" was not sufficiently public
for it to be insulting.

The judicial circumstantial require-

ment is therefore an assessment of the scope of the audience

rather than the probability that the audience will react
undesirably.

In fact, the entire logic of the Act of

1965 and of the "insulting words" provision of the Public

Order Act is that it can be presumed that a heterogeneous
audience will behave badly if a speaker is not sufficiently
diplomatic.

Even Parker's attempt to restrict the con-

cept "insult" to circumstances where there is likely to

be an "insulted" drew quick reaction in Parliament,
indicating a feeling that the Act should be more inclusive.

There is no statutory or judicial rule that requires the
words to present any concrete danger to the community,

simply that the words, in the view of the government and

I

I
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a jury, be insulting.

The best defense of this concept

was Lord Parker's decision in Jordan v. Burgovne
that

'

*

there was such a thing as verbal assault, and that
"verbal
hits" threaten public order.

Just as the logic of the
i

concept "libel" was sustained in 1609 because it "provokes
revenge" and is therefore a potential breach of the peace,

|

the verbal punches of Malik and Jordan were held to be

potential breaches of the peace in 1967.

This is why we
j

have designated the charges stemming from the common law
of seditious libel, the Public Order Act and the Race

Relations Act as conceptually identical to group libel.
Specific objections to this concept on libertarian grounds
have been suggested; it is sufficient to note here that

English Law, and by and large English libertarians, place
great emphasis on the protection of individuals from
insults and abuse by other individuals.

This desire to

^

protect an individual from certain speech can be viewed
I

as a different weighing of competing concerns for the

rights of an individual.

Just as English libertarians

have traditionally been less mechanical in their approach

to freedom of the press, making the "right to know" a
subordinate concern when in conflict with a "right to a

'
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fair trial," the concern for defamation
outweighs the

concern for unfettered expression when the
two values
collide.
It is also worth noting that the lack of
oppressive

legal sanctions against those engaged in
self-expression
is certainly not the result of a want
of authorizing

legislation.

regime

Henry Hamilton has noted that an illiberal

in England has "an intricate web of unrepealed

legislative restriction" which could be used to limit
"the right of freely expressing beliefs severally desig-

nated sedition, blasphemy, and obscenity."®^

Nor did the

courts significantly truncate any of the legislation we
have analyzed.

The attempt of Quarter Sessions to formu-

late a "reasonable audience" test in the Jordan case was

quickly undone by the Queen's Bench, and the Public Order
Act was extended even further by Parker in the ward case.
Parker's only attempt to restrict the application of a
statute was in the Britton case, which irritated parliament,
In cases involving street oratory and demonstrations

thought to endanger security, the courts implement no sub-

stantial alterations which would narrow statutes

.

In the

Jordan and ward cases, however, there was an extension at
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least in the sense that Lord
Parker had defensible argu-

ments as to why the Public Order
Act should not have been
used.

The lack of hysteria over "subversion"
and the
desire to punish those who engage in
verbal hitting are
not unrelated.

Both can be traced to the "deferential"

culture and the expectation of responsible
leadership.

The phlegmatic approach of the English to certain
kinds
of diversity can make thera tolerant of radical
political

creeds and reluctant to define "Englishman" as an
ideological category, but can also make them concerned
about

speech when it takes a form that could erode the understood sense of social propriety.

The assumption that

leaders should govern, not simply represent, leads to

certain expectations, one of which is that they act
responsibly, even if their leadership position entails

only "leadership" in the sense of speaking before a group.
In short, both a subversive "witch hunt" and an anti-semitic

tirade connote hysteria, and as such, conflict with the per-

ception of what constitutes a qualitative political style
that is supposed to reflect "rule by betters."

Deference

implies a certain amount of respect for the leader

the leader

roust,

—but

by his conduct, earn such respect.
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In one sense there is great emotive consistency

in

wishing a person not to be hampered in expressing his
beliefs and desiring that be express such beliefs tactfully.

To tolerate all but intolerance has long been

a

libertarian motto and r fleets a desire to create an

environment in which minds can meet for purposes of
exchange rather than confrontation.

An English liber-

tarian could easily argue, for example, that Malik or
Jordan did not really wish to change the hearts and minds
of those who disagreed, and thus failed to establish the
initial respect which would enable others to give them the

deference of listening.

While it is difficult to establish

that a society "thinks" any particular way about anything,

it would appear that one could,

for comparative pur-

poses, view the English as perceiving free speech as a

value of interaction rather than collision.

A commitment

to speech is secondary to the commitment to communication

through speech and respect on both sides.

As such, speech

can be legitimately restricted not only when it threatens
order, but also when it threatens decorum.

The decorum

requirement is held to be essential if the speech is to
be meaningful.

A deferential polity views democratic
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politics as less a matter of mandate and conflict and
more a matter of rule and control,

in reference to free-

dom of expression it would appear that the English view
liberty not as a guarantee of a pure adversary-conflict
process, but more a matter of basic civility in social
interaction.

Civil liberties do not become an extension

of the adversary legal process, but an extension of "good
form"

— perceived

as rules of cooperation, rather than

rules of conflict.

CHAPTER IV

OBSCENITY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Obscene Publications Act of 1857

The Hicklin Rule
Until the passage of the obscene Publications
Act
of 1959, English law on obscenity depended on
an 1857 Act

which sought both to stop the sale of tawdry
pamphlets on

Hollywell Street and to clear up the ambiguous nature
of
common law doctrine on obscenity.^

The Act was designed

to "suppress works written for the single purpose of

corrupting the morals of youth and of a nature calculated
to shock the common feelings of decency in any well-

regulated mind." 2
R,

V.

m

1868 Lord Chief Justice Cockburn,

Hicklin, interpreted the Act with phraseology

which became the keystone of Anglo-American notions on
obscenity.

A work is obscene, and its author therefore

punishable under the Act, if it has a "tendency," according

to Lord Cockburn, "to deprave and corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a

publication of this sort may fall."

3
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The diligence with which the 1857 Act
was applied

varied of course according to the
general climate of public
and official opinion.

After sporadic use in the late

nineteenth century the number of prosecutions
under the

Act rose in 1923 when the United Kingdom became
a signatory
to a document from an International Convention
dedicated to
the suppression of traffic in obscene publications.

The

most notable case in this revival of prosecutions
con-

sisted of the destruction order of Radcliff Hall's The
well

of Loneliness. 4

For the next quarter-century there was

what Harry Street called a "gradual cessation of prosecutions in respect to literature," but the 1950 's marked

another increase in government concern about obscenfcy.

It

was during this period that the King's Bench Division

cleared up legal details of the Act by holding that photographic negatives as well as positives come within the

meaning of the Act? and that the summons issued to a

publisher to "show cause" why the material should not be

destroyed must be made within a reasonable time of confiscation, but that eleven months is reasonable.

5

It was

also held that if only the covers of a publication were
obscene, the destruction order could still include the
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entire publication:^ and that the prosecution should simply

present material thought to be obscene before justices

without comment or "innuendo," although when such "innuendo"
exists it will not overturn a conviction.

7

In 1954 the

Court of Criminal Appeal held that a magistrate may leave
the matter of obscenity to the judgment of a jury, but

also went to great lengths to indicate that such a practice was not only unnecessary, but probably bad procedure.

Q

In the same year the Court of Criminal Appeal

refused to reverse a case on the ground that the Recorder
conof London in his summation avoided any reference to

temporary standards.^

The court took note of the changing

standards for what may tend to deprave and corrupt but

held that the material in question possessed such a
tendency.

The problem of a contemporary standard for

in
obscenity received more judicial attention, however,

Stanley
another 1954 case involving the publishers of

Kauffman's The Philanderers

.

The "opinion" in this case

the jury
consisted of Justice Stable's instructions to

each
(five-and-a-half pages in the law reports) before
read and evaluate.
member was given a copy of the novel to

entitled to ignore
While informing the jury that they were
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any opinions he had about the
matter, judge Stable expressed
his personal feeling that the
prosecution's case contained
a "certain confusion of thought.'

The prosecution had

suggested that the jury was going to
determine whether
bool^s like

The Philanderers were going to be
published in

the future, and Stable warned the jury
that their role

was not to establish what was good
taste in the United
Kingdom, but simply to decide whether the
prosecution had

established sufficient evidence to affix criminal
punishment for violation of a statute.

After a lengthy discourse

on some of the more extreme Victorian attitudes
about

parts of the

body— such

as referring to gentlemen's legs

as -understandings"— Justice Stable cautioned the
jury
that, while their function was to discover whether
the

book tended to deprave and corrupt, they must be careful
not to confuse this criminal offense with any tendency

the work may have to shock or disgust.
The Hicklin rule. Stable further explained, answers
the question "corrupt and deprave whom?" by stipulating

anyone whose mind is open to such influences and into whose

hands the publication may fall.

These words, however, are

not self-explanatory, according to Stable, and he therefore
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urged the jury to remember that much "great
literature
is

wholly unsuitable for reading by the adolescent

.

.

.

.

.

and that the function of the contemporary novelist
is not

merely to entertain, but to be "chroniclers of an age."
The Philanderers, the Justice admitted, may strike very
many people as very crude, but it purports to depict the
life of certain, perhaps not typical, people in New York

City.

Since this is the objective of the novel. Judge

Stable asked
If we are going to read novels about how things
go in New York, it would not be of much
assistance, would it, if, contrary to the facts,
we were led to suppose that in New York no
unmarried woman or teenager has disabused her
mind of the idea that babies are brought by storks
or sometimes found in cabbage patches or under

gooseberry bushes?
In concluding. Justice Stable underlined his belief
in the necessity of obscenity statutes to protect a healthy

society, but warned of the ultimate ineffectiveness of

such laws if they are employed indiscriminately.

The jury,

evidently choosing not to ignore Stable's personal opinion,
returned a verdict of "not guilty."

This case is an

interesting example of how a trial judge, using instruc-

tions to the jury, can in effect truncate a statute at
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least on a case-by-case basis, since a literal rendering

of the Hicklin rule could have had The Philanderers

evaluated in terms of its effects on a sexually precocious
twe Ive-year-old

Reform
In response to the increasing number of prosecu-

tions for obscenity in the 1950 's the Society of Authors
set up a special committee, presided over by Sir Allen P.

Herbert, himself a prominent author and lawyer, which

sought to reform the Obscene Publications Act of 1857.

Its

reform bill was introduced in the House of Commons by Roy
Jenkins in March of 1955, but no action was then taken. 12
In the same year Parliament enacted the Children and Young

Persons (Harmful Publications) Act, 1955, in order to

deal with "horror comics."

The Act punishes those who

produce stories told in pictures which portray violent,
cruel, repulsive, or horrible acts in a way which would

tend to corrupt a young person.

In March of 1957 the

bill of the Society of Authors was referred to a Select
Committee, and a report to the House of Commons ensued two

years later.

Impressed with what the committee viewed as
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the existence of a sizeable and
lucrative trade in pornography, the report made proposals
both for facilitating
the suppression of pornography
and for clarifying the law
of obscene publications. The
committee sought to vindicate

some of Judge Stable's concerns over
the scope of the 1857
Act, and recommended that the effect
of the work as a

whole be considered; that the defense
of literary or

artistic merit be allowed; and that the
author have a
right to produce evidence indicating that
the material
does have literary merit.

The resulting Obscene Publications Act of 1959
was a compromise of the committee's report, which
even in
its final form faced considerable opposition
because of

the allowability of a defense based on artistic merit,
and
on the admission of expert evidence as to artistic merit.

The 1959 Act tightens the definition of obscenity, but
expands the police power to suppress such obscenity.

Under the old Act, for example, the police could not obtain
a search warrant without evidence of previous sales; under

the new act a warrant can be had on evidence that the

material is being kept "for publication for gain."

The

new Act also empowers the police to search bookstalls and
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vehicles and to seize business documents
which might

help to uncover the wholesale outlets
of obscene publications.

However, the new act does not allow a
defendant

to plead "no intent" to deprave or corrupt,
but does allow

him to argue that he has not read the material,

since

the accused is quite often not the author,
but a book-

seller or the publisher, this defense was hailed
as a

significant improvement by English libertarians.^^

Under

the new Act the author is also given the opportunity
to

argue against destruction of the work and is entitled to

appeal against forfeiture even though he did not appear

before the court in the initial hearing.
Obscene Publications Act of 1959

Lady Chatter lev's Lover

The major clarification of the new obscene
Publications Act involved the prosecution of Penguin Books,
Inc., when they decided to mark the thirteenth anniversary

of D. H. Lawrence's death by publishing an unexpurgated

edition of Lady Chatterley 's Lover.

The new Act, and the

success of the work in legal battles in the United States,

prompted the publishing house to attempt such a venture;
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but the Director of Public Prosecutions
felt that the
work was prima facie obscene under the
new statute.^"*

The well-publicized trial which ensued
featured thirtyfive prominent authors, clergymen and
scholars who testi-

fied on behalf of the book, pitted against
the D.P.P. who
*t one point asked the jury if Lawrence'
s work was a

book that

"...

vants to read?"

you would wish your wife or your ser-

Three of the jurors were women, and the

defense counsel, noting that there were all sorts
of
people, even jurors, who didn't have servants,
exploited

the class prejudice implicit in the prosecution's
argument.

He recalled the observation of a judge in an earlier

case whose indictment against a work consisted of the

assertion that, "it would never do to let members of the

working class read this."^^

The prosecution was unsuccessful, and the major
importance of the encounter in R. v. Penguin Books , Ltd.
in addition to making the paperbook edition of Lady

Chatter ley '8 Lover an instant bestseller, was a ruling on
the status of the author's or publisher's "intent" vis-a-vis

depraving others and the proper application of the "public
good" defense.

Justice Sir Laurence Byrne ruled against

157

Penguin Book a

•

desire to introduce evidence as to
their

(and D. H. Lawrence's)

intent in publishing the work,

counsel for the publishing house argued
that since the
new act was not a general censorship
law but aimed only
at the obscene, the question of
intent was of crucial

importance in determining the offense.

Even though there

was much evidence to indicate that
Parliament had intended

the accused to have the opportunity to
rebut the presump-

tion of intent to corrupt under the new act,
Byrne reasoned
that this was not allowed under the old act
and the new
act did not specifically require it; so precedent
ruled.

According to Harry Street, established tradition in
English legal procedure does not allow courts, in trying
to interpret law, to consult the reports of Parliament
and legislative committees.

language of the act alone.

Courts

roust

rely on the

The matter of intent was allowed

to sneak in on the defense of the public good, however,

when Byrne ruled that in deciding this issue the jury must
evaluate the general purpose of the author or publisher
in producing the work.

Apart from telling the jury that it was insufficient
that the book merely shock or disgust them to sustain it
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as obscene, the only help Byrne gave
the jury as to the

meaning of the words "deprave and corrupt" was
to offer
dictionary synonyms such as "make morally bad,"
"pervert/'
"debase," and "render morally unsound or rotten."

The

defense of the public good, however, proved to be
pivotal
in determining the outcome of the case.

When the jury

deliberated for three hours, after having heard testimony
and read the book, and returned a verdict of not guilty,
C. H. Rolph claimed that the defense of the public
good

probably prevented a hung

Reportedly nine of the

jury.''-^

jurors were in favor of acquittal on the grounds that the

work did not tend to deprave and corrupt.

Three other

jurors believed that the work was obscene, but on the

further question of publication for the public good, they

were convinced that the literary merits of the novel out-

weighed its obscenity; on the basis of this balancing
process they supported acquittal. 18

Even though this case was only a specific trial
with no necessary force as interpretation in English law
it in a de facto sense began a construction of the Act

which emphasized expert evidence.

The defense of public

good, Byrne insisted, did not mean that publishers who can
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give any kind of justification to
literaty merit are

m

immune from punishment,

fact the onus is on the

defendant to establish "public good/' and
the public good
must outweigh the harm caused by the
work's obscenity.

The ruling that literary merit is part of
the test for
the public good, even though this was clearly
not the only
criterion, established a practice whereby both
the defense
and the prosecution (which used no experts in
this case)

can put forth diverse kinds of professional testimony
to
help jurors determine

the nature of the public good."^^

To a certain extent the D.P.p. was "cooperative"
in this case because of his decision to proceed against

the publisher rather than individual booksellers.

The

latter course of action would certainly have resulted in

either less will or less finances to conduct an all-out
legal defense.

No doubt Penguin Books emerged from the

whole incident with a profit, since the trial itself helped
to publicize the book, but the libertarian "victory" was

marred somewhat by Judge Byrne's refusal to award costs
to the publishing house.

In this particular case the

costs were Ll3,000 and Milton Konvitz, totalling

up the

court costs in both England and America (where the book had
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been cleared for the

U. S. malls a weelc before),

concluded

that the clearing of "Lady Chatter ley" of her ill repute,

along with vindicating the public's right to read, cost
at least $111,400.00.
R.

V.

Shaw
In 1961 the "Ladies Directory Case," in which

Frederick Shaw was indicted for publishing a prostitute's
directory, led to further judicial analysis of the new

Obscene Publication Act. 20

On appeal before the Criminal

Court of Appeals, Shaw sought a reversal of his conviction
at the Central Criminal Court in 1960, in which a jury

had found his activities to contravene

1)

the Sexual

Offenses Act of 1956, because he was living wholly or in
part on the earnings of prostitution;

2)

conspiring to

corrupt public morals by means of his magazine entitled,
"Ladies Directory;" and,

3)

publishing an obscene article,

namely, an edition of the Directory, contrary to the

Obscene Publications Act of 1959.

Shaw had been sen-

tenced to nine months' imprisonment.

He had apparently

decided to publish the Directory, which consisted of names,
photographs, and other descriptions of prostitutes, to
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create a medium through which prostitutes
could advertise
for clients.

(Changes in the Street Offenses Act in 1959

had put penalties on soliciting in the streets.)

Shaw,

who also claimed he had "cleared" the publication with
Scotland Yard before distribution, argued that his
endeavor had an "honesty of purpose" which should indicate
he had no illegal intent.

Judge Ashworth, speaking for

the Criminal Court of Appeal, noted that the 1959 Act,

unlike a common law prosecution for obscene libel, did not
require an intention to corrupt

—

"

.

.

.

obscenity depends

on the article and not on the author. "^^

The main argument offered by counsel for Shaw
against the application of the OPA was that the trial
judge, during his instructions to the jury,

incorrectly

directed them to regard what people did after reading the

Directory

at;

a test for obscenity.

The trial judge had

defined the problem as one in which the jury was to decide
whether Shaw's magazine did encourage readers to contact
prostitutes.

If the jury decided that such contact was

encouraged, the next step was to decide whether such

conduct corrupts or depraves people.
not find this objectionable.

22

Judge Ashworth did
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Shaws final argument against

the application of

the OPA was that inasmuch as the
people likely to read

the "Ladies Directory" were people who
had come to such

areas as Soho and Paddington in search
of the practices

advertised in the booklet, they were corrupt and
depraved
already.

Therefore, argued Shaw, he cannot be found

guilty of corrupting those who are corrupt in the
first
place.

Judge Ashworth simply noted, "The fallacy in this

argument is that it assumes that a man cannot be
corrupted
more than once.

.

.

."^^

The Court of Appeal held the first count of living
off the earning of a prostitute to be applicable, because

through the advertisements in his periodical Shaw was "in
essence

.

.

.

paid by the prostitutes."

Shaw had argued

that he did not receive the prostitutes' earnings but

merely profited from the sale of the booklet after all
expenses had been met through advertising.

To Judge

Ashworth this was a "much too narrow view of the facts. ""^^
The common law charge of conspiracy to corrupt
public morals was, however, a
for the Court of Appeal.

more complicated matter

Counsel for Shaw had insisted,

with considerable justification,

25

that the use of the
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common law concept of "corrupting public
morals" in this
case was the creation of a new offense
by judicial fiat.

This argument was rejected by judge Ashworth
because, in
his view, the court was not amaking new laws,
simply
applying "existing law to new facts. "^^

The fact that

the precise definition of public decency and morality

will vary over a period of time because of different
juries does not affect the principle that conduct calcu-

lated or intended to corrupt public morals is an indictable misdemeanor. 27

The upholding of the common law charge was
especially awkward for the Criminal Court of Appeals since

Section II

(4)

of the Act of 1959 stipulates that the

Obscene Publications Act, not

coiranon law,

is to be used

if the essence of the offense is that the matter is

obscene.

Counsel for Shaw argued that Parliament's intent

in his subsection was to prevent obscenity proceedings at

common law against a publication that was also being prosecuted under the Act itself.

It was also argued that the

thrust of the indictment was obscenity, since that was
the concept necessary to establish any "conspiracy to

corrupt public morals."

To this Judge Ashworth replied:
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In our view, the short answer to this
argument is that the offense at Common Law,
mainly, conspiracy to corrupt public morals,
did not 'consist of the publication' of the
booklets. The Common Law offense alleged by
the prosecution consisted of the agreement of
the appellant and others to corrupt public
morals by means of the booklets and although
it is unlikely that if the appellant had been
acquitted on a third count he would have been
convicted on the first, the two counts involve
different issues and the verdict on each need
not necessarily have been the same,
in our
view the primary object of S. 2 (4) was to
exclude proceedings at Common Law for the
Common Law offense of publishing an obscene
libel. The offense has not been abolished by
the Act of 1959, although as a result of the
subsection, proceedings in respect of it can
no longer be brought. ®

The Court of Appeal found all three counts to be
valid.

It dismissed Shaw's pleas against the nine-month

sentence, which it felt would have been appropriate on

any one of the counts, but did grant leave to appeal to
the House of Lords with reference to counts one and two.

The Law Lords sustained Judge Ashworth's
Section II

(4)

of the OPA.

reading of

29

Definition of "Publication"

An appeal in 1962 by one Will Barker against his
conviction and sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment
before a recorder and jury at Manchester Crown Court on
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five counts of publishing obscene articles
in the form of

photographs and catalogs forced the Criminal Court
of

Appeal to define what "publication" meant under
the OPA.
Barker did not deny production of the photographs,

but he did claim that

1)

the photographs in question were

not obscene within the meaning of the Act of 1959 and,
2)

that since he sent the photographs to only four

individuals (one of whom claimed that he used them only
for sketching and never revealed them to anyone else)

he was not really "publishing" within the meaning of the
Act.

judge Ashworth ultimately ordered the conviction

quashed, but not on any ground that was part of the

appeal argument.

Ashworth held that the Trial Recorder's

direction that the jury disregard the testimony of one
of the recipients that he showed the photos to no one was
a misdirection.

The Recorder had also emphasized the

fact that Barker had no knowledge of the age of those

who applied for his photographs, which Judge Ashworth
thought was an irrelevant factor which, together with the
misdirection, led him to conclude that the issues were
not properly placed before the jury.

30

In disposing of the arguments presented by Barker,
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however, the Court of Criminal Appeal
ruled that the forms
of publication punishable under the
OPA fall into three

distinct groups:

first, publication to an individual;

second, publication on a wider scale
involving more than

one person; and third, a mere offer for sale
or letting on

hire which would constitute publication.

So even though

Barker's conviction did not stand, the Court of
Criminal

Appeal made it clear that "publication" means making
anything available to another, and even held that an exchange

of money is not essential to the notion "publish,"

The Copper Case
The issue of who can appeal a decision under the
OPA also arose in 1962 when a metropolitan police officer
(Burke) equipped with the proper warrant, confiscated 650

photographs, negatives, prints, etc., from the shop of

John B. Copper.

Copper appeared to offer arguments as

to why the articles should not be forfeited and apparently

convinced the Middlesex Justices of the Peace that only
123 photographs and prints and 46 negatives were obscene,

because the rest of the articles were returned.

Burke

appealed to the Queen's Bench Division urging that all the
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material was obscene and that there was
no reason for

distinguishing between the articles forfeited
and those
returned.

Copper's defense at the appellate level
consisted
of two basic points.

First, he claimed that the Act of

1959 "in effect contained its own code," and
that in this

self-contained code there is a provision for appeal:
it
stipulated that the party who has appeared to show
cause

why material should not be forefeited has an appeal,
but
the statute said nothing about the prosecution.

To this

argument Lord Parker stated that while for certain
purposes
the Act could be said to contain its own code, it cer-

tainly did not create a special code in regard to appeals. "^^

The second point pressed by counsel for Copper
was that Burke could have appealed only under the Magistrate'

Courts Act of 1952.

That Act provides appellate procedures

for any person who is a party to a proceeding before a

magistrate's court.

Counsel for Copper argued that Burke

was not a party to the proceedings and was not aggrieved

by the order.

Lord Parker agreed that since no costs

were ordered against him. Burke was not a person aggrieved,
"But

I

am quite satisfied that he was a party lo the
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proceedings."

Another factor to keep in mind,
according

to Lord Parker, is that Burke was
"not complaining in

respect of his success.

He was complaining in respect

of the many, many articles in respect
of which no order

was made."

33

This argument by Lord Parker is far from
selfexplanatory, and he did not offer much
elaboration.

He

seemed to be saying that Copper's argument
to the effect
that the magistrate's order was final and
therefore could
not be appealed by the prosecution under the
Act of 1959
or the Magistrate's Courts Act was fallacious
because

Burke was not challenging the order itself but rather
what
was not ordered.

Lord Parker may have felt that his kind

of distinction was necessary, since counsel for Copper
did

argue that there is no right of appeal in favor of a

prosecutor who has succeeded.

Lord Parker was arguing

that the prosecution was not appealing what it succeeded
in doing, but rather what it was not successful in doing.

Lord Parker took great pains to explain that the

question of obscenity was largely "factual" and therefore
a judgment which is properly the jurisdiction of the

Justices, and that the Queen's Bench Division should limit
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itself to questions of law and not
"superimpose their

judgment of obscenity over that of the justices."'^'*
But in this case the Justices "went wrong in
law," Lord

Parker concluded, because, "There is no conceivable
basis
on which it could be said that some photographs
in the

bundle forfeited are more obscene than photographs in
the bundles which have not been ordered forfeited.
"

To

dramatize the superficiality of the distinction made
by
the Justices, Lord Parker, not exactly one who has a

great aversion to subtle distinctions, pointed out that,
"We had our attention drawn to one particular photograph

which appears in two bundles, the one to be forfeited
and the other a bundle not to be forfeited.
In those circumstances, it is perfectly
clear that something has gone very wrong.
Counsel for the respondent, I do not think
from any inspired knowledge but merely as a
suggestion, ventured to suggest that maybe
the justices divided up the photographs and
were each responsible for a certain number, and
on that basis it would be possible for one
justice to take a certain view of obscenity and
the other to take a different view. I am
loathe to think that that happened because it
would have been a most improper thing. The
decision is not a decision of individual
justices but a decision of the whole bench.
Something, as I have said, went clearly wrong.

Finding the same photograph in both the allowable
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and the "obscene' bundle is perhaps an
index of a certain

amount of inattentiveness on the part
of the Justices.
But Lord Parker's criticism (even though
he called it a
"critic isra in law," when one could presumably
argue with-

out great difficulty that he was substituting
his "factual

observations" for those of the Justices) even
goes to the

extent of arguing that the justices perhaps
did not

realize how socially harmful these photographs
were.
these articles were liable to be sent to
.
.
anybody, young boys, school children, young
girls and anybody on payment of the price. One
has only to look at these photographs to
realize that in the vast majority of cases there
is no conceivable artistic merit.
They provide
no inspiration, as has been said in other cases,
and are purely filth.
.

What was extremely interesting, and one could submit extremely devious in this case, was Lord Parker's
assertion, which he had to make in order to obtain jurisdiction, that the Justices made some sort of essential

mistake "in law."

This is a point which he continually

asserted but in no sense proved.

There emerges here a

curious kind of 'judicial activism," in the sense that
the appellate judges are construing their own role broadly
in order to reinforce police autonomy and free them from

the "errors in law" at Middlesex.
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Deprave and Corrupt Whom?
R.

V. C layton

Later in 1962 two proprietors of a
book shop were

convicted of conspiracy and the selling
of obscene articles
under the act, and received sentences
of fifteen months'
imprisonment on each count.

The complication in this

case, and the basis for the appeal
before the Court of

Criminal Appeal, was that the recipients of
the obscene
articles were two plainclothes officers on
the staff of
the Obscene Publications

Department of New Scotland Yard.

Since the criterion set forth in the statute to
determine

obscenity is the effect

of

the material (i.e., tendency

to deprave or corrupt) on those who are likely to
receive
it,

the bookshop proprietors argued that no obscenity had

been proved because the police officers, under crossexamination, testified that the photography in the magazines sold to them did not arouse any feelings in them

whatsoever
Lord Parker, for the Court of Criminal Appeal,

noted that precedents had established that the test of

obscenity was the effect of material on the recipient,
and while partially agreeing with the prosecution that
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there was such a thing as

"

inherent obscenity" which

could characterize the material itself,
held that the
charge
.

viewer.

roust

40

be related to the susceptibility of
the

The prosecution had argued that the
photographs

were inherently obscene and would tend
to deprave and

corrupt a likely buyer.

The fact, they urged, that the

material did not corrupt a "scientific viewer"

(New

Scotland Yard) should not undermine the charge
of "selling"
obscene material.

Lord Parker, however, ordered the con-

victions for selling quashed because the offense
depended
on what happened to the buyer.

But the convictions for

conspiracy stood because, according to Parker, the only
possible defense against the charge would be to prove that
the proprietors sought only to sell their material to

New Scotland Yard and other such "scientific observers."

No such evidence was presented, and Parker reiterated the
fact that even if it were, conspiracy requires no actual

publication or measurement of the effect on others.
Relying on R.

v.

Shaw

,

Parker also rejected the

argument that the common law offense of conspiracy to
corrupt public morals is Inapplicable to a case being
tried under the OPA, by claiming that the two offenses
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are different and that the OPA conviction
had been

quashed anyway.
This in effect means that there are two
different

kinds of obscenity.

One, under the OPA,

is defined in

terras of the effect on an actual recipient;
the other,

under common law, depends on intent to corrupt.

The

publication is irrelevant to this offense, the courts
insist, but it raises the interesting question
of how one

would prove intent without finding some material which
was obscene,

obscene in this context, since the recipient-

effect standard is irrelevant, would have to be based on

the "inherent obscenity" of a piece of evidence which the

prosecution uses to demonstrate an intent to deprave and
corrupt others.

Presumably "no intent" would be allowed

as a defense for this charge since we are not talking

about "obscene libel," which the OPA supersedes, but con-

spiracy to corrupt public morals which is still an indictable offense under common law.

may only mean "since R.

v.

Shaw

"Still" in this context
,

"

but it is an easier

charge to prosecute since it avoids recipients of material.
Parker even ended his opinion with a small apology to

police officials for handicapping them under the OPA but
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told them that test purchases were
still valuable because
the police could then obtain a warrant
to seize obscene

material in order to bring conspiracy
charges.

(They

are presumably relevant only to
help establish intent.)

This seems to be a judicial tip to the
police to concentrate on conspiracy rather than on the
selling of obscene
material,
is a

what constitutes corruption of public morals

decision the jury makes with reference to their

understanding of both 'public" and "morals;" what
constitutes obscenity depends on the jury's evaluation
of the

effect material has on actual, non-scientific,
individuals.

This would imply that corruption of public morals is a
more general notion than obscenity, and one in which the
jury has more discretion.
R.

V.

May ling

The contention, used successfully in R.

v.

Clayton ,

that, where the offense required a tendency to deprave and

corrupt, the police could not be used as a substitute for
the public, was unsuccessful as a defense against a common

law indictment for outraging public decency.

A case in

1963 concerned a homosexual incident in a public lavatory

"to the great disgust and annoyance of divers of Her

I
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Majesty's subjects within whose purview such behavior
was
committed."

The "subjects" in this instance were the

apprehending police officers, and their "disgust and
annoyance," according to Justice Ashworth of the Court of

Criminal Appeal, could be used as evidence of the type
of annoyance required,

it was more important, according

to the Court of Appeal, however, to realize that the pith

of the indictment was that the act was indecent and

committed in public, rather than that it was the reaction
of probable onlookers.

42

Queen's Bench Division

Morgan v. Eowker
In 1963 the Queen's Bench Division reviewed two

prosecutions under the OPA, the first of which concerned
the conviction of Robert Charles Morgan for publishing

obscene film, photographs and magazines which were adver-

tised in a booklet entitled, "Glamor Catalog 1962."

This

catalog was advertised in a magazine called "Sparkle,"
which contained order forms inviting readers to order
copies of the catalog and/or some films and other material

described in Morgan's ad.

No restriction appeared on the

i
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order form as to age or sex of the
potential customer.

After presentation of the catalog and some
examples of
its products. Justices of the County
of Buckingham,

sitting at Slough, ordered Morgan to appear
and "show
cause .
After

the Justices had ordered forfeiture, Morgan

appealed to the Queen's Bench on two grounds.

The first

was a procedural point involving the question
of whether
the full court or only one Justice could issue the
summons,

in Slough all the Justices had viewed Morgan's

material (for about five hours) and then all had ordered
the summons.

Solicitors for Morgan argued that the use

of the full court to issue a summons to "show cause"

meant that the court had already decided the material to

be obscene, and therefore they could not have open minds
to Morgan's defense that the material was not obscene.

Lord Parker, speaking for the Queen's Bench, dismissed
this argument by explaining that the Act did not require
a prima facie case of obscenity and then a full hearing to

decide obscenity in fact.

The function of the hearing

was not to determine the obscenity of the material but

rather to evaluate any reasons the appellant may give as
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to why matter already determined to be
obscene should not
be forfeited.'*^

The second ground concerned the relvance
of actual
recipients of the articles.

The Justices at Slough

refused to hear any testimony about persons
who received
copies of the material in question.

Morgan claimed that

when he received orders for films and other
material he
always wrote back to the respondent asking them
to declare

they were over twenty-one years of age.

This practice,

Morgan argued, should be allowed as evidence that his
material was not published for the young and therefore

could not be obscene within the meaning of the Act.

The

Justices declined to hear such evidence by reasoning that
the Act required that they look only at the actual circum-

stance in which the articles were found in order to determine likely recipients rather than testimony about

recipients themselves.

The Justices' interpretation of

their duty ste^rned from Section

3

of the OPA which states

For the purposes of this section the question
whether an article is obscene shall be determined on the assumption that copies of it would
be published in any manner likely having regard
to the circumstances in which it was found, but
in no other manner.

A confusion which, according to Parker, had been "constantly
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arising" was in the words, "but in no other
manner."

In the present case the Justices took the view that
it

meant they must be concerned with the actual circumstances

surrounding the finding which meant only the situation
in

which the material was discovered.

This interpretation,

for the Queen's Bench, was incorrect because the nature

of the offense required an assessment of the publication

with reference to the circumstances in which it was found,
and the "full circumstance" include the "nature of his

business and the method under which it has been

conducted

.

.

.

just as much as the nature of the premises.'

Morgan's intent is still quite irrelevant to the offense,

but testimony about who the actual recipients were

is

not only not the same as establishing intent, it is

essential to determine whether the material will deprave
and corrupt.

The case was returned to the justices, with

Lord Parker's instructions to consider whether the material

would corrupt adults; whether it was likely to be received
by minors; and if likely to be received by minors, would

tend to deprave and corrupt them.

46
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Straker v. D.P.p.

On the same day as the Morgan decision
the
Queen's Bench Clarified the status of
negatives by holding
that unretouched prints made from seized
negatives could
not be used as evidence, that the negatives
should be
47
forfeited.
This appeal concerned the decision of the

Marlborough Street Magistrate's Court to seize about
1500
negatives and display cards from the studio of Jean
Straker.

This was an unusual case in two respects:

first,

Straker 's method of taking orders? and secondly. Lord
Parker's obvious sympathy for the defendant.

Straker 's

studio, while at the end of a typical honky-tonk Soho
street, is also a corner building on Soho Square, an

affluent block of town houses in central Soho.

Straker

considered himself a serious photographer and artist who
specialized in nude photography for both artistic and

medical uses.

His method of advertising was to post

photographs of nudes (usually tastefully done)

,

in the

windows of the first floor of his studio, and then charge
a 5s. admission fee to his exhibition upstairs.

Reportedly

once inside Straker 's studio each client could review

photographic prints on display cards.

Each card had a
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number and for an additional fee prints
could be ordered
from the corresponding negatives.

The police seized

negatives, made their own copies, and
presented these

positives along with the display cards as
evidence that

Straker's work should be seized.

Straker, conducting

his own defense in both the original hearing
and on appeal
(where Lord Parker commended him for the "moderation"

with which he presented his case) argued that the unretouched prints were made by the police, not him, and could
not be used as evidence of material which he published.

Lord Parker agreed and ordered the negatives returned to
Straker, but was careful to avoid any general ruling that

negatives are not "articles" within the meaning of the
Act, simply that in this case the only negatives which

could be seized were those from which Straker had made
an obscene positive.

Straker also argued that the Magistrate was
incorrect in insisting that any member of the public could

receive a print, because he was vary cautious about

accepting the admission fee and taking orders for prints
so that no one was likely to be corrupted or depraved.

Lord Parker strongly implied that he would personally
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believe Striker's claim, but in his view the Queen's
Bench could only be concerned with whether the Magistrate
had erred in law.

And since the Magistrate had found 204

of the display cards to be obscene and since Straker

could not tell whether something would tend to deprave or

corrupt an individual merely by looking at him, the forfeiture of the material stood.
"

Obscenity " Not
Restricted to Sex
Obscenity as Encouraging the Use of Narcotics

An important clarification and extension of the
concept "obscene" occurred in 1964 in the Queen's Bench

Division's ruling in John Calder

,

Ltd. v. Powell .
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This

case concerned the confiscation of Cain's Book by Alexander
Trocchi, along with numerous other articles considered

obscene by Justices of the Peace in Sheffield.
Ltd.

Calder

(the publishers) appeared at the "show cause" hearing

although the shop owner and publishers of other material

confiscated did not present evidence.

Calder Ltd. called

upon five expert witnesses, including the author, who

testified that, in their opinion, the book did not tend
to corrupt or deprave anybody.

They also urged that even
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it was still a

book of literary and sociological merit.

One of the most

interesting aspects of the case was that the book
concerned
the life of a narcotic addict in New York City,
and the

prosecution invoked the obscene Publications Act of 1959
because they felt the book highlighted the favorable
effects of drug-taking.

The danger of the book from the

standpoint of the prosecution was related to drugs, not
•ex.

The Justices agreed and found that the work, taken

as a whole, was likely to deprave the people who were

likely to buy it.^^

Calder Ltd. on appeal argued that the book was

unlikely to corrupt individuals, and that the positive
testimony of the expert witnesses had not been rebutted

by the prosecution since the Crown called no witnesses.
The publishing company also argued that the Crown gave no
evidence that the book was not for the "public good" simply
that it was obscene.

50

Section 4 of the Act provides that

if any publication is justified as being "for the public

good, that is, in the interests of science,

literature,

or other objects of general concern," it shall not be

destroyed, and also guarantees the right of the opinion
of experts to be used in deciding this question.

Justices, in dealing with the matter of the expert

The
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testimony presented, simply stated that they
did not
accept the evidence as sufficient, and
therefore Calder
Ltd. had not proved that the publication was
for the

public good.
Lord Parker, in giving the decision of the Queen's

Bench Division, stated that he also felt that there was

"abundant evidence" on which the Justices could come to a

decision that the book was obscene even with the existent
of expert opinion.

Part of the argument used by Calder

Ltd. was the assertion that the justices should not have

read the book but simply evaluated evidence laid before
them by the prosecution and defense.

To this Lord Parker

replied that the justices are certainly free to look at
the books themselves just as they are perfectly entitled,

however honest the witness, to say that they cannot accepts
his evidence.

If the Justices are free to listen to

expert evidence, Parker asserts, they are equally entitled
.

.

.

if they choose, to disregard that evidence."
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Calder ltd. had misconstrued Section 4 of the Act.
In Parker's view the relevant section of the Act can be

rephrased this way:
granted that a book has been properly
found to be obscene, nevertheless it nay be for
.

.

.
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the public good that it should be
published, and,
in deciding whether it is for the
public good
that It should be published, the
justices must
consider whether this publication would
be
justified on the grounds of science,
literature
art or learning, or other objects of
general concern.
In other words, the justices must weigh
up the
obscenity against the merits of the article
in
order to decide whether its publication
is for
the public good.^^

In this kind of a case. Lord Parker seemed
to be saying,
the Justices make up their minds as to whether
the obscene

material has sufficient social merit not to destroy
it.
Since the issue of obscenity is already decided,
the

problem becomes one of weighing the social utility of
the article against its obscenity.

The defense had argued

that the burden of proof had been reversed, and it was

essentially up to Calder Ltd. to establish "public good."
Lord Parker agreed, stating,

"...

the onus of proof on

the basis of probabilities is on the defense, "^^ but

didn't find this state of affairs objectionable.

Another obvious issue raised by the defense in
this case, but not the pivotal argument in their appeal,

was that the concept obscenity must have something to do

with sex.

Lord Parker realized that this was a

rather

crucial point, since none of the other points would matter
if obscenity had to be related to sex.

Counsel for
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Calder Ltd. had argued that obscenity
in the past had
always been treated as having regard
to sexual desires
and sexual behavior, and that the
word must be confined
to that sort of behavior.

Lord Parker replied:

Of course it is true that the cases
that
have so far come before the court are
all
concerned with articles which do concern
sex;
but the fact that there has been no
decision
on the point certainly does not conclude
the
matter in his favor.

Counsel for Calder had even referred to the
U. S.
Supreme Court decision in Roth v. United States
to help
demonstrate that obscenity must be used in conjunction

with sex.

Lord Parker, not going into the jurisdictional

aspects of this kind of argument, and also "confessing"
that he had not had time to read a report of the case
in
detail, stated,

"...

but,

in my judgment it is per-

fectly plain that depravity, and indeed, obscenity (because

obscenity is treated as a tendency to deprave) is quite
apt to cover what was suggested by the prosecution in
this case."

—

This book the less said about it the betterconcerned the life, or imaginary life, of a junkie
in New York, and the suggestion of the prosecution
was that the book highlighted, as it were, the
favorable effects of drug-taking, and, so far from
condemning it, advocated it, and that there was a
real danger that those into whose hands the book
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carae might be tempted at any rate
to experiment
with drugs and get the favorable sensations
highlighted by the book. ^

English law has held that there is more than
one
road to depravity, with sex being the
most frequently used

but by no means the only path.

Glorification of Violence as Obscenity
In 1967 the scope of the concept obscenity was

found to be even broader when the OPA was invoked
against

"bubble gum" cards which depicted military battles.

This

case was brought to the Queen's Bench by the prosecution

because Justices of the Northeast London Commission
refused to allow the prosecution to use testimony of
psychiatrists.

The psychiatric testimony was to the effect

that the cards sold by A. and B. C. Chewing Gum, Ltd.,

would tend to corrupt and deprave the average child.

Lord

Parker ruled that if the defense can use expert testimony
the prosecution may also. 58

The London Justices had read the OPA as allowing
for expert testimony to establish the social value of

material but reserving the question of the tendency of
material to deprave and corrupt for the court and jury, not
a psychiatrist.

According to Parker the ultimate question
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of which cards tended to deprave and corrupt was up to

the Justices, but evidence as to the general effect of

the material in question would have on the minds of

children should be allowed.

By excluding such evidence,

the court hampered nob only the prosecution, but prevented

the defense from cross-examining experts put forth by the
state on a question which is pivotal to the entire indictment.

The question of whether material tends to deprave

and corrupt is properly the prerogative of the judge and
jury, but in answering this question they "need all the

help they can get," Lord Parker stated.

A point which the Queen's Bench felt needed some
additional clarification, however, was the interpretation
of the OPA put forth by the chewing gum company to the

effect that expert testimony could only be allowed to

establish the "public good" of material which had already

been decided to be obscene.

Parker wished to make it

clear that expert testimony is allowable on both the

question of the social utility of obscene work and the
tendency of the material to deprave and corrupt (obscenity)

.
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Defense of the

"

Public Good "

Private Prosecut ions
"Last Exit to Brooklyn," by Hubert Selby, jr.,
is
a series of stories about New York homosexuals
and drug

addicts and the violence characterizing their
environment.
In January, 1966, the publishing house of Calder and
Boyers, Ltd., realizing that the book was controversial

and might be regarded as offending the OPA, had its

solicitors write the Director of Public Prosecutions and

enclose a copy of the book along with their announcement
that they proposed to publish the work.

The publishing

company, in this letter, argued that the work was serious

literature and not likely to appeal to those with merely
a "prurient interest," but also stated that if the Director

did decide to prosecute they would engage in a strenuous
legal defense against such a move.
If, contrary to their expectations, the Director

did decide to prosecute, the company requested that proceedings be instituted under Section

2

of the Act, wherein

a defendant is entitled to be tried by a judge and a jury,
as opposed to Section 3 under which the book itself would

be forfeited if it was considered obscene.

A return letter
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Strongly implied that the D.P.P. didn't
feel any action
against the book was necessary, using the

sarae

ground

originally put forth by the Attorney General,
sir Elywn
Jones, who declined to prosecute because
he saw no chance

to prevail against a serious, if somewhat
repulsive, work.
However, Sir Cyril Black, described by Anthony

Lewis of the New York Tiroes as the Conservative
Party's

member of Parliament who "regards himself as a moral
watchdog of the community," brought private criminal prosecu-

tion under Section

3

of the Act.^^

This action was success-

ful, and the magistrate who heard the case ordered
the

forfeiture of the three copies of the book which had been
seized.

Calder and Boyers again wrote the Director of

Public Prosecutions informing him that in spite of the

magistrate's decision, they intended to continue publishing the book and expressed their willingness to fight

legally and proceeding he might feel impelled to take

under Section 2.

The D.P.P. responded to the challenge

and was successful in getting a conviction against the

publishers in Central Criminal Court which resulted in a
L 100 fine plus L 500 towards the cost of prosecution.

60
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Court of Appeals

The basis for the publishing company's appeal
primarily concerned the trial judge's instruction
to the
jury on

1)

the meaning of "obscene;"

2)

paraphrasing the

defense's allegation that the book was not obscene?
and
3)

guidance on the matter of "public good" as a defense

against punishment stemming from the OPA"

Judge Salmon, delivering the opinion of the Court
of Appeals, felt that the appellants' argument that the

trial judge should have explained that the essence of
moral corruption is to make a person behave badly or worse

than he otherwise would behave or blur his perception of
the difference between good and evil, would have resulted
in only greater ambiguity.

The trial judge simply reiterated

dictionary definitions of "deprave" and "corrupt," and
instructed the jury that they must concentrate not on
isolated passages by the work taken as a whole.

When a

statute lays down the definition of a word or phrase "in

plain English, it is rarely necessary and often unwise
for the judge to attempt to improve on the

.

.

.

definition,"

according to Judge Sllmon.
A flaw in the instructions to the jury which the
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appellants didn't point out, but which Judge
Salmon
thought raised a 'difficult question/' was
guidance on
the matter of "persons likely to read the book."

To

Judge Salmon this cannot mean "all" persons, nor can
it

mean "individuals who may be corrupted by almost anything."
Ultimately, according to Salmon, the question becomes one
of numbers:

how many are corrupted.

The statute cannot

be construed as meaning that a majority of the average

readers would be corrupted, because, according to Salmon,
such a work could never be justified as being for the

"public good."

The interesting implication here is that

if a work should corrupt a simply majority, then it cannot

be defended as being for the public good

—which

would

make the defense of literary merit applicable only if
less than fifty-one per cent tended to be depraved.

By

a process of elimination. Judge Salmon held that the

requisite number of corrupted to constitute the offense

cannot be all, it cannot be a majority, it cannot be one,
or even an aggregate of the easily corruptible.

This court is of the opinion that the jury
should have been directed to consider whether
the effect of the book was to tend to deprave
and corrupt a significant proportion of those
persons likely to read it. What is a significant
proportion is a matter entirely for the jury
to decide. ^2
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The lack of such an instruction is
serious,

according to Salmon, but since it is
impossible to determine whether the absence of such instruction
made the jury

conclude that one must be corrupted or more
than half of
the readers must be corrupted, the lack of
direction on

this matter alone does not vitiate the
conviction.

Two other flaws in the direction to the jury were
serious enough, however, for the Court of Appeals
to over-

turn the conviction.

The first was the trial judge's

failure to paraphrase the defense's argument against
the

charge that the work was in fact obscene.

The defense

argued that instead of tending to encourage any one to
homosexuality, drug-taking or senseless violence, the

book vrauld have precisely the reverse effect.

The trial

judge construed that argument to be that the book could

have socially constructive effects, and paraphrased it
as part of the defense's argument on "public good," not

on obscenity itself.

Judge Salmon viewed this as a fatal

defect since it was a contention that the book would not

have the effect the prosecution alleged, and that the
jury's assessment of the effect of the work is crucial

to the finding of obscenity.

The jury might well have

rejected the defense' argur^ent, but
the Court of Appeal
could not be absolutely certain, and
the fact that the
jury deliberated for nearly five and
one-half hours in

this case created the possibility
of a "miscarriage of
"^-^

justice.

The second flaw, according to the Court
of Appeal,
was the lack of guidance on the "public
good" provision
of the Act.

The trial judge faced a difficult task

because he had no previous authority to help
him with
the proper interpretation of the "public good,"
a section

of the OPA which Judge Salmon noted left even the
Director
of Public Prosecution in a "state of perplexity."

Any

guidance given by the trial judge might have been inadequate, but the problem in this case was no guidance at

all

for the jury,

"in effect he threw them in at the

deep end of S.4 and left them to sink or swim in its drrk
waters."

64

Judge Salmon, at least aptly named for such

aquatic metaphors, plunged into the dark waters of Section
4

and stated that in such a case:

the jury must consider on the one hand
the number of readers they believe would tend to
be depraved and corrupted by the book, the strength
of the tendency to deprave and corrupt, and the
nature of the depravity or corruption; on the other
hand, they should assess the strength of the literary.
.

.

.
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sociological or ethical merit which they
consider
the book to possess. They should then
weigh up
all these factors and decide whether
on balance
the publication is proved to be justified
as being
for the public good. A book may be
worthless; a
book may have slight but real merit; it may
be a
work of genius. Between those extremes
the gradations are almost infinite. A book may tend
to deprave
or corrupt a significant but comparatively
small
number of readers or a large number or indeed
the
majority of its readers. The tendency to deprave
and corrupt may be strong or slight. The
depravity
and corruption may also take various forms,
it
may be to induce erotic desires of a heterosexual
kind or to promote homosexuality or other sexual
perversions or drug taking or brutal violence. All
these are matters for the jury to consider and
weigh up; it is for them to decide in the light
of the importance they attach to those factors
whether or not the publication is for the public
good. A jury must set the standard of what is
acceptable, of what is for the public good in the
age in which we live.^^

The significance of the Calder case, in addition
to the "significant proportion" rule for establishing how

many must be corrupted, is that it makes clear that the
judgment of the "public good" served by any work is to be

based on the jury's weighing the positive effect the
book may have in literary or sociological terras against
the work's tendency to deprave and corrupt.

Confusion

had arisen in previous cases because expert witnesses were
asked whether they regarded a particular book or section
of the book to be obscene.

This ruling stipulates that
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What the experts should have been
asked was whether they

regarded the book to have literary or
other merit, with
the jury deciding whether these merits
counterbalanced
the harm which they have already decided
exists since

they have labeled the material obscene.

Calder case in the

A review of the

Quarterly Review found the holding

to "make sense of the law" because a jury
may find without questioning an expert's view, "that a book
has great

literary merits and that on balance the book does
more

harm than good." 66

However, as in the Chewing Gum case,

it appears clear that the defense can use expert
wit-

nesses to present evidence to the jury that the work in

question does not tend to deprave and corrupt.

Once the

jury decides that the work would tend to deprave and

corrupt a significant proportion of those likely to read
it,

then experts are restricted to questions of literary

merit.

But since the jury does not retire to decide

obscenity and then to sit again to hear evidence about
social merit, it is virtually impossible for experts to

know when they are doing what.

The implementation of this

decision would seem to depend on the trial judge's ability
to sort out arguments about the effect of the book on

individuals and the importance of the book to society.
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Post Office Act of 1953
R.

V.

Stanley
In 1965 the Court of Criminal Appeals
was called

upon to interpret the Post Office Act
of 1953 and dis-

tinguish something which is "indecentfrom something
which is "obscene."

This case concerned the conviction

of Allen B. Stanley at the London
Sessions Court on two

counts of sending a postal packet containing
indecent and
obscene articles through the mail and conspiracy
with his

co-accused and others to contravene the same
section of the
Post Office Act.

Stanley was also indicted on two counts

under the OPA of 1959 for publishing two obscene
films;
the indictment failed, even though a fourteen-year-old

boy was found to possess a catalog describing Stanley's
films, because the jury found his films to be "indecent"

but not "obscene."

Stanley was fined L 100 for viola-

tions of the Post Office Act and on appeal invoked

essentially four different arguments.
He claimed, first, that the instructions to the
jury were insufficient because the words "indecent" and
the words "obscene" were employed t auto logically to convey

the same idea and mean the same thing.

Second, he alleged.

197

the jury had clearly indicated that
they had found the

brochures referred to in the indictment
as "indecent" but
not "obscene" because they acquitted
him on the counts

stemming from the OPA.

Therefore, their verdicts of

guilty on the counts stemming from the Post
office Act
were "unreasonable."

Third, he argued that, if the words

"indecent" and "obscene" were not synonymous,
the counts

against him under the Post Office Act duplicated
one

another because they alleged two separate or
alternative
offenses in each count, and they were also vague.

Fourth,

he claimed, the judge was wrong in law because
he failed

to exclude evidence by the fourteen-year-old boy as
to
the effect that certain exhibits had on him (the
boy).^^

Lord Parker dismissed the argument about the testi-

mony of the boy by simply stating that it was "inconceivable"
that such testimony could have made the "slightest
difference."

63

on the semantic issue Lord Parker explained

that the London Sessions Chairman defined "indecent" to

mean simply something that offends the "ordinary modesty
of the average man," whereas "obscene" has a statutory

definition involving the tendency of material to deprave
and corrupt.

The jury had concluded that neither the films
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nor the brochure were obscene
but that they were indecent.

counsel for the appellant had relied
heavily on some
dicta from a 1953 case in which Lord
Cooper had stated
that "indecent or obscene" were
employed tautologically

to convey the same idea.^^

All that Lord Cooper was trying

to convey, according to Parker, was
that the two words
expressed the same idea but in varying
degrees,

m

order

to make this assertion Parker had to
stretch the meaning

of Cooper's opinion (where the point was
exactly the

opposite of his) but the essential fact for Lord
Parker
was that they jury recognized the works in
question not

to offend against standards at the 'top end of
the scale
so as to be obscene, but only at the lower end in
that

they were indecent." 70

To the Court of Criminal Appeal

an indecent article is not necessarily obscene, but an

obscene article is necessarily indecent.
"

Backup Statute " for
When the OPA Fails
Mr. David Cunliffe, publisher of an anthology

entitled The Golden Convolvulus

,

was charged with publishing

an obscene article but was found not guilty because he did
not have enough customers for the jury to decide the
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material's tendency.

However, the jury thought that the

publication was "indecent/' and Cunliffe was
fined L 50
for sending "indecent material through the
post/' contrary

to the Post Office Act.*^^

The Post office Act, therefore,

is apparently used when the offending material
is sent

through the mail, but is not objectionable enough for

prosecution under the OPA.

in the above cases at least

the Post Office Act served as a convenient "back-up
statute" to be used when the OPA fails.

Official Censorship
Lord Chamberlain

Acts of parliament are not, however, the only
instruments of government concerned with obscenity, or

perhaps even the most important.

Reading is essentially

a private matter, and obscenity in a public place, such
as a theater,

courts)

,

involved not acts of parliament (or the

but the Lord Chamberlain,

probably because not

all, or even most, of the Crown's subjects could read in

the early history of England, royal concern for what was

communicated was less with books and published material

than with plays and public performances where it was
possible for a citizen to ascertain a point of view or be
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corrupted without being literate.

The institution of the

Lord Chamberlain, presently Cameron
Fromanteel, first

Baron Cobbold, educated at Eton and Cambridge
and former
head of the Bank of England, was designed
for this purpose,

until 1968, when his censorhsip powers were

removed, he approved or disapproved (for a fee
paid by

the author) of all manuscripts scheduled for
public per-

formance in the United Kingdom.

This curious British

institution was the object of endless complaints from

British playwrights, and the Lord Chamberlain's role as
official censor (he has other roles, such as keeper of
the Royal Swans, etc.) once led him to declare his own

official letters to theater managers as "not permitted"

when one imaginative producer enquired if the could read
the Lord Chamberlain's letter containing the required

deletions during the interlude such deletions would cause
in the production.

What was censored by the Lord Chamberlain was not

solely or even primarily sexual references, but any
references to the Government, Queen, or Church which he

considered to be in bad taste. 73

The usual procedure was

for the Lord Chamberlain first to read the manuscript and
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make deletions. If any, and specify
what must be substituted.

This was frequently followed by a period
of

lobbying between the author and the Lord
Chamberlain over

substitute phrases, etc.

There were techniques of avoiding the scrutiny
of the Lord Chamberlain, such as declaring
the theater a

"private club," but this was an effective technique
only

because the Lord Chamberlain chose to make it so,
since
his jurisdiction extended to "any public place,"
not

simply to theaters.^"*

Periodic prosecutions were taken

against private clubs, usually on the grounds that
nonraembers had been granted admission, which served as

occasional reminders of official authority in this area.
In 1951, for example, action was taken against the Unity

Theater in which the management and everyone concerned
with the production of the play

— including

the ticket-

seller, was fined a total of L 218 plus costs.
;

9

The issue

not the play itself, but simply the "easy membership"

in the club.

This led seven other theater clubs, repre-

sented by the NCCL, to file a "watching brief" which urged
that licensing authorities desist from intervention with

theather clubs. 75

This may not have been a typical
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••reminder" of official power over
play production, because

police, in interviewing the staff
of the theater, allegedly

asked detailed questions about the
private beliefs and
friendships of the staff, and the entire
case took on

aspects of police harrassment of London's
""^^
"minstrel class.

The End of Stage
Censorship
"

Saved "

It was a judicial action which,

ironically, set in

motion a chain of events which eventually, with the
wholehearted approval of Lord Cobbold, led to the removal of
stage censorship powers from the Lord Chamberlain.

Plans

to abolish the curious anachronism had probably existed
since its inception but had always ended in defeat.

In

1865 and 1907 English playwrights petitioned Parliament

to do away with the Lord Chamberlain's power, but with no
results.

In 1949 a bill got through one reading of the

House of Commons but proceeded no further. 77

in 1966,

however, several events coalesced into a road to reform.

Not to be overlooked, of course, was the impor-

tance of Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, who was openly
opposed to the Lord Chamberlain as censor and instrumental
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in liberalizing the Obscene
Publications Act of 1959.

But an even greater source of pressure
was generated when
the Lord Chamberlain himself extended
his censorship powers

to cover plays put on by "private"
theater clubs.

The

action against "Saved," which some speculate
was a deliberate extension of power by the Lord
Chamberlain to bring

about his own undoing, ''^ received judicial
sanction in the

Marylebone Magistrates Court in April of 1967.
In this case Magistrate Leo Grodwell held that

the English Stage Society (the producers of "Saved")
had

violated the "for hire" provisions of the Theaters
Act
of 1843.

The Lord Chamberlain wanted the deletion of a

•cene in the play in which a baby is stoned to death;

the author and producers refused, which meant the pley
was not approved by the L. C.

The Lord Chamberlain argued

that he had jurisdiction over "Saved" because

1)

English

Stage Society was not a genuine "private club" and

2)

the

Theaters Act stipulated that a play must be approved by
the L. C. if it is "for hire."

This was a break from the

long tradition of accepting a tongue-in-cheek definition

of private club.

The English Stage Society charged

5 s.

by which a person became an "associate member" of the
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Society and was entitled to see a performance.

The

Marylebone Magistrate was to help end this sixty-yearold custom by holding that because the Royal Court Theater,

where "Saved" was performed, like most English theaters,
sold alcoholic drinks and did not have free admittance,

the entire production is "for hire."

During the trial such notables as Sir Laurence
Olivier testified as "character" witnesses for the
Society, and the magistrate showed signs of irritation at

the "advice" prominent citizens were offering.

The

action against the English Stage Society did, however,

provoke a debate in Parliament which gave rise to a
promise by the Labor Party to form a committee to review
the entire issue of censorship.

80

Act ion from Parliament

A joint conunittee of the House of Lords and the
House of Commons was then set up and, after studying the

problem for a year, announced in June of 1967 that it
unanimously felt that an end to the licensing system was
desirable.
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Almost a year earlier the Lord Chamberlain

had publicly announced that he felt his censorship duties
were "no longer appropriate."

The committee saidi
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No one man should possess unqualified dictatorship
over what may or may not be presented in our
theaters. Attendance at a theater is a voluntary
act.
It is better that an individual should have
the right to decide, with full knowledge, what
sort of play he wishes to see than that some
central authority should attempt to lay down what
is suitable for the average person.®^

During the various hearings before the committee
the only significant group wanting to continue the cen~

sorial powers of the Lord Chamberlain was the Society of

West End Theater Managers.

These managers, who run the

more lucrative of London's commercial theaters, feared
that if plays were not licensed they would be open to

prosecution for libel and obscenity.
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The committee

proposed an end to all forms of licensing and recommended
that the theater be covered by the obscene Publications

Act of 1959.

This, together with the laws of libel,

defamation, public order, blasphemy and sedition, it felt,

were sufficient to make the English theater subject to
the rule of law.

At the hearings criticisms of the Lord Chamberlain
as guardian of sexual propriety were frequent, but not
as frequent as the criticism of censorship based on the

political aspects of censored plays.

The banning of

"MacBtrd;" Hochhuth's "The Soldiers," which Lord Cobbold
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held maligned the characters of Sir Winston
Churchill and
Lord Cherwellr and the Hampstead Theater Club's
production
of "In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer"
were cases in
point.

In the Hampstead case the simple technique of
open

defiance resulted in the Lord Chamberlain subsequently
licensing the play for public performance.^^

On February 23, 1968, Labor backbencher George

Strauss (because he had good luck in the annual draw for
limited private-bill time) introduced the measure to end
stage censorship. 85

The Labor Government approved of the

idea, but left it as a private member's bill, which is

the usual course in matters of morals.®^

Strauss' bill

permitted legal action to be taken against a play if any

citizen complained the play libelled him.

The Attorney

General was also authorized to bring criminal obscenity
proceedings under the OPA.

Conservative MP Norman

St. John-Stevas, a noted libertarian legal scholar,

expressed concern about satirization of the Crown and

unsuccessfully called for an amendment to forbid the

depiction of existing heads of state in any country.
Strauss rejected the notion on the ground that political
figures can be and are satirized in newspaper cartoons
and books, and that there was no reason to attempt their
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protection on the stage.

He also noted the popularity of

the stage hit "Mrs. Wilson's Diary" which
portrayed Prime

Minister Wilson as a bumbler in a Batman costume.®''
Surprisingly, the long-argued proposal passed the

House of Commons by voice vote without recorded
dissent,
and 400 years of stage censorship came to an end.

The

last play to be submitted to the Lord Chamberlain was
the

proposed production of "Hair," which came back marked
"unacceptable."

88

The official date for abolition of the

Lord Chamberlain's censor power was July 25, 1968.

On

July 26, 1968 "Hair" opened in Shaftesbury Theater, London.
Br itish Board of
Film Censors

Film censorship in the United Kingdom stems from
the original desire of the Crown to protect the public
from flammable films.

Checking the chemical content of

the celluloid was extended to the content of the film,

but since sixteen-millimeter films were usually nonflammable they are curiously exempt from censorship and
control.

Repeated attempts, in 1934, 1939, and again in

1951, were made to introduce control over sixteen-milli-

mater films, but pressure group activity on the part of
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the NCCL, the Missionary Societies, and
the Association
of Cinematographic and Allied Technicians
was able to

keep censorship from being extended.
The chief instrument for censorship of films
is
the British Board of Film Censors, which, while
not a

statutory authority, operates under the general
model of
licensing conditions stipulated by the Home Office.

In

films, as in plays, sexual impropriety is not
the only

ground for censorship.

Clause 10 of the general condi-

tions for licensing set down by the Home Office states

that a particular film may be banned if,

"...

it con-

tains matter which, if exhibited, would offend against

good taste or decency or would be likely to encourage or
incite to crime or lead to disorder or to be offensive to

public feeling."
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This mandate is interpreted by the

general secretary of the BBFC.

One of the central objec-

tions to censorship, of course, is that it makes art so

dependent on the censor, and nowhere is this dependency
more evident than with the BBFC, and the man who happens
to fill the role of secretary.

Clause 10 was used by Lord

Morrison, secretary during the period immediately following

World war II, to prohibit producers from showing such
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things as "antagonistic relations between
management and
labor,"

"clutching hands," "salacious wit," "sensuous

exposure of girls' legs," and "British officers and
civilians in an odious light as regards their conduct
in
India."

Under the reign of John Trevelyan, the Board of

Film Censors became in the view of many, an important
positive influence on the British film industry.

Lord

Morrison once stated that "South Pacific" was among his
favorite films, and critics charged that he used this film
as a critical yardstick for what was morally acceptable.

Trevelyan, on the other hand, is not only a connoisseur
of the arts (a jazz pianist, member of the Board of the

Wertern Theater Ballet, and for twelve years Chairman of
the London Philorousica) but also a genuine film aficianado.

The New York Times reported that while Trevelyan had his
detractors, many London critics and movie producers

credited him with having created the atmosphere "essential
for the revolution in British film making that began a

decade ago."
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Trevelyan himself has stated that he liked

to think his job was not "wholly negative."

One of his

most ardent supporters is Harold Pinter, whose

pj.ay.
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"The caretaker," received severe
deletions by the lord
Chan,berlain but emerged almost
intact when it was made

into a movie,

when the play was revised, the Lord

Chamberlain even reversed his decision
as a result of what
Trevelyan had allowed in the film, and
made no deletions.

"I detest and fear censorship
and equally the office

of the censor," Pinter has stated.

But about Trevelyan,

Pinter feels that, "Without him, most,
if not all, of the
serious international products of the
British industry in

recent years could not have been made."^^

Trevelyan

construed his function to be one in which the
public
received films which were "in good taste."

His only

criteria for establishing this was "on the feel
of the
thing."

His standards for obscenity centered very closely

on whether, for example, nudity was relevant to the
film
or had any intrinsic value.

Excessive violence and

violent sexuality, he would contend, can have disasterous

effects on children, and for this reason he believes that
some sort of censorship is necessary to the public
interest.
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Most of the cuts made by the BBFC in most films
seem to receive at least tacit approval from critics.
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Richard Round, £il™ critic of
the Manchester Guardian,
felt that the scenes cut fron,
Mai Zetterling-s "Night
Games" still left "enough that
is scandalous

.

.

.

regaining for those who are
interested in that kind of
thing." 94

Much more controversial, however,
was the film

version of James Joyce's "Ulysses/shown widely in the
united States with all of its
footage and dialogue intact
(although simultaneous two-day
showings throughout the

nation helped to make action against
the film difficult),
but subject to what the director felt
was a "hatchet job"
in Britain. 95

Joseph Strick, director of the film,
was

so upset by the twenty-nine cuts,
twenty-seven involving

Joycian language and two involving Joycian
images, that
he "retaliated" by marking each cut in
the film with a
"beep" on the sound track and provided
theater patrons

with a leaflet containing the beeped dialogue
and a
description of the beeped scenes.

Strick also facetiously

threatened to add a title card to the picture reading:
"Cuts by John Trevelyan.

But Trevelyan also met his critics head on.

meeting in Festival Hall on September

16,

in a

1968, before a

crowd of about 2,000 film buffs and movie critics, most of
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them members of the New cinema
club formed in 1967 at
least partly to campaign
against governmental control
over
films, Trevelyan showed more
than two hours of film that
he had censored, and explained
why.
the daring confrontation, in which the audience
saw sequences never
Shown to the public before, many
left still convinced that
censorship was inherently evil and
unnecessary, but very
few left unmoved by what they saw.^^
Sean Day-Lewis of

m

The Daily Telegraph described himself
as feeling "nauseated"

by film clips from japan depicting a
maniac with

a penchant

for slicing off the ears of young, naked
virgins; the

Manchester Guardian's critic. Derrick Malcolm,
was
"horrified" by the sequences depicting violence,
although

he found the pornography sequences "quite harmless"

(but

did add that he would not want his children to
see thera).^®

Trevelyan described this rather unprecedented
exhibition as "an illustrated lecture" in which he tried
to justify his job in terms of what he felt to be

"regrettable necessity."

What began as a hostile audience

ended up giving Trevelyan an ovation.

"Frankly," Trevelyan

told the audience, "i find sex in truly artistic films
much less a problem than the mounting wave of violence,"
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and he expressed a particular concern
about the possible

flood into England of American "blue movies"
which he
said were "scarcely concealed pornography
with a strong

streak of sadism thrown in."^°°

The audience did object to the deletion of a
nude
scene in the Swedish film "Hugs and Kisses,"
but Trevelyan

argued that he had to "anticipate" probable
action under

obscenity statutes and stated. "We have to protect
not
only the public but the film industry itself."
Other Sources of Punishment
for Obscenity

Customs
H. M. Customs gained the authority to censor books

through the Customs Consolidation Act of 1876, which prohibits the importation of indecent or obscene works.

Customs officials work from a black list compiled by the

Commissioners of Customs and Excise which may include
books which have not been the subject of prosecutions.

Customs officers are empowered to seize any books a citizen or alien may wish to bring into England, but the list
itself is not divulged to the public.
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This is

especially inconvenient since a person does not know what
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books he may buy abroad and import
and has no way of
finding out.

A person whose books are seized has a
month

in which to notify the Commissioners
that he objects.

As a matter of practice the customs
officials do not
tell the individual of this procedure,
and after this time

the books are automatically forfeited,

if the person

does object within the specified period,
the matter then

goes to court,

m

one of the more well-publicized

examples of customs censorship, jean Genet's
works in

French were seized even though they had been
bought for
the reference library in Birmingham.

British customs successfully resisted the Select

Committee's proposal that no destructions be made by
customs officials without a court order, arguing
on
grounds of administrative inconvenience and expense,

it

is important to realize that in the seizing of
books by

the customs officers the OPA does not apply.

Material

seized by customs operated essentially under the guidelines of the Obscene Publications Act of 1857; literary

merit cannot be raised as a defense, expert evidence about
such merit is inadmissible, and the criteria for deter-

mining obscenity can be based on isolated parts of the
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book, not the work taken as a whole.

^^'^

Nor, as we have

seen, do the standards of the OPA of 1959 apply to
obscene

material sent through the mails.

Post office officials

censor under the authority of the Post office Act of 1953,

which made it punishable to send obscene matter through
the post and authorized officials to detain and destroy

such material.

Having essentially three different agencies

operating under three different statutes to search for

obscenity in books alone can create endless confusion.

In

1960, for example, customs officials were allowing Lady

Chatter lev '8 Lover to be brought into the country, while
the Post Office was seizing copies which were mailed.
The NCCL, in 1968, effectively intervened on

behalf of a young American poet, Clive Matson, who traveled
to Britain in order to give a series of readings.

Customs

officials seized sixty copies of his own book and seven
copies of a magazine in his possession because they were
"on the borderline" and could possibly be obscene.

The

Council in this case provided Matson with legal counsel,
and after it approached some members of Parliament, the

material was returned to Matson with no further action

taken by the authorities.

106

216

Local By-Laws

There are also, of course, numerous
local acts
relating to obscene publications, as
well as local bylaws.

The Home Secretary, however, has in
recent years

refused to authorize those portions
of local by-laws which
are submitted for his approval (as all
by-laws must) if

they deal with obscenity.
Local authorities also obviously have
numerous
informal mechanisms to control the type of
reading matter

circulating in the community.

There are unofficial

approved lists of comic books and picture post cards,
and
numerous communities have unofficial censorship
committees

composed simply of concerned citizens.

There have been

certain types of industry pressure on the Home Office
to set up national censorship boards.

The Post Card

Association, which represents most of the manufacturers
and wholesalers of post cards in the United Kingdom, on
one occasion asked the Home Office to set up an independent

national censorship board because the Association com-

plained that the criteria of various local authorities was
so erratic that the industry did not know what sorts of

things it could print and have legally distributed in all
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areas.
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Pressure groups urging more stringent appli-

cation of obscenity statutes presumably would be
in
favor of decentralized control of the criteria
for

obscenity, since this would force whatever
"industry"

concerned to be extremely cautious in what it presented
the public if it wished their products to be widespread
and therefore make money.

The increase in literary and cinema prosecutions
for obscenity was usually not the result of high govern-

mental involvement but of local police officers and private pressure.

It was individual police officers who,

for example, made the decision to prosecute sellers of

Beards ley pictures under an early nineteenth-century

Vagrancy Act.

This Act, aimed originally against veterans

Showing their wounds as they begged,

prohibits "will-

fully exposing to public view an indecent exhibition"

and is prosecuted without a jury or the right to offer

evidence of serious artistic purpose.

Concentrating on

the literal wording of the Act and avoiding its historical

context enabled Magistrates to convict the sellers.
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Obecenity Statutes and
Pressure Groups

The NCCL
The Council almost annually attacks
British cen-

sorship laws, usually by pointing out
that the measures
do very little to restrict the sale
of what it calls "true

obscenity and pornography."

it usually chooses to focus

on the archaic nature of the entire endeavor
rather than

on the problem of obscenity itself.

A typical statement

occurred in the 1967 annual report:

Meanwhile those in search of true obscenity
and pornography can still find it readily
obtainable commercially in unlimited
quantities (if not in the most attractive
surroundings) in Soho and elsewhere in our
large towns. So much for our laws of public
morality.
In its annual report for 1966 the NCCL stated its

general philosophy toward censorship,

in principle it

accepts that there "may sometimes be a need for limited

censorship when real harm to individuals may otherwise
result:

liberty is a principle only insofar as it does

not infringe the rights of other individuals. "

went on to state that:

It
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In practice, however, it is at present
difficult
to 3U8tify censorship, in that no
recorded case of
the banning of a film, a book, play
or a television
program has in our view been in the public
interest.

This general acceptance of the power to
censor is
thus not only typical of British society in
general, but

also of libertarian organizations.

For a whole host of

reasons the British are perhaps much more sensitive
and
sympathetic to arguments about the public interest and

governmental action in the public interests, than Americans
are, and there does not seem to exist the rather
congenital

hostility to power per se that exists among American
libertarians.

The great harm of pressure groups lobbying to
tighten up English censorship laws, at least to the NCCL,
is not their effectiveness but the fact that they detract

attention from the need to revise British censorship laws
"in the light of common sense and tolerance."

The

OPA is viewed by the Council as a flagrant infringement on
civil liberty because it leaves far too much discretion on
the vague standards of obscenity to the judge or jury.
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Other Groups and
Public Opinion

There is also, of course, a demand
for an increase
in censorship.

Groups such as the League of Women
and

the "Clean Up TV Campaign" pressured
the House of Commons

to place greater restrictions on the
portrayal of violence
and sexual relationships in TV plays, and
certain MPs did

call for a control body for the BBC but
were resisted by
the rest of the Commons on the ground that
the BBC had

criteria for -good taste and decency,
strated any violation of public trust.

and had not demon-

The BBC is not

especially timid about presenting things such as nudity
to its audience,

in October of 1968, for example, it

ran a television documentary on a group of naturists
(nudists) exhibiting male and female anatomy in full color.

The program began with an opening shot of two

nalced

men

swimming in a pool, with the producer of the documentary

warning the audience that they might find what was to
come a bit embarrassing.

A BBC official said later that

he had received some telephone calls from viewers com-

plaining about the program, but the overwhelming critical
reaction, on the part of the British press at least, was

that the program was a poor advertisement for sex. 116
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While bold things were happening
on the BBC, in
1966 the Hampstead Arts Council took
what the NCCL viewed
as timid action when it
withdrew from its exhibition

works by six Swedish painters,
including a nude portrait
of the Roman emperor Heliogobalus
because of "recent police
actions." 117 The police actions
referred to by the Arts

Council were, the NCCL surmised, the
prosecution of the
Robert Frazer gallery for its display of
works by the

American pop artist Jim Dine which were
visible from the
street and were held by the police to have
"caused offense
to the public (violation of the Vagrancy
Act)
Listener, describing the American's work as

"

The

.

.

.

.

phallic

exaggerations to be found on the walls of public lavatories," stated that Dine,

"...

used these graffiti deli-

cately and wittily, although not without sympathy.
The 1966 trial in which

I an

Brady and Myra

Hind ley were found guilty of murdering three children-

dubbed by the press as the "Moors Trial" because the bodies
were found in the nearby Moors

— created

an increase in

public sentiment for censorhip of salactious works with

overtones of sadism.

This crime was motivated by a need

for sexual gratification, and Brady in particular had a
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library almost exclusively concerned with the works of
the Marquis de Sade and other works of this genre.

While

there was much discussion about the relationship between

pornography and crime and the general social utility of
censorship, the dialogue quickly moved to a re-evaluation
of capital punishment and the complaint that the lack of

the death penalty made the trial "aesthetically" dis-

appointing because it did not produce any kind of public
catharsis.
event,
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Intense as the public reaction was to this

it brought no new practices about,

simply "argu-

ments" to be used by those who had traditionally supported

stricter censorship.
Most English libertarians feel that pressure
groups designed to rid England of obscene material, such
as the Public Morality Council and the Catholic Teachers

Federation, are not very influential where the local

police are apathet ic about obscenity statutes.

They are

more than willing to assist the police in uncovering
obscenity, but usually have not resorted to private pro-

secutions.

The overwhelming majority of prosecutions

against obscene publications are taken by the police, even

though initiative may originally stem from a pressure
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group.

When police prosecute they are required by the

Prosecution of Offenses Regulations of 1946 to report to
the Director of Public Prosecution.

The Director is

empowered to advise police on whether to prosecute, and
occasionally, if he thinks the case is sufficiently important, take up prosecution himself.

The Director classifies

allegedly obscene works reported to him into four different
categories:

1)

material for which previous destruction

orders have been made;

2)

orders have been refused;

material for which destruction
3)

new material which he thinks

should be put before the court; and 4) new material which
has been reported as obscene but which the Director thinks
is not obscene.

the Director
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Local authorities may, however, reject

's "advice."

The Select Committee in its

recommendations urged that the Director not only advise
on such prosecutions, but that obscenity should be added

to the list of crimes which cannot be prosecuted without
his consent.

The Committee, and libertarians in general,

were anxious to promote uniform standards since most of
the more repressive obscenity prosecutions come from local

police officials.
1955,

The Children and Young Persons Act of

for example, required permission of the D.P.P. before
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any prosecution can be instituted,
and the Select Committee
argued that since the Director had
tabulated information

on which to advise local officials
under this law, it

would not be a great addition to administrative
labor
for him to decide whether to allow
prosecutions for obscenity.

The government successfully resisted any such
implementation on the ground that the definition of
obscenity

is

necessarily so imprecise that it would be improper
for
the executive to usurp the court's task of deciding
what
is

obscene by screening all prosecutions.
But even if prosecutions were under centralized

control, determining precisely who initiates prosecutions

would still be difficult.

Just as in sedition cases, the

Home Office is in some ways the government department
concerned, since the police forward all reports of con-

victions and detention orders to the Home office which

maintains records and statistics.

The Home Office is also

notified of seizures by H. M. Customs and the Post Office,
and actions of the Director of Public Prosecutions,

it

is also the designated authority to act in the name of the

United

Kingdom under the International Convention for

the Suppression of Pornography and communicates with other
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states about obscene

material being distributed,

in

this international role, the Home office
reportedly cir-

culates a list of books which it believes
to be obscene,

although no prosecution has been launched against
such
books.

The American novel, Lolita, was never prosecuted

in England, for example.

The Home office simply wrote to

France about this "highly obscene book," in order
to
secure the suppression of an English- language version

being printed in France.
Cone lus ion
Nature of the
Crime

Legally the crime of "obscenity" is at once a very

broad concept, since it is not restricted to sex; on the
other hand it is now a quite technical notion denoting

only the effect a thing has on a probable

recipient.

The telescoping nature of the offense is compounded by
numerous statutes used to attack the same problem.

A

thing may be "indecent," i.e., not sufficiently corrupting
to be obscene in the technical sense, and still bring

punishment to an individual under the Post office Act, or
the Vagrancy Act, or the common law charge of corrupting
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public morals.

Recipients of questionable material may

lose them when passing through customs,
or be forbidden

to import English translations of them,
based on a cri-

teria known only to the Home Office.

The profusion of statutes which can be applied,
together with the diffusion of the power to
prosecute,
increases the variable nature of the offense, and
is the

chief reason libertarians prefer centralized
application
of obscenity

laws— better one national censor than many

parochial censors.

But even where prosecution is under

the OPA where the defense of "public good" is allowed,
the burden of proof is still on the defendant to demon-

strate socially redeeming value.
In between indecency and technical obscenity

there is the ambiguous notion of "inherent obscenity"

which turns up in common law prosecutions where a 'publication" is not necessary but an intent to corrupt is.

Intent here would presumably be based on evidence, i.e., a

magazine or picture, etc., which, since its effect is
irrelevant, would be evaluated on a reasonable guess as

to its consequences.

This criterion remains as unannounced

as that of the Home Office.
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Role of the
Bench
Judicial interpretation has occasionally
altered

application in a liberal direction, such
as when Justice
Stable used his instructions to the jury
in the Philanderers

Case to prohibit the old OPA from preventing
the publication of serious literature simply because it
might be

harmful to young children.

The OPA of 1959, however, has

usually been bent in the other direction—almost
to a
right angle in

v.

Shaw

.

The "Ladies Directory" holding

seemed to establish that the tendency to deprave and

corrupt means any aid given to those who are corrupt

already and are seeking depravity.

Since Justice Ashworth

held that a man can be corrupted more than once (and by
implication in more ways than one)

,

the offense of

obscenity can be constituted by simply facilitating the
desire of others to intensify their depravity.

This is

not a totally absurd point of view, since most of the time

obscene material is not paraded before unadorned innocenca,
but before those whose expectations of depravity make them
seek out situations in which they can become probable

recipients.
case.

But it is an awkward doctrine in the Shaw

As Lord Reed (the only dissenter among the Law
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Lords in this case) pointed out,
the directory itself is

not inherently obscene, nor is
resorting to prostitutes
an offense? but the conviction
punished the act (of

inviting others to prostitution) as a
conspiracy to corrupt
publicnorals, and the actual printed
invitation ( (the
directory) is held to deprave and corrupt
(i.e., is
obscene).

This in itself. Lord Reed stated, is a
"novel

doctrine," but his basic objection centered
around the

wide power given both to the bench and the
jury.

Reed

was upset with what he viewed as judicial
usurpation of
the delicate question of how far the law ought
to punish

immoral but basically private acts.

This, he argued, was

properly a legislative problem which the Law Lords has
made a problem of common law.

But more important, he

insisted, the case negated judicial power at precisely

the juncture where it was most needed— in defining such

terms as "corrupt" and "deprave."

The meaning of words

is normally, and should have been in this case, a question

of law.

Juries are not allowed to use their own defini-

tions of such things as negligence, and to Lord Reed, giving

them such power in obscenity cases erodes the certitude
of criminal law.

The law loses its ability to inform a
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man what conduct is and what conduct
is not criminal.

The holding. Reed correctly points
out, makes the jury
a censor morum;

'the law will be whatever any
jury may

happen to think it ought to be.
In Calder v. Powell

,

.

.

."^23

which held that "Cain's Book"

was obscene because it could tempt readers
to experiment

with drugs, and later in the "Chewing Gum"
case, the scope
of obscenity was greatly extended,

m

Calder the grounds

for forfeiture came close to saying that
the work "advo-

cated* something which Lord Parker, and in
the case of drug

abuse most others, believed to be socially harmful,

using the logic employed to justify these cases any
speech
in Hyde Park which advocated the positive aspects
of

narcotic addiction would be illegal, not only on grounds

of corrupting public morals, but because the statements
themselves would be obscene.

Obscenity with this kind of

construction emerges as a concept which seeks to delineate
legal punishments for attempts to deprave Her Majesty's

subjects in all senses.

There is more than one path to

depravity, and enticing subjects down a particular path

can be illegal,

phrased in this metaphorical fashion, the

concept is certainly not a new one to Anglo-American
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jurisprudence; enticing an individual to
murder another

individual has long been held to be
punishable behavior,

but it is important to realize the someone
who "entices"
another to murder is guilty of murder.

What raises enor-

mous problems with the concept of obscenity is
that where
it is defined as enticing someone down a
particular road,
it is not always clear that the situation at
the end of

that road is illegal,

with narcotic addiction it would

be perhaps clear, but it is difficult to say that whatever exists at the end of the sexual road to depravity
is illegal, unless the judges and the prosecution are

making assumptions about criminal sexual activity,

if

these assumptions do exist they are not sufficiently
examined to be stated as part of the rationale for the
concept obscenity.

Several judicial rulings had the consequence of

undermining the liberal aspects of the OPA.
use of common law in R. v. Shaw

Parker in R.

v.

,

The creative

the tip to police by Lord

C la^rton to use common law rather than the

OPA, and Parker's "error in law" holding against the

Middlesex Justices in the Copper case reflect a judicial
determination not to be cavalier about depravity in England
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The latter case especially reflects Lord
Parker's attitude about "pure filth"— under the guise of
a fine point
of law.

The Bench's own felt need to restrain itself has
interesting consequences in obscenity cases.

The restraint

is always most pronounced when it acts to sustain
convic-

tions.

In instances such as the Copper case the appellate

justices are not so willing to defer to the judgment of
lower courts,

in other instances, such as the Straker

case where Parker apparently felt that the material was

not obscene, judicial humility triumphs and the conviction
stands

This judicial deference to the prosecution

is

especially dangerous considering that the rationale used
against any attempts to centralize prosecution of obscenity

cases is that it would be an interference with the courts.

The national government's deference to the courts and the
bench's deference to both the prosecution (on the appellate
level) or to the jury create a round-about abdication of

responsibility in this area.
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Obacenity and English
Culture
The notion that law should punish
activity which
tends to deprave and corrupt is
obviously an idea which
is still

very much alive in the United
Kingdom.

The

specific content of what is "obscene"
is dependent not only
on the general tenor of the times
but also on the particular jury.

Also, the seriousness of the problem
of obscenity

tends to fluctuate between serious
assaults on human

depravity and sporadic reminders that the
sword of state
is sharp enough to cut paper

may be).

(or celluloid,

as the case

But the basic idea that it is a legitimate

function of government to protect the public
from corrup-

tion and depravity is usually not challenged
even by

British libertarians.

A legal concept is simply a demarca-

tion of authority in this area remains fairly
constant,
while the specific content encircled in the crime of

obscenity is highly variable.

Tt is much more variable

than the same notion in the United States, because as
social mores about sex change, the content of obscenity in
the United Kingdom has moved progressively away from

simple candor about sex to a concern about violence, sadism
and drug abuse.

Whether something depraves is a much more
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inclusive question than whether
something is simply
prurient,
it is this variable nature
of the content of
obscenity in the United Kingdom
which led English playWright and former MP Benn Levy
to describe the implementation of obscenity law in
Britain as a search for "a crime
to fit the punishment."

While obscenity law could probably
be described
as •punishment"

in search of a crime"

in almost all cul-

tures. Levy's witticism seems
especially accurate for

Britain.

The deferential political culture
and the liber-

tarians in that culture once again
seem to concentrate on
how reasonable the particular exercise
of authority is,
not whether that power belongs to
government at all.

m

Britain, while there have certainly been
objections to

censorship, the longevity of the censorship
power of the

Lord Chamberlain and the present existence
of the Board of

Film Censors would seem to indicate that
questions of
obscenity are not formulated with the initial assuitption
that prior restraint is necessarily an infringement
of

civil liberty.

While prior restraint may be more acceptable

to English libertarians because it is more accepted in
English law, the cultural propensity to construe liberty
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not as a matter of reluctantly
mandated authority but as

-reasonableness" of those who govern has
meant that the

libertarian attack on obscenity law has
focused on the
more antiquated institutions of censorship
rather than on
the constitutional propriety of protecting
the public
from themselves.

English obscenity law is punishment in search
of
a crime because concern about obscenity
symbolizes a

sense of rectitude, if not self -righteousness.

But this

motivation would be as true of other cultures, even
though "Victorian" is a phrase thoroughly English in
origin.

in another sense, different from Levy's meaning,

English obscenity law is legal punishment poised before
changing targets not only because the concept is sta-

tutorily broader, but because the English take the sword
of state more for granted.

CHAPTER V
SEDITIOUS SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES

Doctrinal Influences Prior to 1945
Seditious Libel

The exact status of the English common
law crime of
seditious libel was not definitively
settled in the United
States until 1964 when the Supreme Court
ruled, in New

York Times v. Sullivan, that there was
no such concept in

American law.^

This had long been a view urged by judges

such as Holmes in his dissenting opinion in
Abrams v.
U. S.

(1919)

and Jackson in Beauharnais v. ill .

(1952),

and it received support from such prestigious
American

constitutional scholars as Zechariah Chafee.^

Some his-

torians, such as Leonard Levy, disagreed, arguing that
the

framers of the Constitution were "nurtured on the crabbed

historic ism of Coke and the narrow conservatism of Blackstone."

3

others argued that since the fines levied under

the Sedition Act of 1798 were repaid by an Act of Congress
(on the ground that the Sedition Act had been unconstitu-

tional)

,

and since Jefferson pardoned all those convicted
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under the Act (even though he was willing to
see his

Federalist opponents prosecuted for seditious
libel in
the various states)
1964.

4

,

the concept had atrophied long before

In any case punishment for seditious speech in
the

U. S. has not

historically been tied to the notion of

"libel"— the more commonly used rubric was "espionage."
The Search for a
Judicial Rule

"

Clear and Present Danger "

The Espionage Act of 1917 gave birth to a cluster
of famous Supreme Court decisions in which the judges began

their quest for guidelines on freedom of expression.
Act, applied during the aftermath of World War

I

This

and the

Russian Revolution, was part of the general "Red Scare"
hysteria that swept the nation and penalized many forms
of utterance.

Under its provisions over 1,900 people

were prosecuted for alleged subversion, and many radical

publications were excluded from the mails.

It was in sus-

taining the application of this Act against a socialist
who had mailed circulars to eligible draftees urging them
to resist conscription that Justice Holmes enunciated his

homely analogy about shouting "fire" in a crowded theater
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to demonstrate that speech cannot
have absolute protection
in all circumstances,

since the First Amendment is not to

be understood as an unqualified right
to verbalize regardless of consequences. Holmes defined
the issue, in Schenck
V.

U.

S.

(1919), as whether:

... the words are used in circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a
clear and
present danger that they will bring about
the
substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent.
This is an important approach to the problem
because
what is being evaluated is not merely the
content of what
a speaker says but the circumstances
in which he is speaking.

These circumstances, not the words themselves, can
justify

removal of the speaker if (and presumably only

if)

they

present a clear (not ambiguous), and present (immediate)

danger that they will bring about some substantive evils
the Congress or a state has a right to prevent (with the

assumption that they do not have the right to prevent all
substantive evils).

with reference to Schenck, however,

Holmes hastily concluded that when a nation is at war,

"...

many things that might be said in time of peace

are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance

will not be endured.

.

.

."^
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Holn,e. also wrote two
other unanimous opinion,
for

the court urging that
the sa™e standard be
applied to up-

hold conviction, under
the Act.'

.ater, i„ i^is, „,i„„,

along with Brandeis,
began to pen dissents
claiming that
the majority of the court
was not correctly applying
the
"clear and present danger'
test.« The doctrine was
to
become Characteristic of
Hol,nes-Era„deis dissents in
free
speech cases and was to be
™o.t explicitly stated in

mtnsL

V. C a lifornia

(1927), where Brandeis insisted
that

the "danger apprehended'
must be not only 'serious"
but
so "imminent" that the proper
remedy for fallacious speech,

namely "more speech," could
not avert the danger.^

it is

open to conjecture as to whether
Holmes really believed
that people such as Schenck
did present a clear and present danger to the country.
Holmes may have realized that
the Court wished to uphold
convictions under the Espionage
Act. regardless of rationale,
so he yielded on the conclu-

sion (making a unanimous court and
a much stronger posi-

tion for the doctrine than if it had
simply been a dissent)

but formulated a judicial standard which
could have
libertarian consequences in less hysterical
times.

Whatever

the motives, it is important to realize
that while the

i
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Holmesian formula was logically
quite libertarian, its
successive statements during this

time were, in the words

of C. Herman Pritchett, "eloquent
but

.

.

.

kept no one

out of jail."^^
"

Bad Tendency "

While Holmes and Brandeis were busy
clarifying
their doctrine, the Court majority
began to evolve a new
standard, frequently called the "remote
possibility" or the

"bad tendency" test which as a theoretical
formulation was

considerably more restrictive of freedom of
speech than
the Holmesian test.

Gitlow

V.

Enunciated by Justice Stanford in

New York (1925), which upheld the conviction
of a

radical pamphleteer under the New York Criminal
Anarchy
Act, this formula emphasizes the possible
consequences of
a particular speech rather than the probability
of a

specific evil.

Silencing utterances which call for violent

overthrow of the government are not arbitrary or unreasonable exercises of authority, according to Stanford, because

such measures seek "to extinguish the spark without waiting

until it has

.

.

.

blazed into conf lagration. "

"""^

Thus if

the speech has the "tendency," even though remote, to lead

to disorder, it is in the public interest to prevent such

i
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speech,

under this formula it was not
necessary to demon-

strate an actual relationship between
speech and disorder,

simply to demonstrate a relationship
between the content of
the speech and the possibility of
disorder at some future
date.

The Search for a
Judic ial Role
Judicial Activism v. Judicial Restraint
Initially the clear and present danger doctrine
was

not a test for the validity of legislation,
but only a test
for determining "how closely words had to be
related to

illegal acts in order to be infected with their
illegality."
In Schenck, Abrams and Git low

.

Holmes did not challenge the

statutes in question? he merely in the latter two cases

doubted whether they were correctly applied.

Brandeis in

the Whitney case, however, extended the clear and present

danger doctrine from a rule guiding the application of
statutes to a rule evaluating the constitutionality of the
statutes themselves.

In Whitney

,

Brandeis claimed that

declarations by state legislatures that certain kinds of
speech and assembly do in fact create a danger is merely a
"rebuttable presumption." 13

The clear and present danger
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test by Brandeis was to be used to determine
whether the

conditions alleged by the legislature in fact
existed.

The Whitney concurrence was to set forth a
doctrine by

which courts and citizens could challenge any law
abridging
free speech and assembly by "showing that there
was no

emergency justifying it."^"*
This formulation of the clear and present danger

doctrine moved it away from simply being a standard to
evaluate speech and into the most sensitive area in which
a court can move? namely, a theory about its own power.

While judicial review gives the Supreme Court the power to
nullify legislation, it also gives it the burden of
justifying the use of that power in terms which spare the

Court the image of being arbitrary or political.

The

traditional way the Court approached this problem had

been to claim that there exists a presumption of constitutionality of all statutes, and that this constitutionality must be upheld if the actions of the legislature
were "reasonable."

To strike down a statute on any other

ground other than that it is hopelessly arbitrary or

grossly unreasonable was to engage, some believed, in
judicial legislation, superceding the legislative branch.
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Both the clear and present danger
doctrine and the

criteria of legislative reasonableness
ironically trace
their origins to Justice Holmes.

His operating assumption

about the proper role of the Court was
that it leave
statutes alone unless, as he said in his dissent
in Lochner
V.

New York (1905),

"...

a rational and fair man would

necessarily admit that the statute proposed would
infringe
fundamental principles as they had been understood
by the

traditions of our people and our law."^^
While there is no contradiction in the ultimate logic
of claiming that when possible courts should leave legisla-

ture alone, and when possible legislatures should leave
individuals alone, to stop the second is obviously to

transgress on the first, and so cases involving First

Amendment freedoms were to perennially raise two sorts of
questions.

The first question involved judgments about

the permissible limits of speech, while the second involved

judgments about the proper function of the Supreme Court,
vniile these two arguments did not address themselves to

the same question, they frequently had opposing consequences
in the disposition of free speech cases, and an attempt to

resolve this conflict was not attempted until the time of
the Roosevelt court.
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"

Preferred Position "

After 1937 such new appointees of President

Roosevelt as Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy,
and Rutledge,
aided by Chief Justice Stone, began to reassert
the clear
and present danger test.

But since the doctrine, at least

as it was formulated after Whitney , implied
an active role

for the court in nullifying legislation; and
since the new

appointees were hostile to the older court's assumption
that it had an active role to play in declaring
social
and economic legislation unconstitutional, the Roosevelt

court was left with the problem of justifying judicial

activism in one area and not in another.

The "preferred

position doctrine" emerged as the judicial theory to explain
this apparent paradox and served as the larger theoretical
fab. ic on which the clear and present danger doctrine could

be pinned.
The ultimate logic, if not content, of the preferred position doctrine occurred in a footnote penned by

Justice Stone in United States v. Carolene Products Co .
(1938)

in which he noted that the Covrt is always to presume

legislative judgment as constitutional when it affects

ordinary commercial transactions unless obviously

I
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unreasonable, but that there may be a
"narrower scope of

operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when
legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific

prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first
ten Amendments.

.

.

."^^

waiter F. Berns is quick to note

that there were other periods in constitutional
history

when the Bill of Rights was elevated over the
assumption of
legislative reasonableness, such as the time when
the Taft

Court gave so much emphasis to the Fifth Amendment
and its

concern for property, and suspects that the transfer
of
Stone's logic from a footnote to a central doctrine
is
more motivated by libertarian wishes than constitutional
^
tact.
.

17

Stone's footnote, however, provides only the

structural scaling of the doctrine.

The actual design of

the interior came later through the efforts of Stone,

Douglas and Rut ledge, the latter of whom gave the most
concise statement of the doctrine in Thomas

v.

Collins in

1945.^®
In this case, which concerned the validity of a
state law requiring all labor organizers to secure permits

before soliciting members, the Court held the statute to
violate the First Amendment, and Rut ledge justified this

245

action with reference to the special
status of First

Amendment liberties.
This case confronts us again with the duty
our
system places on this Court to say where the
individual's freedom ends and the state power
begins. Choice on that border, now as always
delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual
presumption supporting legislation is balanced
by the preferred place given in our scheme to
the great, the indispensable democratic freedom
secured by the First Amendment. That priority
gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction
not permitting dubious intrusions.
For these reasons any attempt to restrict
those liberties must be justified by clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely,
but by clear and present danger. The rational
connection between the remedy provided and the
evil to be curbed, which in other context might
support legislation against attack on due process
grounds, will not suffice. These rights rest on
firmer foundation.

This doctrine, and the clear and present danger
test,

laid the foundation for an active libertarian role

for the Court in its interpretation of the First Amendment.

Speech and Disturbances of the
Public Order

Access to the Public
Permits

The iQode of speech rather than its content is frequently
subject to regulation in the interest of public tranquility
or order.

But because "content" and "mode" are frequently
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difficult to separate, the issuing of
permits poses First

Amendment problems.

The simple "volume" of speech, for

example, can develop community pressure to
stop the speech.

The Supreme Court approached this aspect of
the problem
in 1948 when,

in Saia v. N. y .

,

it overturned the convic-

tion of a Jehovah's Witness minister who used
loudspeaker

equipment without a proper permit.

Justice Douglas,

speaking for a narrow majority, held the authorizing

ordinance to be an unconstitutional "previous restraint"

because no standards were prescribed for the exercise of

discretion by the police chief in defining "abuse."

A year later, however, in Kovacs

v.

Cooper (1949),

a Trenton, New Jersey, ordinance outlawing sound amplifica-

tion devices, if they emitted

'loud

and raucous noises,"

was held to be constitutional. 21

Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, took the

opportunity to attack the preferred position doctrine

which had,
opinions.

"...
..."

uncritically crept into some recent
This "mischievous phrase," Frankfurter

asserted, subtly implied that any law touching communication

was infected with presumptive invalidity.

This point of

view, he stated, had never been accepted by a majority of
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the Court, since Justice Rutledge only
represented the

opinion of four judges in Thomas v. Collins

,

and the

phraseology of the doctrine was a gross misunderstanding
of both the clear and present danger doctrine
and the

judicial philosophy of Justice Holmes.
Black, Douglas and Rutledge dissented, with Black

claiming the Court had denied "constitutionally- sheltered
speech the power of amplification."

When the issue appeared to focus more on the content than the loudness of speech the Court was more willing
to strike local ordinances,

in Kunz v. New York (1953),

for example, a majority of the Justices reversed the convic-

tion of a Baptist minister who held outdoor worship services in New York City without the proper permit.

after

a

Kunz,

hearing before the police commissioner, was denied

a new permit on the ground that he had "ridiculed and

denounced other religious beliefs" in his meetings.

The

city ordinance regulating permits did not specify this as
a criterion for permit revocation, but it did, in clear

language, allow the police commissioner to exercise dis-

cretion in denying permit applications.

This ordinance was,

to the Supreme Court, an invalid prior restraint because it
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vested an administrative official with
too broad a discretion.

Justice Jackson, labeling the majority's
opinion
as a "quixotic tilt at windmills
which belittles great

principles of liberty," relied heavily on
the fact that
Kunz was frequently indiscreet in his attacks
on Roman
Catholics and Jews.

To Jackson such "sermons" were

"intrinsically incendiary and divisive," and speech
which
was simply a "name-calling contest without social
value"

was not protected by the Constitution.
The ACLU, while lauding this decision, was quick
to point out that Kunz was arrested shortly after the
court

opinion on grounds of disorderly conduct.

The New York

Civil Liberties Union carried the case to the Supreme
Court, but appeal was denied.

The ACLU claimed that the

police had "simply found another way to suppress a speaker

they do not like," and that Kunz was "suffering from a
hostile discrimination not applied to other collectors of
crowds."

23

Injunct ions Against Demonstrations

Many of the Court's decisions about injunctions
involved attempts at economic persuasion, rather than moral
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or political persuasion, and thus
were inevitably tied to

considerations about legitimate restraints
of trade rather
than the probable disorder caused by
such "speech."

Injunctions against clearly political kinds
of events were
dealt with by the Court in 1968, however,
when it reversed
a 10-raonth restraining order which
prohibited the National

States Rights Party from holding rallies in
Princess Anne
County, Maryland.

The party, a "white supremacist"

organization, was subject to a l©-day ex parte
restraining

order after it made militantly racist speeches at a
racially-

mixed outdoor rally.

At the end of the 10 days a Maryland

Circuit Court extended the injunction for 10 months, also
in ex parte proceedings, and the Supreme Court held
such

action to constitute an unwarranted prior restraint on
speech.

Justice Fort as, speaking for the majority,

emphasized that while there are limited circumstances in

which speech is so "interlaced with burgeoning violence"
that it is not protected by the First Amendment, in ordinary

circumstances criminal penalties imposed after the freedom
to speak has been grossly abused are sufficient.

If the

conditions are not ordinary, then such mechanisms as an
injunction bear a heavy presumption agains t their consti-

tutional validity, and in this case, the Court felt that
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even the 10-day restraining order
could not be sustained.

Even though the Court had ruled a
year earlier that demonstrators who had proceeded with a
protest march in the face
of an injunction should have sought
judicial review of the

order rather than disobey it,^^ ^he ex
parte proceedings
in this case were felt to be unnecessary.

Some of the

justices, such as Douglas in his concurrence,
suggested

that the net effect of such a temporary
injunction is to
give the state the "paralyzing power of a
censor."

Breach of the Peace
"

Fighting Words "

Justice Murphy had made it clear, in Chaplinsky v.

New Hampshire (1942),^^ that not all random utterances
deserved protection when he ruled that the "lewd and obscene,
the profane, and libelous, and insulting or 'fighting'

words," are not "speech" within the meaning of the First

Amendment.

But "fighting words" are always linked to the

mood of the audience, and several controversies have forced
the Supreme Court to deal with the nature of legal rights

when a provocative speaker meets a belligerent audience.
In 1947, for example, the Court overturned, by denying

certiorari, the action of peace officers in Lacona, Iowa,
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who prevented a group of Witnesses
from entering the town
to hold a Sunday religious meeting
because their meetings
on four previous Sundays in a
public park had evoked

heckling and physical attacks by the
^'^
townspeople.

A

Federal District Court found that the
local sheriff had
acted within the scope of his authority
because the "threat
of mob violence in Lacona was apparent
and real," but the

Federal Court of Appeals felt that the
disorder in the park
was due to the failure of the local and
state authorities

to police the park when unpopular people gave
Bible lectures.^®

The strongest, and some critics would say most
"mechanical," application of the clear and present
danger

doctrine to this type of problem was probably the Court's
1949 decision in Terroiniello v. Chicago, which reversed the

conviction for inciting a breach of the peace against a
suspended Roman Catholic priest after he delivered a speech
in a city auditorium under riotous conditions,

in the face

of a volatile crowd-situation Terroiniello started to give
a speech, which was strongly anti-semitic, and explanations

of what ensued ranged from "an increase in the riotous
situation" to "total pandemonium."

The police reportedly

asked Terroiniello to stop, but he refused, and the police.
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reasoning that he was the immediate
cause of the riot,
arrested him.
Justice Douglas, in delivering the
majority opinion,
focused on the failure of the trial
judge to define breach
of the peace in terms of the clear
and present danger test.

The judge instructed the jury that
the offense included
speech which "stirs the public to anger,
invites dispute,

brings about a condition of unrest,
or creates a disturbance."

This formulation of the question, according
to

Douglas, was unconstitutional, because the
"function of
free speech under our system is to invite
"^^
dispute.

Counsel for Terminiello had not argued this
point, but for
Douglas that was immaterial,

it wasn't so immaterial for

Justice Frankfurter, who thought the Court should
stick
to deciding questions asked of it, and was joined in

dissent by Justices Burton and Jackson.

The latter, after

giving a lengthy description of the situation in which

Terminiello attempted to deliver his address, warned that
if the Court did not "temper its doctrinaire logic with a

little practical wisdom, it will convert the Constitutional

Bill of Rights into a suicide pact."^^

The deaths of Justices Murphy and Rutledge in 1949
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and their replacement by Justices
Clark and Minton meant
that only Justices Black and
Douglas remained active

supporters of the preferred position
doctrine.

The

remainder of the Court examined
restrictive statutes on
the basis of "reasonableness" with
the presumption that
all such laws were valid until proven
otherwise. "

This

shift in presumptions about constitutionality
became

especially apparent in two 1951 decisions
on free speech

written by Chief Justice Vinson.
The first, Peiner

v.

New York

,

concerned the con-

viction of a college student on the charge of
disorderly

conduct in Syracuse, New York,

in Vinson's interpretation

of the trial record Feiner, "gave the impression
that he
was endeavoring to arouse the Negro people against
the
whites, urging that they raise up in

equal rights.' 32

arras

and fight for

These statements in such a racially-mixed

audience stirred up sone "excitement," and some of the
onlookers chided police on their inability to handle the
crowd, and at least one threatened violence against the

speaker if the police did not act.

After three requests by

police to stop speaking, Feiner was arrested "in order to

prevent a fight."

To a majority of the Court, the arrest
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was not motivated by any
content in Feiner's speech but
by the situation which it
engendered.
Frankfurter, sensing shades of
Terminiello in some

Of the dissents, wrote a
concurring opinion in this case
which argued strenuously that it
was not a constitutional

principle that protection of free
speech meant that police
must proceed against a crowd, whatever

its size and temper,

and not against the speaker.

Justices Douglas, Minton and Black dissented,
with
Black objecting to the Court's "blind
acceptance' of the

trial court and the judge's testimony on
all the important
points.

It is the Court's prerogative, he felt,
in spite

of its desire to review only questions of law,
to examine

evidence itself when the case involves fundamental
con-

stitutional guarantees.

The pertinent facts, for Black,

were that Syracuse had granted a permit to a former

Assistant Attorney General to speak in a public school
building on the subject of racial discrimination and civil
liberties.

On the day of the proposed address, however,

the authorities cancelled the permit, and the Young

Progressives, under whose auspices the meeting was scheduled,

then arranged for the person to deliver his speech at a
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local hotel.

According to Black the gathering on
the

street and Feiner's speech was a
protest against the can-

cellation of the original permit and to
publicize the
meeting at the hotel.

Black remained highly suspicious

of police testimony to the effect that
the crowd was

"restless," "pushing," "shoving and milling
around,"

and claimed that there was nothing in the
record to indicate that Feiner used the phrase "in arms" except
for
innuendo by the prosecution.

The majority of the Court

reasoned, according to Black, that police may, if
they

reasonably conclude that a serious fight or riot is
imminent, stop a speech in order to prevent a breach of

the peace.

As a general principle Black found this

unarguable, but maintained that it was "far-fetched" to
suggest that the facts showed any imminent threat of

uncontrollable disorder.

An isolated threat of assault

on a speaker did not, he insisted, "forbode disorder."^"*
In Edwards v. South Carolina , when a city manager

ordered a civil rights demonstration to disperse because
some onlookers were in his view "possible troublemakers,"
the 1963 Supreme Court overturned convictions of the 187

demonstrators for breach of the peace after they failed to

J
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disperse.

This situation was, the Court insisted,

a far cry from

.

.

.

Peiner."^^

"...

The demonstrators were

parading on the South Carolina State House
grounds, and
since the crowd of three hundred onlookers
made no

threatening remarks or hostile gestures and there
was
adequate police protection, the protestors were,
in the
words of Justice Stewart, convicted of an offense "so
generalized" that it was "not susceptible of exact

definition" and upon evidence which proved nothing more

than that some members of the community were probably
opposed to the views of the demonstrators.
Justice Clark dissented and viewed the case as a
simple application of the clear and present danger test

by the city manager to prevent a public brawl.

The fact

that the demonstrators responded with defiance rather than

with cooperation created, in his view, a new situation
which was more dangerous than the one which already existed,

The city manager might have been honestly mistaken as to
the imminence of the danger, Clark stated, but the impli-

cation in the majority opinion that police may not intervene until the riot has occurred overlooks the "almost

spontaneous combustion in some southern communities," and
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is

"

.

.

.

like keeping out the doctor until the
patient

dies."

The Court was much more divided, however,
in two
1965 cases stemming from a protest rally in
Baton Rouge,

Louisiana, in which 2,000 Southern University
students,
led by E. Elton Cox, an ordained Congregational
minister,

were protesting the arrest of 23 students who
had been

picketing segregated lunch counters the previous day.

Cox was arrested and convicted on three separate charges
1)

and

disturbing the peace;
3)

2)

obstructing public passages;

picketing before a courthouse.

The Supreme Court

reversed all three charges, but with greatly varying
degrees of consensus.

The Court unanimously reversed the

breach of the peace conviction using the same criteria put
forth in Edwards

divided 7-2.

,

but on the second charge the Court

At least five of the Justices felt that the

obstructing public passages statute was basically a permit
statute which gave too much discretion to local officials
and was not applied to all groups equally. 36

The issue

of picketing before a courthouse, dealt with separately in

Cox No. 49, was narrowly overturned.

Justice Goldberg,

speaking for the 5-4 majority, claimed that while the state
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has a legitimate interest in protecting its
judicial

system from "pressures which picketing near a
courthouse

might create," in this case police gave demonstrators

permission to gather where they did, and to sustain
conviction would be to approve entrapment.
Justice Black, along with Justices Clark, White,
and Harlan, angrily dissented, claiming that he could not

understand how the majority could reverse the conviction
because of,

"

.

.

.a

permission which testimony in the

record denies was given, which could not have been authori-

tatively given anyway, and even if given was soon afterward revoked."

37

The majority of the Court was to reaffirm the Cox
rationale in 1966 when it overturned by a 504 majority
the conviction of five Negro demonstrators for breach of

the peace after they refused to leave

a

public library.

38

Justice Black, who argued in dissent that tranquility in
a library should take precedence over the expression of

dissident ideas, was to be vindicated later in the same
year when a majority of the Court held picketing before a
jail to constitute trespass.

39

Justice Black, speaking for the

In Adder ly v. Florida ,

majority this time, drew
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a distinction between Edwards and
the present case by

noting that the speech took place in front
of a publicly-

financed building, but that it was "public"
in the sense
of being designed for security purposes,
not "public" in

the sense of being open to the public,

in this context.

Black warned, the fundamental fact of the First
Amendment
is that it dees not create a constitutional
right for

propagandists to protest "whenever and however and whereever they please."

Justice Douglas, joined by Warren, Brennan and
Fortas, felt that a jail was a "seat of government" and as

obvious a center of protest as executive mansions and
legislative chambers.

The Court seemed to continue im the tradition of
Edwards, however, in a 1969 case which overturned the con-

viction of Dick Gregory and others for refusing to stop a

demonstration when police feared that the conduct of the
spectators might lead to a severe breach of the peace.

The controversial Chief Justice Warren, speaking for six
of the judges, thought the essential fact in this case
was that the defendants were charged with disorderly con-

duct when not even the police claimed that their conduct
was in fact disorderly.

However, reasonable the police

request may have been, the Court felt that the charge
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disorderly conduct, rather than a more accurate charge,
such as refusal to obey a police officer, negated conviction.

There were no dissenting opinions, but Justice

Black in his concurrence underscored the fact that the

holding was tied to the lack of narrowly-drawn statutes to
handle the problem of "obnoxious conduct" which do not

collide with the broad rights guaranteed in the First
Amendment.

The holding was not a construction of the First

Amendment, he insisted, which would "subject all the

people of the nation to the uncontrollable whim and

arrogance of speaOcers, and writers, and protestors, and

grievance bearers."

41

The authority of government is not

"so trifling," he warned, that it elevates the interest

of those with complaints above the community's interest
in tranquility; especially the tranquility of those spots

which Black thought people have selected to "escape the

hurly-burly of the outside business and political world,"
or other buildings that require "peace and quiet to carry
out their functions."

For Black a list of such places

would have to include at least hospitals, schools, courts
and libraries, and an individual's home,

even a Mayor's,

should be free of uninvited dialogue about social change.
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While discourse is to be left free, so that public matters
can be discussed with impunity, picketing and demonstrating

can be, according to Black, "regulated like other conduct
of men."

Incitement

The charge of inciting disorder usually assumes a
sympathetic audience which a speaker wishes to lead in some
illegal action, but there have been cases where the charge
was used when police suspected that a speaker deliberately

planned on the reaction of a hostile audience to create
disorder.

In 1966, for example, a state District Court of

Appeals reversed a "conspiracy to riot" charge leveled by

California authorities against members of the American
Nazi party.

The charge, along with charges of assault

(which were sustained)

,

stemmed from an incident which

took place when defendants, wearing Nazi uniforms, steel
helmets, and carrying provocative and derogatory signs,

pushed their way through a crowd of persons who had congregated outside a meeting hall to await the beginning of
a celebration of the fifteenth anniversary of Israeli

independence.

42

In the wild melee which ensued a number

of the members of the crowd and police officers were injured.
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but the Court of Appeal, relying heavily
on the Supreme

Court criteria set down in Terminiello, insisted
that
picketing and the carrying of signs, even though
derogatory,
were legitimate forms of free expression, and ruled
that the
simple fact of membership in the American Nazi Party or
the

wearing of uniforms (even steel helmets) did not

jger

se

constitute a conspiracy.

On the issue of "provocative" speech the American

Civil Liberties Union insists that unless the most obnoxious
have freedom of speech, it cannot be guaranteed for others.
In the context of innumerable defenses of George Lincoln

Rockwell and his American Nazi Party's right to hold outdoor speeches and demonstrations, the Union has stated that
in its view,

speech can be limited only when a speaker
urges immediate violent action and there is a
real danger that his followers will act then and
there on his incitement. This 'cletu: and present
danger* applies only to violence urged by the
speaker.
It does not apply to threats of violence
by his opponents (or even actual attempts to
carry out such threats) , although, of course,
opponents of the speaker have every right . . .
to peacefully express their views.
•

.

.

The Union opposed the cancellation of permits, etc., to
controversial speakers on the grounds that they may create
violence because of the strong feelings they may evoke in
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their audience.

To deny a speech or demonstration on

these grounds, such as Mayor Wagner's
refusal to grant

Rockwell a public park permit in New York
City because he
was "an invitation to riot," the Union
maintained was to

sacrifice freedom of speech to the "threat of
mob action."'*^
In 1968, the Supreme Court, by denying certiorari,

upheld New York State's prosecution for incitement of
William
45
Epton.
Epton, in the wake of a racial disturbance in

New York City, was alleged to have actively participated in
the formation of a group dedicated to armed revolt against
the police.

Police claimed the riot was under the direc-

tion of "block captains" and "terrorist bands," equipped

with Molotov cocktails which Epton himself had explained

how to use.

He was convicted and sentenced to serve three

concurrent one-year terms; one for conspiring to riot,
one for advocating criminal anarchy, and one for con-

spiring to engage in advocacy of criminal anarchy.

In

the Court's per curiam decision, two justices wrote

opinions

— Stewart

concurring with the denial and Douglas

dissenting from the Court's decision.

Stewart felt that

the riot conviction presented no substantial federal ques-

tion and, in a footnote, asserted it was probably arguable
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that a state could convict someone
for criminal conspiracy

without first "demonstrating some
constitutionally unprotected overt act in furtherance of
the alleged unlawful
agreement."

Instruction in the use of incendiary devices,

however, could make no "serious claim
to constitutional

protection."

Douglas, however, reasoned that, since
many

of the alleged overt acts consisted in part
of speeches
made by Epton and his participation in
preparation and

distribution of certain leaflets, the indictment was
improperly inflated.

Douglas argued that the Court should

have approached the question of whether an overt act
required to convict on a conspiracy charge can be an

activity which is customarily protected by the First

Amendment (with a strong implication that he thought not)
In later cases, however, the Supreme Court was

quick to overturn cases in which inflammatory speech was

simple political hyperbole not followed by disorder.

A

"threat" on President Johnson's life made in the context

of a rally to protest alleged police brutality in Washington,
D.

C,

was held by the Court not to violate the federal

statute making it a felony to willfully threaten the
President,

46

and racist remarks of a leader of the Ku Klux
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Klan were held to be inadmissible as evidence of
violation
of an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute.

In the latter

case, Brandenburg v. Ohio , the defendant's rhetoric
even

took place at a cross-burning rally at which some of the

participants carried firearms.

The Court chose this case

to overrule the longstanding precedent of Whitney v.

California and declare that the First Amendment forbids
states to proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law

violation except where such advocacy was clearly related
to "imminent lawless action."

While Brandenburg was

unanimous in result. Black and Douglas each concurred

separately on what they believed to be the confusion in
the venerable phrase "clear and present danger."

Douglas,

using this concurrence to scold the Court for its holding
in U. S. V. O 'Brien (to be discussed later)

,

even stated

that the formula had become "so twisted and perverted" that
it should have

"...

no place in the regime of the First

Amendment
In 1970 the Supreme Cou

overturned the disorderly

conduct conviction of some anti-Vietnam War demonstrators
because the trial judge's instructions to the jury failed
to distinguish speech from other forms of conduct in the
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demonstration.

Thus it would appear that the
Court,

while not claiming that disorderly
conduct can be "speech"
(because of the "fighting words"
criterion), insists that

rhetoric, short of incitement, be clearly
separated from

other actions (such as lying across a
public sidewalk in

this case)

,

so that conviction is free from any
taint of a

jury's disapproval of a demonstration's
"point of view."**®

Libel and Freedom
of Expression

Group Libel
Politically-related speech and the rubric "libel"
were to cross paths in 1952, when the Supreme Court
upheld
a state statute prohibiting the

manufacturing, publishing or exhibition in
.
.
.
any place of any publication portraying depravity,
criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a
class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or
religion which . .
exposes citizens ... to
contempt, derision or obloquy or which is pro.^^
ductive of breach of the peace or riots. .
.

.

At issue in Beauharaais v. Illinois was the conviction of a
president of the "White Circle League" because of leaflets
he distributed in downtown Chicago asking the Mayor and the

City Council of Chicago to "halt the further encroachment,
harrassroent and invas

of white people, their property,

neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro.

..."
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The trial court, proceeding on the assumption
that
the material in question was libelous in
character, instructed the jury to decide only the question of
publication.

On appeal, the Supreme Court, by a narrow majority,
found
the Illinois statute valid since it prohibited speech

"liable to cause violence and disorder" and this "paraphrased" the traditional justification of criminal libel.

Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, noted that
the classes of speech reiterated in Chaplinskv are all

utterances which are "no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is

clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality."

in such a balance. Frankfurter concluded, an

individual's interest in hurling epithets is outweighed

by society's interest in order and morality.
Justice Black, dissenting along with Reed, Douglas
and Jackson, feared that minority groups would hail the

decision as their victory and quipped, "Another such victory
and

I

am undone."

The majority, he said, condoned an

expansion of state censorship by "painstakingly analogizing
it to the law of criminal libel," but this "sugar-coating"

did not make "censorship less deadly."

I
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Jackson, in his dissent, subscribed to the validity

of the notion that a "group" could be libelled, but
felt

that the clear and present danger test should have been
invoked to assess the consequences of such libel,

it
j

!

would appear impossible, however, to sustain any group
libel conviction using the clear and present danger doctrine

j

as an interpretation of the First Araendraent since, if

correctly applied, if would prevent any state action

i

against group defamation, except as another label for
incitement to a breach of the peace.

This was the rationale

applied by the ACLU when it listed the case an an "unfavorable decision" in its annual report. 50

The notion of group libel usually receives the
most support from those, like Richard B. Wilson, who also
|

object to the clear and present danger formula as the most
|

appropriate criterion for approaching free speech problems.

51
^

I

Wilson, for example, would prefer to relate

basic First
I

Amendment values to the maintenance or improvement of the
\

nation's "capacity for self-government" and since group

defamation is, in his view, anti-democratic in character,
it reduces a community's capacity for self-government and

should not be tolerated on First Amendment (democratic)

(

i

i
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grounds.

Even Wilson felt, however, that much
of

Frankfurter's analysis of libel was incorrect.
But Loren P. Beth, who shares Wilson's
hostility

to the clear and present danger doctrine as
the dominant
interpretation of the First Amendment, nonetheless
conclu-

ded that since group libel laws are unlikely to
achieve
any substantial results and do involve suppression
of

speech they are unjustified.

Beth was willing to grant

that consideration of free speech in a value hierarchy
does not automatically rule out the possibility of dealing

with the problem of group vilification, but he posed the

problem as a choice between the value of free speech and
the value of racial equality.

Wilson, and the defenders

of the notion of "group libel," seek to make the two

values not only compatible, but complementary, and for

Beth a democratic process (since "practically if not
philosophically" free speech is more basic to self-government than equality) can (though it should not) function

without equality.
It is noteworthy that Frankfurter, while insisting

that Beauharnais was convicted under valid libel law,

refused to allow him the protections normally provided in
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a libel procedure.

Even if the criterion is restricted

to the truth or falsity of statements made
rather than
the intent of the speaker, the very nature
of such statements, as Beth pointed out, makes it almost
impossible to

prove them either true or false.

Even though the validity of "group libel" was
sustained, it is a rare charge, and what was viewed
in
1952 as libeling a group would probably,

if applied con-

sistently, be viewed as hyperbole— if only because

invective against groups (especially if the Establishment
or "effete snobs" are groups)

is so widespread.

Political Speech and Individual Libel
In addition to the flat declaration that the notion

of seditious libel is inconsistent with the First Amendment
in New York Times Co . v. Sullivan (1964), already mentioned,

the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that since erroneous

statements are probably inevitable in any public debate,
the First Amendment protects even false statements

"honestly made."

In this case the Court overturned a libel

conviction against the New York Times which published a
paid advertisement criticizing the treatment of Negroes
in Montgomery, Alabama, by the police in particular.

The
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ad contained some factual errors and the local
Commissioner,

though not mentioned in the ad either by name or specific
reference to his office, contended that the criticism

constituted a libel of hira.^^

The issue as Justice Brennan

formulated it for a majority of the Court was whether the

constitutional protection given to debate on public issues
was withdrawn if some of the statements were erroneous.

To follow a rule which would compel any critic of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all of his factual

assertions on pain of libel judgements, would impose,
said Brennan, a "pall of fear and timidity

.

.

.

upon

those who would give voice to public criticism.
In concurring opinions Justices Black, Douglas
and Goldberg were willing to go further, with Black

claiming that the press must have an absolute immunity for

criticism of public officials and viewing state libel laws
as a threat to the very existence of freedom of the press.

The "actual malice" test, he insisted, was an attempt to
create an "elusive, abstract" exception to the First
Amendment.

Goldberg expressed concern that freedom of

speech could not be effectively safeguarded by a jury's

evaluation of the speaker's "state of mind."

The American
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Civil Liberties Union, which submitted a
friend-of-thecourt brief in this case (as did numerous newspapers),

hailed the decision as one of their most important
victories
as well as a landmark decision in civil
liberties law,^^

The Union's general position on libel suits is
that they do not raise civil liberties questions, but that
suits which involve "political" figures, criminal libel
and "group libel" all threaten freedom of speech because

government becomes the arbiter of truth in what is usually
"politically-related speech."

While

"

.

.

.

defamatory

attacks on individuals have little relation (if any at
all) to the purposes for which freedom of speech is safe-

guarded,

"

according to the Union, in civil suits involving

people in political life, and in criminal libel "there
exists an overriding public interest" in maintaining the
"widest scope of criticism and free discussion." 55

By

implication, at least, the Union would not wish to pro-

hibit suits by political figures totally as long as
greater proof, in the form of "convincing clarity," were

required by courts to establish "actual malice."
In 1964 the Court extended the "actual malice"

rule to criminal as well as civil libel, and in 1966 it
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reversed a conviction which defined criminal
libel as "any

writing calculated to create a disturbance of
the peace. "^^
In 1968 the Court overturned a defamation action
brought

against a candidate for public office who charged in a

televised speech that a local deputy sheriff had a criminal

relationship with a local labor union officer.

The

allegation was false and the sheriff sued, but Justice
White, speaking for six members of the Court, ruled that

the defendant had relied solely on an affidavit given by
a union member without verifying the information; and

even though he gave no consideration to the consequences
of his statements, he fell short of demonstrating a reckless disregard for accuracy.

Black and Douglas concurred, but argued on grounds

of freedom to criticize official conduct rather than "actual
malice."

Justice Fortas dissented, claiming there should

exist on speakers a burden to check the reliability of

their statements.

While "group libel" is a precedent, it has tended
to remain only a precedent.

The Court's handling of

individual libel when such speech even hints at being
"political" or "official" would indicate no propensity to
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use, or to let local governments "use/' libel
as a device

to narrow the dialogue on public policy.

Figurative Speech

Speech Plus

Even justices thoroughly devoted to the spirit of
the First Amendement find difficulty in deciding what

constitutes "speech."

The idea of "speech plus" was first

developed by the Supreme Court in labor picketing decisions,
and in the accompanying difficulties with such phenomena
as picketing, potential breaches of the peace, permits for

demonstrations, etr-, which were not simple verbal or

written communication but part of a more encompassing
activity.

Some, such as Harry Kalveon,

58

have found the

dichotomy between "pure speech" and "speech plus" worthlees, because all speech, since it can be interpreted as

noise by someone else, is necessarily "speech plus."

But

even though speech which tends to be politically and
legally significant is usually inherently social and thus
involves other dimensions, the distinction is useful, as

Pritchett suggests, precisely because it draws attention
to a wide range of speech situations.

59

The distinction,

for example, helps to emphasize that a demonstration, while
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certainly an expression of a point of view,
is also a
gathering of people which can create problems
simply

because it is a gathering of people regardless
of any
ideas which may have motivated such an assembly.

Injunc-

tions, for example, were issued and sustained
to control

both the time, route, frequency and numbers involved
in
Martin Luther King's open housing marches in Chicago
in
1966.

In the same year Chicago enjoined George Lincoln

Rockwell from demonstrating in Jewish neighborhoods during

Jewish high holidays.
Some scholars who are not notably illiberal, such
as Pritchett, have criticized the Court for its decision
in Greoqry v. Chicago by arguing that the sheer numbers

involved in that incident could have constituted an invasion
of privacy.

Even though it may be claimed that a public

official has no private life, the reasoning would hardly
extend to citizens unfortunate enough to live next to that

public official.

To Pritchett, Gregory's

method of making

contact with the Mayor had "less the character of a petition
and more that of harrassment, intimidation, and coercion. "^^
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Sit-ins
If picketing is "speech plus," the variations of

picketing (protesting), such as the "sit-in"

(a

technique

used widely by the Negro civil rights movement after 1960

which consisted of refusal to leave segregated lunch
counters or other places when service was denied)
have to be labeled speech "plus-plus."

,

would

Such action usually

led to the demonstrators being charged with either breach

of the peace or criminal trespass.

The Supreme Court, in

a series of decisions between 196C and 1964, was reluctant

to find such modes of "speech" illegal, even when such

reluctance was somewhat embarrassing legally.

In cases

where the charge was breach of the peace, as in Garner

v.

Louisiana (1961), the Court easily held the charges invalid
if the demonstrators were not disorderly.

Until 1964

the Court was able to directly avoid dealing with the

trespass issue by holding that since segregation was legally
required by the state or municipality and was thus a state
action in violation of the equal protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, no trespass occurred because the
demonstrators were entitled to service.
Bell V. Maryland , however, the Court received
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a clear case of criminal trespass
in the restaurant where

the decision not to serve Negroes was
entirely a private

choice of the owner.

m

earlier cases the judges had

noted that demonstrations conducted on
private property

over the objection of the owner would not
constitute

protected speech, and the groundwork was clearly
laid for
the Court to uphold this sit-in conviction.

The Court was

able to avoid this, however, by claiming that
the owner

had engaged in illegal activity because a
Baltimore ordinance prohibited racial segregation, and there was
thus no

basis for the trespass charge.

This was a particularly

clumsy way out of the problem because the Baltimore law
was passed five months after the trespass convictions were

affirmed by the Maryland Supreme Court.

This was apparently

the rationale of three of the Justices, with Warren,

Goldberg and Douglas concurring to make a majority but
arguing that restaurants, since they are devoted to public
use, are not private and are controlled by the equal pro-

tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

Black, Harlan,

and White dissented, insisting that the Fourteenth Amendment

"standing alone," did not "prohibit privately-owned restaurants from choosing their own customers."

63
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Symbolic Speech

The Court was less malleable when novel
methods
of protest focused on something other than
racial segregation.

The principle that even peaceful picketing
and pro-

test can be enjoined if it interferes with
the effectuation
of valid state policies was the basis for the
Court's

upholding of a draft card-burning conviction of 1968.
In United States v. O'Brien 64 four persons who burned
their

draft cards as an expression of opposition to the Vietnam
War were tried and convicted under a 1965 Congressional

statute passed in order to stop such activity.

Even

though both the draft card burners and Congress viewed

mutilation of draft cards as an expression of contempt,
the Court did not view it as speech.

By a 7-1 vote, with

only Douglas dissenting and arguing that the Court should
have dealt with the constitutionality of conscription in
the absence of a formal declaration of war, Chief Justice

Warren held that the draft cards were sufficiently important to the administration of the Selective Service System

to deserve protection.

There

is not,

according to warren,

a "limitless variety" of conduct which can be labelled

"speech" simply because the conduct expresses an idea.

As
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in the picketing cases, when speech and
non-speech ele-

ments were combined, the interest was in regulating
the

non-speech element, and draft cards. Warren submitted,
serve as proof of registration and identity, and
give the

address of the local board.

Destruction of the cards

would also, the Court argued, make tracing the illegitimate
use of draft cards for identification more difficult.

A

Circuit Court of Appeal had declared the Congressional
statute unconstitutional because the conduct it sought to

punish was already punishable, but with less severity,
under existing law.

The Supreme Court felt, however, that

it was within Congress* power to enact such a statute in

the interest of the smooth functioning of the Selective

Service System.

The Court never really touched on the issue

of Congressional intent (which was not a concern for smooth

administration) nor did Warren explain why the functions
of a draft card, which were largely inflated since there

are other ways of determining registration and identity,

were so essential to smooth administration of the system.
Even though the Court had made it clear in O'Brien
that one man's symbol may be another

'

s

essential tool of

administration, the use of arm bands to protest U. S.
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involvement in Vietnam by high
school students was held to
be constitutionally protected
speech,
Tinker v. pes

m

Moines Independent Community School
District public school
officials suspended students who wore
armbands on the

grounds of maintaining order and decorum
in the school,

but Justice Fortas, speaking for the
majority, found no
evidence of actual disruption, and claimed
that the.-appre-

hension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right
to freedom of expression. "^^

Black, however, thought the

majority was undercutting the power of school
officials
over pupils, and in his dissent expressed concern
that
schools in the country would be subject to the
"whims and

caprices of their loudest-mouthed but maybe not their

brightest students."
Presumably, the rationale in Tinker was that

neither society, government, nor the public schools had
a genuinely valid purpose which was interefered with

because of students wearing armbands, but in another case
involving

destruction of the American flag, the Court

showed signs of indicating that the symbolic destruction
of a symbol was not deserving of constitutional protection.
Street v. New York , the Court by a 5-4 majority
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overturned the conviction of Street, who
after learning
that James Meredith had been shot in
1966, burned an

American flag on a Brooklyn street while
shouting the words,
"We don't need no damn flag."^^

The statute in question

punished mutilation of the flag, but also
prohibited anyone from casting "contempt upon the flag by
either word or
act."

Justice Harlan, expressing the view of the narrow

majority, felt the statute was over -broad because
it

included "by word," and there was no way of telling
whether
it was Street's words, which are protected by
the First

Amendment, or his actions which were the basis of his conviction.

The Court was thus able to skirt the issue of

whether flag desecration could be punished, but even for
the majority there was the strong implication that it could.

This case is also interesting because of its unusual
voting alignment.

Harlan's fine distinction, which enabled

the Court to skirt the basic question, was not unusual
since the Court frequently relied on him for fine distinctions, but it did

put him among an unusual majority, with

Warren, Black, Foruas and White composing a rare combina-

tion in dissent.

Warren, Black and Fortas wrote separate

opinions and all took notice of the trial record's emphasis
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on "burning" as opposed to "words."

To these justices

Street was in fact convicted of
"burning," and such a conviction was in their view constitutional,
justice White
felt that the action punished was
not speech alone, and

that the conviction for Street's "plus"
activity was legitimate,

warren simply stated that he believed
government

had the power to protect the national
emblem, but he

didn't state reasons because the majority
had refused to
meet the central issue.

beyond

"...

To Justice Black it was simply

belief that the Federal Constitution bars

a State from making the deliberate burning
of the American

flag an offense."

Portas attacked the notion that flags

were simply private property to be disposed of as one

pleases by insisting that a flag may be property, but that
it is property "burdened with peculiar obligations and

restrictions."

Fortas did not say why a flag is so

"burdened," only that property has always been subject to

reasonable regulation when competing interests are involved

without mentioning what the competing interests are.

Fortas

mentioned that if a state made it a misdemeanor to burn
one's shirt on a public street, it could hardly be asserted
that the citizen's constitutional right would be violated.
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but the tone of his dissent suggests
that his concern about
flag burning was not really based
on a desire for cleaner

streets or less air pollution.
The Court could presumably have found easy
logic
to construe O'Brien as a de facto attempt
to inhibit

symbolic expression, and thus have held that flag
burning
was constitutionally protected.

Public opinion would

probably have been outraged, but certainly no more
than
in the Court's prayer decisions or rulings on
criminal due

process.

Even though Street's conviction was overturned,

the fine distinctions drawn in the majority opinion,

together with the holding in O'Brien and the dissents in
Tinker, indicate a warning to dissident groups that they

must choose their symbols very carefully.

Direct Act ion
There is frequently a great deal of confusion

surrounding differences between simple challenges to laws,
either as applied or on grounds of unconstitutionality,
and other challenges justified in the name of "direct action"
or "civil disobedience."

Direct action, stemming from

Martin Luther King, and ultimately Ghandi, refers to a
technique used to establish sufficient tension in a community
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so that the community is forced to
confront the issue which
a given political group wishes to
dramatize.

Such activity

can be legal or illegal, violent or
non-violent,

in the

case of the early civil rights movement it was
usually nonviolent protest involving the use of the sit-in or
street
demonstration.

Further confusion arises when some view

activities such as sit-ins as acts of civil disobedience,
since there is a deliberate violation of either criminal
trespass, or (as in the early sit-in demonstrations in the
South)

,

a violation of a local law (requiring segregation)

Others would argue, however, that such challenges to laws
were simply techniques to force application of federal and/
or constitutional law, and thus were not acts of civil

disobedience but merely activities which were legal in all
respects, but not respected as legal in certain areas of
the nation.

The advent of confrontation politics and the

decision of protesting groups to move from simple forms of
assembly and picketing to tactics of "direct action" in

which laws are violated in order to dramatize a political
issue compounded the problem of legitimate free expression

not only for the courts but also for the American Civil
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Liberties Union.

The Union opposed an automobile "stall-in

which sought to block traffic approaching the
World's Fair
in 1963.

The Union's position was that such action was
a

violation of the "legal protections of the public's
right
to movement/' and that stall- ins "exceed the
limits of con-

stitutional guarantees."

The Union's general position on

"direct action" was set forth in a 1963 pamphlet entitled

"How Americans Protest" which, while condemning the

physical obstruction to the public's "free access,"
emphasized with almost equal ink that "disorders' are

usually the result of "pervasive discrimination that public
officials and the public itself have done little to combat.

After the World's Fair "stall-in" for example, the ACLU
statement of disapproval of the tactic was hidden in a

rhetorical flourish which insisted on "bold action to
remove the bias that prompted such forms of protest."

The

New York Civil Liberties Union spent most of its energy
attacking Mayor Wagner for attacking the demonstrators.
"Criticism," said the affiliate is no "substitute for

affirmative action."

"The dominant forces in our community

and especially its elected officials," the Union said,
cannot.
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.escape responsibility for harsh events
.
.
by
pointing an accusing finger at the
lawless acts
of Negroes and their supporters.
They must
understand that if lawlessness occurs,
it is a
direct consequence of the failure of
the
community, and especially its white
majority,
to implement the laws of the land, the
laws of
human decency and the laws of social
experience.
Public officials must recognize the
simple truth
that men who have been brutalized by
their
society will not always act in a peaceful
fashionmen who feel they have little at stake
in their
society will not always act conservatively
for
they have little to lose.^*^
The ACLU uses the "concentrate-on-the-causes-of-theincident-rather-than-the-incident-itself" argument a great
deal, but there is some evidence that they
apply this argu-

ment with a kind of evenhandedness, especially
if the ultimate blame is placed on government for failing
to investigate the "true causes."

The Union was critical, for

example, fo President Johnson's suggestion that Congress

investigate the Ku Klux Klan after the murder of a civil

rights worker in 1963.

The Union suggested that "trial

by publicity" and the methods of HUAC would be hostile to
civil liberties and suggested that the real need was to
"probe the underlying reasons for the encouragement which

overt criminal acts now enjoy in some Southern states. "^^
In 1968 the Union issued a statement on civil disobedience, specifying two categories in which it would not
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undertake a defense of an individual,

one category was

when an individual engaged in a deliberate
violation of
law based on his belief that the law was
unjust even

though it was constitutional.

The second category involved

violation of laws which the individual did not find intrin-

sically objectionable but violated in order to call attention to some other evil.

Examples of conduct which the

ACLU felt to be beyond its concern were such things as
refusal to take part in civil defense drills, to pay
federal taxes as protest against military expenditures or

refusing to register for military service.

The very

decentralization of the Union, however, and fierce internal
conflicts which began to be apparent with the fragmenta-

tion in local affiliates when confronted with such things
as the New York City school strike make it difficult to

predict the behavior of any local branch.

The Union agreed,

for example, to defend Benjamin Spock in the 1968 anti-

draft conspiracy prosecution as well as some defendants in
the "Chicago Eight" trial.

Speech and National Security
Ant

- Subver s ion

The "Smith Act"

Legislation

— the

Vinson Court's approach to the

problem of civil liberty, and that of the older Roosevelt

288

Court, were to be inost apparent in cases involving members

of the American Communist Party and federal loyalty and

security programs.

The Court, between 1946 and 1953,

operated almost "entirely within the tradition of the
Strong legislature-weak judiciary formula.

6^
.

.

."

The

Vinson Court also deferred to the "democratic" authority
of legislatures at a time when American public opinion was

more sensitive to the notion of a foreign threat using
internal mechanism than it had been since the period

immediately preceding World War I.

Participation in World

War II with the Soviet Union as an ally acted to blunt
pre-war fears about Communism, but the beginning of the
"Cold War," U. S. involvement in Korea and along with the

improbable career of Senator Joseph McCarthy, all coalesced
to create an atmosphere in which, in the words of Justice
Douglas, "suspicion (had) taken the place of good will."

70

The federal government brought indictments against 145
leaders of the American Communist Party and was successful

initially in securing 89 convictions.

The "Smith Act,"

technically the Alien Registration Act of 1940, was the
first law to be used against the Communist Party (though
it was initially designed with Fascists in mind)

and makes
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it a criminal offense to advocate or teach
the overthrow

of the United States government by force or
violence, to

print or distribute written matter advocating the same,
to

organize or knowingly become a member of any group which

advocates the same, or to conspire to accomplish any of
the aforementioned,

it is this statute which,

in the view

of Zechariah Chafee, Jr., contains "the most drastic

restrictions on freedom of speech ever enacted in the

United States during peace."
The prosecution of 11 leaders of the American
Communist Party under the Smith Act, which some speculate
was the Truman Administration's technique to under-cut

Republican charges of being "soft on Communism," 72 resulted
in a tumultuous trial marked by exchange of insults,

bickering, and criminal contempt citations that ranged
from thirty days to six months' imprisonment, as well as
the disbarring of attorneys.

73

The central figure in this

case, Lawrence Dennis (who had already been convicted in
1947 for failure to comply with a House Un-American

Activities Committee Subpoena)

74
,

,

was General Secretary

of the party, and he and his co-defendants were convicted;

their conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals of the
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second Circuit, with Judge Learned
Hand (probably America's
most respected jurist) writing the
opinion. The Supreme

Court granted certiorari but limited
review to the question of whether the Act violated the
First Amendment free
speech guarantee of the Fifth Amendement
because of
indef initeness

On both counts the Court was to answer,

"Nol"

and in the process created a new formula
for interpreting
free speech under the Constitution.

Chief Justice Vinson,

after a lengthy discussion of the clear and
present danger

doctrine (with the implication that he was applying
invoked instead the rationale of Judge Hand.

it)

Under this

formulation the question is not whether a danger is
imminent, or even whether the speech tends to create
public

disorder, but 'whethe*. the gravity of the evil, discounted

by its iraprobabxiity, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."

In other

words, what is advocated is as important as when

,

and since

for Vinson the government's existence was at stake, there

was no need to wait until a "putsch" was about to occur.

Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, in separate concurrences,
attacked the application of the Holroesian danger test to
this type of casei

the former argued that the doctrine

291

was "a sonorous formula" which disguised an
inability to
solve concrete cases; and the latter; while holding
the

doctrine useful in dealing with "street corner

.

zealots," claimed that its use in this case would have

placed government in a "judge-made verbal trap."
and Douglas,

in dissents,

Black

indicated they would have applied

the clear and present danger test, and using this would
have struck down the Smith Act, since it is aimed at
advocacy, not overt acts.

The ACLU actively opposed the Smith Act at the
time of its enactment, scolded the Communist party for

approving the use of the Smith Act against Trotskyites in
1943, and continued to press for repeal after the Dennis

decision.

The Union attacked the majority's decision in

Dennis on the grounds that it "permitted punishment of

advocacy in the absence of a clear and present danger."
It also argued that the jury should pass on the question

of a clear and present danger, and that the new formulation
of a "clear and present danger" was unwise and ultimately

hostile to a constitutional tradition which elevates First

Amendment guarantees to fundamental values of the society.
After the favorable ruling in Dennis

,

76

the government

went after the Communist Party's second string.

Over 100
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convictions were obtained before the Court
intervened with
a clarification of Dennis in Yates
v. United States in
77
1957.
In this case the Court granted

certiorari without

limitations and found the conviction of 14
California
Corarnunists defective because the trial court
judge had

failed to distinguish simple advocacy from "advocacy
of
action."

Justice Harlan, writing for the raajority,

claimed that the Act, to be constitutional, must be directed
at advocacy of action, not ideas.

Mere doctrinal justi-

fication of forcible overthrow of government was, for
Harlan, "too remote from concrete action to be regarded
as the kind of indoctrination preparatory to action which

was condemned in Dennis .

Clark dissented on the ground that the Smith Act
was basically directed at conspiracy, and that the same

conspiracy existed in Yates as in Dennis

.

Clark found

Harlan's opinion to be a confusing "artillery of words,"
and since there was little substantive difference between
the cases, he correctly suspected that the majority was

subtly pushing some kind of new doctrine.
The more stringent evidentiary requirements laid

down in Yates led to the reversal of many convictions in
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federal circuit courts and even impeded
denaturalization

proceedings against naturalized citizens accused
of Communist

Party membership. 7fi
The addition of Warren and Brennan to the Court
created a large minority hostile to the Smith Act, and
in
1961 the majority, while holding the membership clause of

the Act constitutional, did so in a fashion which made
simple membership in the party an unacceptable basis for
prosecution.

Justice Harlan, in Scales v. United States,

reasoned that the Smith Act membership clause was not
repealed by the section of the Internal Security Act of
1950 which said that mere membership in any Communist

organization would not be a violation of that law, because
the Smith Act was directed only at "knowing, active"

membership, not simple membership.

The Smith Act can't

mean mere membership, according to Harlan, because if it
did it would be unconstitutional; and since it isn't unconstitutional, it can't mean that.

Harlan's technique of

changing the Act by interpretation in order to keep it
constitutional irritated Douglas, who didn't want to save
it;

but in a companion case, Noto

v. United States ,

Harlan

and the majority were to hold the act unconstitutional as
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applied because evidence indicated
that the defendant only
engaged in the "abstract teaching
of Communist theory.
The distinction between various
types of 'memberships" made in the Scales decision
was welcomed by the ACLU
as a hopeful sign that the
Supreme Court would not tolerate

"wholesale prosecution of members of the
Communist Party/'
but the union still maintained that
regardless of how the

government chose to implement the Smith Act,
the Scales
verdict, "strikes at the very heart of
the First Amendment

guarantee that freedom of association, unrelated
to the

performance of an illegal act, is inviolate."

The decision,

the Union argued, "vitiates the First Amendment
by placing

every individual on notice that he joins organizations
under peril of future criminal prosecution."
It puts a premium on an ignorant, not an
enlightened citizenry, it requires that a
person who considers joining any organization roust do so either without regard for
its stated purposes or, to protect himself,
attempt from the outside, to look behind
such purposes to find the 'real' motives of
the organization. Either procedure places
extra burdens on the right of free

association.®^
Internal Security Act of 1950
The "Cold War" atmosphere induced Congress to enact
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the most comprehensive legislation
on Communism in the

Internal Security Act of 1950 (the McCarran
Act)

.

This

Act (title one) and the Emergency Detention
Act (title
two), was, due to the deft skill of
Representative Richard

Nixon, passed over President Truman's
veto, and makes it

unlawful to "knowingly combine, conspire or
agree with any
other person to perform any act which would
substantially

contribute to the establishment within the United
States
of a totalitarian dictatorship."

This phraseology was

designed to avoid the "force or violence" test of
the

Smith Act, since in Nixon's view Communists had developed
techniques for taking over governments illegally, but

without using force or violence.

No prosecutions were

ever brought under this section, which was fortunate since
the proviso contains what Pritchett has called a "loose

definition of sedition" which is "rather clearly
unconstitutional.

82
.

.

This Act also established the Subversive Activities

Control Board (SACB) to designate Communist action organizations and "front" organizations both of which would then

be required to register with the Attorney General.

The

proviso that Communist Party membership per se would not
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constitute a violation was the Congressional
technique of
satisfying the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against coerced

self-incrimination.®^

The order to register also meant

that the organization must disclose the
names and addresses
of its officers and give an accounting
of the sources of
its finances,

other sanctions under the Act included the

labeling of mail, radio and television broadcasts
of

registered groups as subversive propaganda;
prohibition
of members from working in defense plants; and
withholding

of passports. 84

This Act always received opposition from the ACLU
and while the Union usually did not oppose the findings
of

the Board (other than to point out the "semantic spectacle"

of the hearing on whether the Communist Party was a

Communist organization), they consistently attacked the
registration requirements and the other provisions of the
law as violative of free speech and association.®^

The Communist Control Act of 1954
In 1954, Congress (led by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey)

finding the Communist Party to be "an instrumentality of a
conspiracy," statutorily held it to be a "clear and present,
and continuing danger."

The Communist Control Act of 1954
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added to the McCarran Act's category
of Comraunist organizations the label "Communist- infiltrated"
organizations,
and also contained the interesting
phrase that the party
"should be outlawed."

since it is specifically not outlawed

in the McCarran Act (or it couldn't
be asked to register),

this emerges as Congress' moral judgment
rather than its
legal command.

This attempt to "keep the party legal

enough so that it can be successfully prosecuted
for its
illegalities.

.

libertarianism.

.

."®^ was hardly the product
of pristine

if it were an unequivocal offense, the

law would at least be clear in its command to
citizens,

and Communists would be entitled to the due
process pro-

tections of courts rather than the "non-punitive" techniques
of Congressional committees? and a statute of limitations

could prevent people from being harassed who had flirted

with radical politics twenty years earlier,

in the sub-

sequent hearings which attempted to register the Communist

Party as a Communist action organization, numerous problems
as to admissible evidence and the use of governmental

informers, ex -Communists and professional informers (whose

names would not be divulged) created significant questions

about a fair hearing and evidentiary requirements.

The
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Supreme Court, for example, remanded a case,
requesting the
introduction of additional evidence in 1956 when
it was

persuaded that three government witnesses had
been discredited and the findings of the Board had been
based on
their evidence. 87
In round two the Board found again that the Party

should be required to register, and on appeal the Supreme

Court upheld the order by a

5

to 4 vote in 1961.

Justice

Frankfurter, writing for the majority, rejected arguments

that the Act was a technique for "outlawing" the Party.

Frankfurter also refused to consider the constitutionality
of any of the sanctions which the Act applied to registered

organizations, on the ground that they were hypothetical,
since the Communist Party had not yet registered.

The

sanctions incurred by a registered organization were all

problematical because. Frankfurter argued, no one could
foresee what denial of tax exemption would mean, whether
the Party would wish to utilize the mails, whether its

members would ever seek eraployement in a defense facility
or a labor union, or whether they would ever apply for a

passport.

Frankfurter was more interested in attacking

the notion that the First Amendment enjoyed a preferred
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position in the Constitution, since this was
the "activist"
premise of those who wanted to anticipate
unconstitutional
consequences of the Act before they occurred.

He urged

hi« brethren to balance the competing interests
at stake,
and in his view the government's interest in
protecting

itself outweighed the social and individual interest
in

freedom of expression 83 (at least, of Communist expression).
So, eleven years after the Act had been passed by

Congress, the Communist Party was registered, opening the

door for litigation about the constitutionality of the

consequences which followed from registration.

After the

1961 decision individual Party officials refused to

register, and the SACB gained conviction but was reversed

by a Court of Appeals in 1963 on the ground

s

that the act

of registration was necessarily incriminating and no

individual could be forced to register the Party. 89

The

Supreme Court denied certiorari, so the ruling held.
In 1965 the government, not to be outdone by

judicial ingenuity, again brought action, claiming that two
FBI informants within the Party would volunteer to register

the Party if asked, and presumably, because of their

affiliation with the FBI they would not be incriminating
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themselves.

A federal District Court convicted the Party

on this evidence and levied the maximum fine of
$230,000,
but this conviction was reversed by a Court of
Appeals in
1967 on the grounds that the McCarran Act contravened
the

Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination,
even if it was registered by FBI informants.

The govern-

ment, showing signs of fatigue, decided not to appeal this

decision to the Supreme Court.
The McCarran Act also stipulates that if a

Communist action organization does not register as ordered,
then individual members of the organization must register
and, since no one voluntarily took this step, the SACB

brought action against two individual Party members in

Albertson v. SACB in 1965. 91

The Supreme Court, in a

unanimous decision, held that this procedure constituted

compulsory self-incrimination, and that it was not premature to raise the question even though they had not
registered, because the individuals would be incriminated
if they registered and punished if they didn't.

The ACLU supported the appeal of Albertson, arguing
that compliance with the SACB's order would force disclosure
of political associations without any showing a "grave
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public necessity" to justify such
disclosure.

Prior to

accepting the Albertson appeal the Supreme
Court had sidestepped a case which could have raised
questions about the
legitimacy of requiring "communist-front"
organizations
to register, and the ACLU urged Attorney
General Nicholas

de B. Katzenbach to discontinue legal action
against such
groups on the grounds that such a "futile pursuit"
failed
to meet the clear and present danger test;
failed to dis-

tinguish between a communist-front and a communist
action
organization; and because it sought to penalize a vague
and uncertain range of actions.

In the same year the

SACB attempted to register the American Committee for the

Protection of foreign Born and the Veterans of the

Abraham Lincoln Brigade without success.
ever,

In 1966, how-

in a per curiam decision, the Court oustained

^

move

by the Attorney General to petition the SACB for an order
requiring the DuBois Clubs of America to register.

The

plaintiffs attempted to bypass the Board by suing in

District Court, alleging that the Communist- front registration provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act
were unconstitutional.

missed the appeal.

A three- judge District Court dis-

The Supreme Coutt also refused to enjoin
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the Attorney General and the Board from
proceeding, with

seven of the judges holding that since
the Act provided
full evidentiary public hearings and a review
process, the

DuBois Clubs had not exhausted administrative
remedies and
thus could not challenge the constitutionality of
these

proceedings.

The DuBois Clubs had relied on a 1965 ruling

in Dombroski v. Pfister,

in which the Court held that it

is not necessary to exhaust all administrative
remedies

if the action had a "chilling effect upon the exercise
of

First Amendment rights."

In the present case, the Court

maintained the complaint constituted no more than a "con-

clusory allegation" that the purpose of the threatened
enforcement of the Act was to "harass" the appellants.
While the total Act remained constitutional on its
face, application became impossible because of judicial

truncation.

In 1964, the Court declared the passport

provision of the statute unconstitutional. 96

in the same

year the Court struck down the defense facility employment

proviso on the ground that it indiscriminately lumped all
types of association with Communist action groups together,

"without regard to their quality or degree of membership
which, the Court held, was literally establishing guilt

by association.

97

.

I
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In 1968 the Court applied the same
criterion and

ruled that the Coast Guard had exceeded
its authority by
inquiring into the beliefs and associations
of an

individual before granting a conunon seaman's
license.^®

At the end of eighteen years of costly litigation,
the only operative part of the Internal Security
Act seems

to be the registration provision, which is only
applicable
if the individual voluntarily chooses to register,

it

emerges as one of the few pieces of legislation in history

which is dependent for its effect upon the consent of
those to whom it would be applied.

After 21 years the

SACB has no function which is constitutional, but still
receives an appropriation of $450,000.

This, plus the

renomination of Otto Otepke, small hero of the subversive

hunting right wing in American politics, led Marquis
Childs to equate the SACB with a kind of lavish unemployraent

compensation for career anti-communists. 99
"

Gravity of the Evil" Test
Comment on the Dennis decision was, of course,

extensive, and there appears at least a general consensus

that Vinson's decision was a substantial alteration of the
Holmcs--Brandeis doctrine, and that the pivotal test was
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really Learned Hand's "gravity of the
evil" formula.

Some,

in considering the majority's opinion,
claimed that any

"danger" judges perceived was entirely
divorced from any

notion of "present," and for others the case
marked the
second "red menace" in American legislative- judicial
history.

The "gravity" test was defended by Elliot

L.

Richardson, who argued that proof of probability that
some illegal activity will occur is one sort of judgment,
but that it is also useful to arrange these illegal acti-

vities in some sort of hierarchy.

Richardson, for analytic

purposes, posed walking on the grass at one end of a

continuum and violent overthrow of the government at the
other.

Both, though they are different requests that a

speaker may make, contain a common idea; namely, a

direction to violate the law.

When a person speaks and

encourages his listeners either to walk on the grass or

overthrow the government, he can be clearly punished,
"provided the probability that the utterance will bring
it about approaches certainty."

Supposing that the degree

of probability is the same, but not certain, Richardson
argued that it should make a difference whether we are
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talking about revolution or
unrestricted grass-walking.
Since revolution is a greater
evil, it needs less probability than some lesser and more
probable offense.
Nathaniel L. Nathanson, in a much
less ornate
argument than Richardson's but one
closer to the basic
issue, supported Douglas's view
that the trial was

essentially a conviction for the crime
of seditious conspiracy, but used another statute
which did not require
as much proof for conviction.
"

Doctrine " v.

"

Action "

The majority's distinction between advocating
"doctrine" and advocating "action" in Yates
was well

received by Walter Gellhorn who in somewaat
livelier
language than the Court dramatized the distinction
as
follows S

One can recognize a qualitative distinction
between a speaker who expresses the opinion before
a student audience that all law professors
are
scoundrels whose students should band together
to beat them within an inch of their lives, and a
second speaker who, taking up the theme, urges the
audience to obtain baseball bats, meet behind the
law faculty building at three o'clock the next
Thursday afternoon, and join in attacking any
professor who can then be found. The first speaker
(in the Yates Court's vievj, should not be prosecuted; the second has stepped over the line
between advocating a belief and advocating an
illegal action.
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But Learned Hand, perhaps realizing
that Yates comes close
to a clear and present danger test
by another name,

claimed there may be times when a
speaker loses his privilege even though he confines himself
to

divorced from action."

"

principles

The hypothetical situation which

Hand posited is that of a man who
denounces an inept and
corrupt government before a crowd which he
knows to be
"ripe for a riot," and that he has been
told that what he

proposes to say would probably set it

off.'*"^^

Loyalty and Security
Loyalty Oaths and Security Programs

By Executive Order 9835 President Truman set up
in 1947 a loyalty program for federal employees in which

employees and applicants were required to undergo a loyalty-

security check, and the Department of Justice prepared a
list of subversive organizations to aid the Loyalty Review

Board of the United States Civil Service Commission in

making determinations about security risks.

This list,

known as the Attorney General's list, was made public in
1948 and contained 82 organizations; by 1953 the number

had grown to over 250.

This list is important, since

tax-exmmpt organizations that find themselves on the list
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lose tax-exemption privileges, and it
is also used to

decide admissi'.n policy for aliens wishing
to visit the

United States, as well as by some private
employers.
Thus the loyalty program not only involved
issues of due

process to civil servants but also due process
vis-a-vis
the groups on the Attorney General's list,

in 1951 the

Court dealt with this program in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee

Committe e v. McGrath,

and by a 5-3 decision held that

three organizations had been improperly placed on
the list.

The

itJajority

reasoned that the Attorney General could only

designate groups after "appropriate investigation and
determination," and since this had not been performed,
the Attorney General had acted arbitrarily, and the

defendants were denied due process.

Justice Black, in his

concurrence, held that the publicized findings of the

Attorney General, regardless of their truth or falsity,
"are the practical equivalents of confiscation and death

sentences for any black-listed organization;" he viewed
the existence of such a list as a bill of attainder.

The dissenters argued that the list was only a

criterion for federal employment and did not constitute
guilt by association or a bill of attannder, since no
"punishment" was forthcomingi

there was no constitutional
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"right" to a federal job.

On the same day the Court split

(Clark did not participate), and thereby
sustained a

Court of Appeals ruling which upheld a removal
for disloyalty^^^ but affirmed the doctrine of United
states

v.

Lovett ^^^ by holding that a loyalty board order
barring
individuals from federal service for a three-year
period
was a bill of attainder.

During the Eisenhower administration the standard
for discharge was changed from "disloyalty" to "security
risk."

This new rubric made discharge possible if a

person's employment was not "consistent with the interests
of national security;" it included sexual immorality and
perversion, drug addiction, excessive intoxication,
"criminal, infamous, dishonest, or notoriously disgraceful

conduct," conspiring to commit acts of treason, sabotage,

sedition or espionage and membership or affiliation with
any subversive group

107

as indicators of security risk

status.

The ACLU opposed all attempts to make "loyalty" a
criteria for governmental employment, and commended the
Eisenhower administration for,

"...

recognizing a

principle" it had long advanced, namely,

"...

that the
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necessary test is not one of loyalty-which
results in
inevitable incursion upon freedom of
speech and association

without any compensating gain to national
security.-but
one of security."

The Union also applauded promises by

the Administration that it would attempt
to transfer possible

security risks to non-security positions,
but did criticize
the new security program for its lack of
centralized review

procedures which would have helped to insure uniformity
in
the application of security criteria.

The warren Court, in a number of rulings on loyalty

dismissals, usually avoided constitutional questions but

managed to overturn dismissals on procedural and evidentiary
grounds.

Lack of statutory authority was used to overturn

dismissals in

"

non- sensitive positions," or, in other

cases, failure to follow proper administrative procedures.

In 1959, by a 5-4 vote, the Court even reinstated
a Department of the Interior employee because the depart-

mental hearing included questions about the employee's
feelings about Negroes, Jews, college admission quota
systems. Franklin Roosevelt, Norman Thomas, Henry Wallace,

and other matters which Justice Harlan could not believe

were related to the question of national security.

The
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Court also insisted on tighter

measures in loyalty hearings

connected with private manufacturers
doing government work,
but when a commanding officer of the
Naval Gun Factory in

Washington revoked the security clearance
of a civilian
cafeteria worker without any hearing or any
other type of
procedure, the Court upheld this action on the
ground that
in a military establishment the government
has "unfettered

control" over personnel and operations.

"'"^^

The number of loyalty oaths in the United States,
as well as punishment for disloyalty, is an indication
of

the seriousness with which Federal, state and local lawmakers, and some private member organizations, took the

notion of "subversive activity."

Indiana's demand for a

loyalty oath from professional wrestlers; the loyalty
oath requirement for membership in the Screen Actors Guild

of America (invalidated by a federal court in 1966);
as well as New York State's suspension of drivers' licenses

for anyone who advocates violent overthrow of the govern-

ment, serve as cases in point.

The loyalty oath provision of the Taft-Hartley Act
reached the Supreme Court in 1950, in American Commun icat ions

Assoc iat ion v. Douds.

112

The Court sustained the

311

constitutionality of the requirement that all
officers of
labor organizations annually sign an
affidavit disclaiming

any affiliation with the Communist party or
any other

organization which believes in or teaches violent
over-

throw of the government.
The Taft-Hartley oath, which was the center of
the controversy in Douds

.

was repealed in 1959; it had

proved ineffective because Communists were willing to take
the oath, and perjury sanctions proved difficult to

establish.

Pursuing the same objective. Congress then made

it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as

an officer or employee of a labor union, but this action
was struck down as a bill of attainder by a narrow Supreme

Court majority in 1965.

113

Oaths disclaiming membership in the Communist

Party in order to obtain state and local employment were
upheld by the Court in 1951 114 as "sufficiently relevant

to effective and dependable government

.

.

."to justify

their existence, but blanket endorsement of such oaths
was quickly qualified in 1952 when a unanimous coux't held
that oaths must encompass "knowing" association as opposed

to mere membership in order not to offend the due process
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clause.

In 1958 the Court overturned California's

ingenious scheme to require those seeking
exemptions from

state property taxes to sign a loyalty
oath, reasoning

that such legislation shifts the burden
of proof on to
the individual and necessarily has the effect
of encouraging

citizens to avoid controversial associations.

Florida Act prohibiting 'aid, support, advice, or
counsel"
to the C. p. was struck down on the grounds that it
was
not "susceptible [to]

.

.

.

objective measurement, "

"•^'^

and

the Court used vagueness as the criterion to overturn

loyalty oaths requiring school teachers to swear that they

were not "subversive persons" and that they would 'by

precept and example promote respect for the flag

.

.

,

reverence for law and order and undivided allegiance to
the government of the United States."

lift

in a 5-3 decision

in 1966 the Court made an "apparent" reversal of its 1951

holding that a state had a legitimate interest in dis-

couraging public employees from having membership in the
Communist Party, it ruled an Arizona loyalty oath (which
provided punishment for anyone who took the oath and later
became a member of a proscribed organization) as
unconstitutional.
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A statute, known as the Feinberg Law,
required
the New York State Board of Regents to

1)

promulgate rules

for the removal of ineligible public
school employees;
2)

draw up a list of "subversive" organizations;

make

3)

membership in any listed organization prima facie
evidence
of disqualification to held any position in the
public
school system.

Although no dismissals had been made

under the law, action was brought to have the statute

declared unconstitutional and to enjoin enforcement by
the Board of Education of New York City in Adler v. Board

of Education. 120

Justice Minton, speaking for the

majority

of the Court, felt that since a teacher works in a sensitive area, shaping the attitudes of young minds toward
the society in which they live, teaching is a vital con-

cern of the state and the terms laid down by the statute
were reasonable,

if individuals do not "choose to work

on such terras, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs
and associations and go elsewhere," he claimed.
I" S lochower v. Board of Education (1956)

,

how-

ever, the Court overturned a conviction of a New York City

college professor who had been dismissed because he had

taken the Fifth Amendment before a Senate committee which
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sought information about his political
associations/^^
and in 1958 the Court narrowly upheld
dismissal of a

subway conductor and a school teacher.

Both invoked the

Fifth Amendment plea when questioned about
Communist

party membership, and for the majority such
refusal could
be at least partial evidence of unreliability
and incom-

petency.

The same rationale was applied to the discharge

of Los Angeles County empbyees who failed to answer

questions before the House Un-American Activities Committee

Justice Clark, in the latter case, laboriously separated
the constitutionality of the California Code (which

required public employees to give testimony relating to
subversive activity on pain of discharge) from the Court's
ruling in S lochower by claiming that dismissal for refusal
to testify is a "built-in" inference of guilt and not

allowed, but if the state statutorily declares the same

action to be "insubordination," then such dismissals do
not violate the Fifth Amendment.
In 1967 a Supreme Court much less dazzled by argu-

ments of legislative reasonableness overturned Adler

v.

feoard of Educat ion and declared New York State's updated

"Feinberg law" unconstitutional.

In Keyishian v. Board
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of Regents of the University of

thie

State of New York

Justice Brennan, speaking for the narrow five- judge
majority, claimed (even though the State in 1965
announced

that no person would be deemed ineligible for employment
"solely" because he refused to sign the disclaimer affidavit) that a state's legitimate interest in protecting
its educational system from subversion "cannot be pur-

sued by means that broadly stifly fundamental personal

liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."

The New York Civil Service law, in seeking to
establish removal procedures for "treasonable or seditious"
behavior, was dependent on an ambiguous penal law in which
the meaning of sedition had "virtually no limit."

One

committed a felony in New York, Brennan noted, if he

"publicly (displayed) a book

.

.

.

containing or advoca-

ting, advertising or teaching the doctrine that organized

government should be overthrovm by force, violence or
any unlawful means."

Breanan asked what would happen to

a teacher who carried a copy of the Communist Manifesto

on a public street.

To argue that the statute would not

be applied to arrest that teacher is insufficient, said
Brennan, because it means that the potential effect of
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obscure wording depends on the "conscientious and scrupulous" nature of those who would apply the statute.

The essential point, Brennan insisted, is that the teacher
could not know where the line was drawn between "seditious"
and non-seditious utterances and acts.

Using Communists

Party affiliation as orima facie evidence for disqualification, approved in Adler, was rejected, and the doctrine

that public employment may be denied under "any condition,

regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected," according to thenajority because it failed to dis-

tinguish "knowing membership."

Justice Clark, joined by

Harlan, Stewart and White in dissent, found Brennan 's

opinion a "blunderbuss" of words, since the majority
struck down a law on the basis of a certificate and other

practices which were no longer in use.

To Clark, no

court had "ever reached out so far to destroy so much

with so little."
The effects of Keyishian are difficult to assess,
since it was a close decision, which qneans that a change
in personnel/ or heart, could make it short-term law; but,

as Clark seemed to sense, the majority here was mostly

interested in evaluating the language of statutes such as

i
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the Feinberg Law, even when the safer
course of action

might have been to view them as moot.
In 1967 the Court declared unconstitutional a

Maryland law requiring state employees to swear
that they
were net subvers ive

,

and in 1968 it struck down a Texas

loyalty oath for state employees, but upheld a New
York

oath requiring prospective employees to swear to uphold
the federal and state constitutions.

In the Maryland

case. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, found

that since the oath required an applicant to swear that

he was not engaged in political subversion, it was uncon-

stitutionally vague because "subversive" as defined by

Maryland statute included attempts to "alter" the government.

On the other hand, to Harlan, and Stewart and

White who also dissented, the Maryland oath was a meticulous attempt on the part of the state to conform to the

requirement set down by the Court in 1951 in which oaths

which sought to bar only those who seek overthrow of the
government were sustained.

124

The majority's focus on

"alteration," according to Harlan, "artistically avoids"

past doctrine, and the only thing which shone through the

majority's thinly-veiled legal reasoning was that it did
"not like loyalty oaths."
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The U8e of loyalty oaths in federally-assisted

programs aimed at the general welfare was also
not overlooked by Congress as a technique to rid the nation
of

subversion.

Loyalty oaths for students seeking aid under

the National Defense Education Loan Act were required

until numerous private educational institutions refused
to participate in the program and Congress repealed the

provision in 1962.

Until 1965 numerous programs under the

Economic Opportunity Act required s disclaimer oath, and
a loyalty oath can statutorily be required for citizens

seeking benefits under the Medicare Act of 1965, but the

Department of Health Education and Welfare has decided
not to use failure to answer the disclaimer question on

the application form as a basis for disqualification. 125

Even though numerous private associations reflected
concern over "loyalty" and "Americanism" in the 1950 's,
such as the Westchester County American Legion attack on

both faculty and students of Sarah Lawrence College as

being "strongly communist-tinged," the ACLU felt that the
roost
in

dangerous over-reaction on the part of private groups

the year 1951 involved the loyalty oath restrictions

of numerous Bar Associations which sought to disbar

attorneys who commit "acts of disloyalty."

126
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The denial of admission to the bar in
order to

become a practicing attorney has also raised
free speech
issues when the refusal is based on the
applicant's per-

sonal beliefs or association or his refusal
to answer

questions about such matters.

The Supreme Court has held

that admitted membership in the Communist Party
cannot
be the sole criterion for "bad moral character," but it
has also ruled that while bar examiners cannot construe

the silence of an applicant to constitute bad character
or disloyalty they may, if they specify clearly that

answers are required because they have substantial relevance to his qualifications, deny admission (to the same
applicant) because of non-cooperation, or simple stubbornness.

127

What makes the entire issue of loyalty programs
and employment an eepaciaXly difficult problem is that

very few people insist that there is a constitutional
right to employment, public or otherwise, in the sense

that such employment cannot be proscribed except for some

criminal offense.

Government can certainly insist on cer-

tain attitudes, even political, in certain of its functions, especially those directly related to national
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security.

But two factors emerge as extremely important

in discussing loyalty dismissals.

The first is that

public employment in the modern welfare state, which
increasingly includes more and more citizens, and this,

together with some sort of loyalty test for the other services of the welfare state, could create an informal net-

work of "punishment" that would be broader in scope and
effect than any criminal legislation.

The second factor

is that while no one may have a right to a job, and that

ordinary dismissal is not and should not be considered
"punishment," dismissals for reasons relating to loyalty
or security, as Pritchett has noted, take on the charac-

ter of punishment because of the social stigma attached
to them.

Being discharged for simple incompetence,

regardless of task, need not imply that the individual is

unsuited for other tasks, but a discharge for "loyalty"
carries with it the same kind of "character" implications

that a person would inherit if he had been convicted of

criminal conduct, and in some cases social sanctions

would probably be more severe.

128

The impact of loyalty security programs is pro-

bably greater than nost realize.

Arval A. Morris has

321

stated that as of 1958 a few more than
1,600,000 pro-

fessional people (scientists, teachers,
lawyers, engineers,
etc.) had occupations dependent upon
their ability to

meet some type of loyalty criteria.

To these he added

seven and a half million people in federal, state
and
local government plus four and a half million people
who
are required to meet industrial security tests.

As applied

to a work force of 65 million this 'means that at least
one person out of five, as a condition of his current

employment, has taken a test oath, or completed a loyalty
statement, or achieved official security clearance or sur-

vived some undefined private scrutiny."

He also noted

that about 11,500 people, of which the largest single

group involved private employment in firms which received
federal contracts, had failed loyalty tests.

Statistically

this worked out to the barring of one person in 2,500 on

security grounds.

Between 1948 and 1958 approximately

500 teachers, including primary, secondary and college,

were dismissed because of refusal to answer specific questions or take loyalty oaths as conditions of employ ment.

Congressional Investigations
Perhaps the most controversial of all techniques

129
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of official government to protect itself
from subversion

surrounded the uses and abuses of Congressional
investi-

gatory power by such celebrated committees as the
House
Un-American Activities Committee (not the House Committee
on Internal Security) and the Senate Permanent Sub-Committee
on Investigations under Senator Joseph McCarthy of
Wisconsin.

While many of the complaints against these

committees involved questions about the extent of

Congressional power, the nature of the contempt power, and
the self-incrimination privilege; the most general

objection was the "trial" atmosphere that pervaded the
committees' investigations, the "exposure" techniques

which guaranteed attention in the media and the personal
aggrandizement of committee members.

Inquiry into

individual beliefs ranged far beyond any conceivably valid

legislative purpose and brought charges that Congress was

doing by investigation what it could never achieve by
laws which would have been constitutional.

Similar charges

were levelled against committees in numerous state legislatures.

The Supreme Court never declared such investigatory
committees unconstitutional (although it came close)

,

but
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usually chose to overturn contempt citations on grounds
that Congress, or state legislatures, had to limit
inquiries to things which were pertinent to the committee's
mandate.

Since a committee such as HUAC had a mandate

which was so broad as to be practically meaningless, the

Court could have easily voided all contempt convictions
from such committees on grounds of an unconstitutionally
vague mandate; this looked like the probable direction of
the Court in 1957.

130

The desire of the Committee to

"expose" subversive elements had long been opposed by

the ACLU as an illegitimate goal, and in one case, which

they sponsored, they raised this issue, but also sought,
unsuccessfully, to have the case turn on the legality of

compelling testimony from anyone about the activities of
others
By 1959, reacting to Congressional threats to

curb its jurisdiction as well as considerable public
criticism, the Court swiftly retreated and sustained con-

tempt convictions on both the state and federal level and
suddenly found the authorizing resolution of HUAC clear
enough to warrant response from hostile witnesses who
invoked the First Amendment rather than the Fifth Amendment
as their rationale for refusing to testify.

132

After
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these decisions, the ACLU began a massive
campaign to
influence public opinion, including the
placement of

magazine articles, distribution of hundreds
of thousands
of copies of newspaper articles, editorials,
testimony,
and public statements as well as a filmed
television debate

between HUAC and anti-HUAC spokesmen.

HUAC itself did

much to structure the dialogue, however, by sponsoring the
film Operation Abolition (about a student demonstration

against the Committee in San Francisco) which gave local

ACLU affiliates numerous opportunities to argue for, and
occasionally get, "equal time." 133

After 1961, however,

the Court seemed to return to its more restrictive cri-

teria for the pertinence of legislative inquiry by

reversing numerous contempt convictions. 134

Travel
Denial of passports to citizens because of Communist
Party membership, as already mentioned, 135 was voided by
the Supreme Court, but the government's interest in

refusing to issue passports to any citizen to travel to
restricted nations was upheld by the Court in 1965.

136

The State Department could refuse to issue passports to
those wishing to travel to restricted areas, but it could
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not prosecute those who had
passports and went anyway,

according to a decision in 1967.^^"^

Later in the same

year a Federal Court of Appeals
ruled that the State

Department could not deny a passport to
individuals (such
as Staughton Lynd) who had previously
violated area

restrictions and who wished to travel to a
non-restricted
area (even if they intended to proceed to a
restricted
area from the non-restricted area)
"Disloyalty" Sanctions Against Aliens

Deportation and denaturalization proceedings are
another governmental alternative to punish the subversive.

The Supreme Court sustained deportation orders against an
alien for past rnerabership in the C. p. and upheld several
post-war denaturalization proceedings with only Justices

Murphy and Rut ledge claiming in dissent that the government's power to naturalii^e did not connote a power to

denaturalize.

139

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 took
over some of the categories of the Subversive Activities

Control Act and added some others but generally had a
mitigating effect because it provided alleviations for
persons who had joined the proscribed organizations
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"...

involuntarily, or while less than sixteen years

of age, or for the purpose of obtaining eraployraent
or

the essentials of living, or who had for at least five

years prior to application for entry actively opposed
the doctrines of these organizations.

•

.

."

The people

wishing to enter the United States as aliens who fell
into any of the above categories could be granted visas
if the appropriate consular officer and the Attorney

General found it to be "in the public interest
Deportation for past membership in the Communist
party was again upheld by the Supreme Court in 1952, and
in 1960 the Court approved the deportation to Finland of
a 5 2 -year-old alien who had lived in the U. S.

since

childhood on grounds of his Community party membership

between the years 1937 and 1939.

141

Conclusion
Free Expression and National Security

What is immediately apparent after surveying the

plethora of federal and state legislation, as well as
loyalty oaths and loyalty- security programs designed to

protect the nation from domestic subversion, is that

Americans take the problem of "subversion" much more
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seriously than the English.

To some extent the duplication

of legislative effort on the state
and federal levels

reveals overlapping jurisdictions and
competition for
favorable public attention.

But the pervasiveness of the

concern about domestic subversion in the United
States
was much greater than in England during
the same period,

and there seems little evidence to indicate
that the

danger of subversion in America was in fact greater
than
in the United Kingdom.

Harold M. Chase, in trying to assess the nature
of what the public felt to be a serious "Communist menace,"

concluded that there was no significant internal threat
of Communist revolution

in

the post-war period.

Official

estimates of Communist Party strength in the United States
indicate that there were never more than 100,000 Party

members in the nation, and that membership had progressively

declined from a high point in 1932.

j. Edgar Hoover

estimated that Party strength went from 54,174 members in
1950 to 23,000 in 1954.

Mr. Hoover, however, had con-

sistently warned that the size of the Party was relatively

unimportant because of the enthusiasm and discipline with
which they pursue their objectives.

In 1947 he revealed
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was at least

designed to be startling, to the effect, "That in 1917

when the Communists overthrew the Russian government
there
was one Comraunist for every 2,277 persons in Russia,

m

the United States today there is one Coiamunist for every
1,814 persons in the country."

Chase was quick to note

that the use of these figures to show that there were pro-

portionately more Conununists in the United States than
there were in Russia in 1917 implied a belief that the
total situation in Russia then and in the United States
after World

Viai

IX were analogous.

A belief that the

situations were analogous. Chase noted, would have to
mean, among other things, that the FBI was as inefficient
as the Czar is t police? that economic conditions in the

United States made people ripe for revolution; and that
a significant number of Americans would have helped to

perpetrate a coup,

chase concluded that none of the three

propositions could withstand examination, and that there
was no danger from Coimnunists in the United States in the
sense of probable revolution.

142

But events, such as the

Hiss inquiries, the Rosenb^arg trial, etc., despite all the
spectacular demagoguery and hysteria, did reveal that
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secret papers were ending up in places they
ought not to
be, and that the danger of espionage and
sabotage was

real, if not as vivid as sorae members of Congress
thought.

Statutes such as the Smith Act and the Internal Security

Act were aimed primarily at the prevention of revolution

by abridging important liberties which were "a greater
danger to the nation than the unlikely revolution they
(were)

intended to prevent," while the failure of Congress

so solve such problems as the easy illegal entry of any-

body (especially Russians) across the Mexican border led
Chase to conclude that the national government has "too
frequently fought the wrong battle in the wrong place."

Chase was extxemely critical of President Truman
and the Democratic leaders of Congress for responding to

criticism about loyalty and security in the administration

only with the "red herring" argument.

In 1947 and 1948,

when a security problem began to be evident, the nation
was still relatively calm about the Communist threat.

For

Chase, in the myriad of wild charges by the Un-American

Activities Committee, there were occasionally serious and
"foreboding revelations," and he blamed the Democratic
leaders for failing "to face up to the realities of the

Communist threat."
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They evidently felt compelled to deny
any and
all evidence of Communist infiltration
in
order to discredit the wilder allegations
about
the motives and loyalties of the Democrats.
Consequently, there came a time when every
revelation, no matter how substantial, like
the
warnings received about Alger Hiss, was
dismissed
as 'red-baiting.
of course, the excesses of
those searching out the Communist menace were
a real provocation, but hindsight makes
it
clear that the intransigence that refused to
allow an objective examination of the evidence
from whatever source derived was dangerous to
the nation and injurious to the Democratic Party.
•

The American concern over subversion and disloyalty

obviously involved and involves more than simple disagreement about the nature of a supposed threat to national
security.

The fact that conviction under the Smith Act

could have such subsidiary consequences as denial of burial
in Arlington Cemetery even if the deceased was a decorated

World war li hero 144 would seem to indicate that the issue
went far deeper than merely the defence of the nation
as deep as the defence of an appropriate national character.

The pluralistic nature of the American polity, together

with its "plebicite" notion of democracy, has always
created fertile soil for a nationalistic demagogue who,

because Americanism could not be translated as a culture,
religion, or race, capitalized on an immigrant population's

propensity to over-identify with available symbols and
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translated "sense of nation" into a common idea system
rather than a common background.

To belong to the nation

means to believe certain things (or more accurately not

to believe in certain things) rather than simply to reside
in a common territory.

The English perimeter of nationality,

since it involves race and religion as well as geography
and long history, is arbitrary, but it is also relatively

clear and final.

The American notion of national self

more open, fluid, even egalitarian

— was,

during the early

1950*8, to belong to a certain segment of public opinion.

But American nervousness about loyalty was also

more than (or less than) a side effect of ethnic pluralism.
For reasons which Louis Hartz has tried to give the most

cogent explanation, the very narrow width of the American

political dialogue (when compared to that of Europe) also'
created factors which were curiously to make the narrow

dialogue narrower still.

145

The historic enunciation of

the value that opposing points of viev/ are necessary to

democracy also created a very restricted view about what
was legitimate "loyal opposition."

Much of the "second

red scare" was a curious blend of nationalism, a restricted

view of "legitimate" criticism, and old fashioned dirty
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politics.

To view your political enemies
as "treasonous"

was not beyond Jefferson, let
alone Joseph McCarthy or
Martha Mitchell.

When the Supreme Court by unanimous
action in
1966 reversed the Georgia state
Legislature's attempt to

exclude Julian Bond from membership
(even though appro-

priately elected) because he had opposed
the federal
government's policy in Viet Nam and the
Selective Service
system, it was curbing a deep American
instinct to narrow

the political competition by making it
illegal.

Georgia

had argued that, by majority vote (thereby
making it democratic)

,

it had a right to exact a higher
standard of

loyalty from its legislators than it could
perhaps con-

stitutionally require from ordinary citizens, but
the
action vaa probably motivated by considerations of
race
as much as those of loyalty.

^"^^

V. 0. Key once suggested

that the highly charismatic demagoguery of southern
one-

party states was caused by the lack of party opposition
and the resultant "mu It i- factional" internal politics

which placed a premium on attention-getting devices for
electoral success.

The fact that the American political

system, as well as its culture, is highly fragmented
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(multi-factional)

,

could place a premium on demagoguery

in national politics.

The usual assumption is that the

multiplicity of forces involved in national politics leads
to moderation rather than excesses.

But

rau

It i- factional ism

can also tempt politicians to adopt an extreme and volatile style which exploit symbolic conflicts and achieve

consensus by transcending "mundane" political issues and
focusing on emotive, symbolic (and even romantic} questions.

issues .

Civil liberties questions are primarily tyinbolic
Since McCarthy was the first truly national

demagogue, in a nation which abounded in flamboyant regional

political leaders, the issue by which he gained national
prominence emerges as especially important.
Psychologically, if not logically, the subversive

hunts merged with class politics.

The career of Senator

McCarthy was in no small way a manifestation of hostility
to elite politics (the State Department, Harvard, etc.)
and loyalty oaths and scrutiny of teachers had heavy over-

tones of simple ant i- intellectual ism and the suspicion that
"bookish" types felt they were "more than equal."

The entire judiciary, as well as the Supreme Court,

while balking at times under congressional threats and

334

internally divided about their proper
role in all this,

nonetheless emerged on the whole as a
critical libertarian
force.

While structurally the Supreme Court is
supposed

to play a more important role than courts
in the United
Kingdom, it could have played a much less
spectacular role

than it did; even in the cases which deferred
to legislative reasonableness, the vigorous dissents were at
least
a source of literary inspiration for libertarians.

While rarely striking down legislation in this
area on its face, the insistence that the Smith Act dis-

tinguish between mere menibership and "active" membership;
that the Internal Security Act's registration provision
roust

be "voluntary" in order to avoid violating the Fifth

Amendment; that the State Department's right to establish

restricted areas doesn't include the authority to enforce
theiji,

were not-so-subtle techniques to void the original

intent of such legislation and policy.

Speech and Public Order
The problem of trying to elucidate a criterion
for a general problem based on the Supreme Court's experience

with several specific cases is not only that each case is
different, but that different Courts and occasionally the

I

I
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same Court will approach the problem on different "levels."
i

C. Herman Pritchett, for example, has suggested that the

Court's approach to breach of the peace problems reveals
three different "stages" of judicial analysis.

In this

typology the Court decides first whether the speech involved
enjoys constitutional protection at all; second, whether
the ordinance used is valid, i.e., narrow and not per-

mitting overbroad discretion; and third, if the law is

,

'

valid, both on its face and as applied, and the speech
is protected, whether the danger to the peace is sufficient

to override the claims of constitutional protection.

Presumably the Court would use the Chaplinsky list to
i

establish whether the speech had sufficient social utility
to claim First Amendment protection.

If the speech is

'

held not to be lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, insulting,
or inciteful, then attention is turned to the validity
of the statute in question.

Cases such as Terminiello

;

i

can be viewed as stopping at the second level, with the
dissenting Justices vigorously arguing that the Court
should move to the third stage and analyze whether a breach
of the peace was imminent.

Stage three involves a factual

assessment, which Pritchett implied the Court used in

^

^

336

Peiner, but in cases such as
Edwards and Cox, the Court

chose to dispose of the problem
within the context of
stage two.

Since stage three involves the
probability of
violence, the Court faces the awkward
problem of substitu-

ting its assessment of a condition for
that of the police
or jury,

if the issue is disposed of at levels
one or

two, the government's assessment of probable
violence, be
it correct or incorrect,

is not germane.

Cases such as Adderly

v.

Florida can be viewed as

a variation of Pritchett's third levol,
wherein the

justices balance the utility of what would normally
be

constitutionally protected speech against the community's
interest in tranquility as well as the prevention of disorder.

Black in this case did make reference to the

"danger" presented to the jailhouse, but the real crux

of the matter for him was that places such as jails,
libraries, etc., have functions other than the facilitation

of the exchange of ideas.

Thus the decision to analyze the problem at any
of these stages or any of their variations can have great

consequences for the holding in particular cases, because
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it is at this juncture that the
Court decides What it is

deciding,

its answer to this question is
frequently more

important than its decision within a
particular level,
since disagreement within a level tends
to be so minimal
as to make the conclusion almost
pre-ordained.

With the exception of the decision on group libel
and the symbolic speech cases, the Supreme Court
was

fairly consistent in insisting that some concrete
evidence
of probable disorder, beyond simple apprehensiveness
on
the part of authorities that a particular event could
lead to disorder, was necessary before speech could
be

constitutionally intercepted,

it usually did this by

insisting that the legitimate aim of authorities could

be achieved either by more narrowly drawn statutes, or in

the case of Jehovah's Witnesses in Lacona, Iowa, or anti-

Semites in Chicago, better police protection for the
target of the community's hostility.

In some cases, such

as Black's dissent in Feiner or the majority's opinion in

Edwards or Gregory v. Chicago

,

the judges vere quite

wilUng to impute unconstitutional motives to the local

— or

simply disagree about the explosiveness of the

situation.

Even though Justice Black was making it clear

police
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that the "whim

.

.

.

of

.

.

.

grievance bearers" was not

to take precedent over the coimnunity 's interest
in tranquility, the basic dispute in the court involved where

speech may take place, not the content of the speech.

Keyishian was an example of the Court leaping to bring a
case into First Amendment territory, and Bell v. Maryland

demonstrated very creative use of jurisdictional rules to
protect a group for which the majority had obvious sympathy.

The only exceptions to the Court's general pattern
of negating governmental and private action when it either

interferes directly with speech or has a "chilling effect"

on the spirit of free discussion are the upholding of the
validity of the concept "group libel" (which even though
infrequently used is still a notion with great restrictive
potential)

,

draft cards.

and the apparent sanctity of the flag and

Since Americans from the time of Garrison

have been attracted to small-scale arson as a technique to

dramatize their complaint, such statutes could receive

widespread use in the future.
While there was also a propensity for English
libertarians to play a political role, i.e.. that of

defender of the individual citizen against the power of
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government or the vociferous majority,
this role seems

to be accentuated in the American context.

The generally

more "legalistic" political environment
(and the more

politicized legal environment) in the U. S.j the
role of
the judiciary and judicial review? the perpetual
juris-

dictional jealousies created by a federal system? and
checks and balances in the national government, are no

doubt factors in conditioning this "adversary" role.

Whether the role produced a certain "conception" of civil
liberties or the conception of civil liberties in America

helps produce this role is less important than the penchant

to view the problems of individual liberty in an "adversary"
context.

Even some of the judicial analogies about civil
liberties:

"the free marketplace of ideas," "sword of

state" pitted against the "shield" of the Bill of Rights,

indicate a basic referent steeped in attempts to delineate

legitimate rules of conflict, rather than in rules to

facilitate communication through speech.

The English per-

ceive freedom of speech as a value of interaction
as a value of collision.

—Americans,

This is a subtle difference which

certainly cnnnot explain all dissimilarities, but it may
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have subtle consequences which over
an extended period of
time can have great impact.

The traditional libertarian response
to the

threats of espionage in the 1950 's, as
Chase pointed out,
wag to claim that conservatives were
engaging in their

traditional role of claiming that their enemies
were subversive.

Standard response A (enemy within) brought

standard response B (no enemy within)

.

The adversary

syndrome encouraged a network of affirmations and
denials

which acted to increase the atmosphere of hysteria
because

groundless accusations became merged with legitimate
ones.
This had the disastrous two-fold effect (depending
on
public opinion) of either validating all claims about an
internal danger or validating none.

A similar "set response" characterizes some of the
American libertarian response to New Left "confrontation
politics" and black revolutionary movements.

The auto-

matic assumption that every indictment against a Black

Panther or Yippie is a governmental attempt to truncate
the American political spectrum, is more than the simple

assumption of innocence until guilt is proven, it is the

assumption that guilt cannot be proven, which inevitably
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leads to a hostility to trials per se.

One of the effects of this posture toward
problems
of individual liberty, for example, is that it
lends
itself more easily to a "fixed role" in which the
liber-

tarian response is more likely to be doctrinaire than
illuminating.

When the adversary conception of civil

liberties springing from a "suspicious" as opposed to a
"deferential" polity is the perennial response to problems,
it can quickly lead to a network of allegations and

denials, which can transcend, and many times avoid, real

problems

CHAPTER VI

OBSCENITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Obscenity, Official Action an^
the Law
P'-^^^^c

Pressure for Censorship

While our concern will be focused
on official and
unofficial attempts to prevent the
public distribution of

material felt to be harmful because it
violates acceptable
notions of sexual propriety, it is important
to realize

that in the United States, as in the United
Kingdom, there

are many other rationales which can motivate
attempts to

stop the distribution of

a

particular work.

Movies in

particular have been the target of censorship on grounds
not related to obscenity:

In the 1950 's Jewish groups

protested the "anti-Semitic overtones" of the British film

Oliver Twist so vehemently that it was withdrawn from the
market for

a

year.

The American Humane Association

protested the depiction o
Balls

?

f

cruelty to animals in The Brave

the NAACP objected to Birth of a Nation .

The

Catholic War Veterans resented the depiction of Catholicism in Bicycle Thief .

The American Legion picketed
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Spartacus because of its "revolutionary message"
and

were even successful in stopping exhibitors in New
Jersey from showing any films of Charlie Chaplin because

of his "left-wing affiliations."

Numerous groups boy-

cotted Ingrid Bergman movies because of her "lax morals,"
and a Chicago police chief successfully prevented the

showing of No Way Out on grounds that it might inflame
race relations.^

Simple "objections" of course do not

necessarily discourage either the production or the showing of controversial movies, but frequently the pressure

of private groups is easily translated into the command
of public officials, such as the celebrated declaration by
the New York City Commissioner of Licenses that the movie

The Miracle was "blasphemous" and would result in the

suspension of the theater's license if shown in the future.

This action, unanimously declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in 1952,

2

.

is only one of the more ostentatious

manifestations of public and personal pressure to restrain
the communication of political and religious points of
view.

When the criterion shifts to sexual candor, the

federal courts and government in general have been more

obliging
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Defining Obscenity
"

Roth Test "

Between 1942 and 1956 Congress
enacted 70 obscenity
laws, and the various states had
obscenity laws which dove-

tailed with local licensing procedures
all of which, as in
Britain, are supported in principle by
international agree-

ments between 50 nations.^

The modern concept of obscenity

in the United States can be roost conveniently
traced from a

Supreme Court ruling in Roth v. United States in 1957^
in

which the American standard for obscenity was clearly
divorced from any dependency on the Hicklin test.

As early

as 1934 lower Federal courts were holding that the Hicklin

rule should not apply to the importation of such works as

Joyce's "Ulysses" because, according to Augustus Hand, the

work was sincere, erotic material presented was not the
dominant theme of the work, and taken as

a

whole it did not

have a libidinous effect.^
Roth, which concerned the conviction of an individual

for violation of the federal obscenity statute prohibiting

the mailing of any material which is "obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy.

.

.or indecent" on pain of a $5000 fine

and/or five years' imprisonment,

was to lay down a new

^

definition of obscenity
in ..eeping with
the
sses
decision. ..stice Brennan.
spea.in, for the
„a,o.ity. upheld the conviction, but
stipulated that the new
constitutional teat Of Obscenity
is whether the
material
appeal, to the "prurient
interest" of the "average
person,"
applying "conte„,por3ry
cownunity standards" and
considering the "dominant the^e
of the material taken a,
a whole,"
not isolated passages.
This is a new, and stricter
standard which the First
Amendinent requires, according
to Brennan, but the concept
••obscurity" itself is not
incompatible with the First A.end-

mend because it is one of those
"we 11 -de fined and narrowly

limited classes of speech" which
were listed in Chaplinskv .

The First Amendment was designed
to protect "unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the

prevailing climate of opinion," but
obscenity is utterly

without socially redeeming importance.

We know this, Brennan

implied, because so many states and
nations have made it

punishable.

By declaring obscene speech to be without

socially redeeming importance, and by declaring the
First
Amendment to apply only to speech with socially redeeming
importance, Brennan effectively took prurient material out

346

Of ran.e of the Pi„t
Amendment.

..,,.ent about "consequences,.,

such as Whether the material
presents any Kind of danger,
clear or otherwise, to the
comn^unity, are not germane

because they are questions which
are relevant only in
deciding whether speech with
social value is outweighed by
other comr^unity interests. Just
as libelous utterances do
not require a demonstration of
danger to the community,

neither do obscene materials,

in this case all of the judges

were willing to assume the "fact"
of the obscenity of the
material in question. To the majority
the issue was the

proper definition and the relationship
to the First Amendment.

Black and Douglas, in dissent, did not
question the

factual basis of the case, either, but simply
argued that

government should be concerned with anti-social
conduct,
not utterance or "thoughts," regardless of what
they are
labelled.

In short,

for Douglas and Black there is con-

stitutional protection for obscenity just as for other
speech.

Things were more complex for Justice Harlan, who

concurred in Alberts

,

but dissented in Roth

,

on the grounds

that the standard for obscenity should not be the same
on the state as on the federal level and that the federal
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government was more limited because
the dangers of
federal censorship are greater
and because the First Amendment applies specifically to
federal action, while the
Fourteenth is more vague and leaves
states more leeway.

Harlan was not attacking the concept
of obscenity but he
urged that on the federal level
everything should be protected
except "hard-core pojjaography, " which,
he felt, could not

characterize Roth's wares.
The Roth test, it should be noted, was
more a theo-

retical formulation and defense of the concept
of obscenity
than a concrete application.

Lower courts had to assess the

same material under the Roth standard; but
they often dis-

agreed about the proper conclusion, as when Henry
Miller's
"Tropic of cancer" was declared not obscene in California

but obscene in Florida.

The Supreme Court held the work not

to be obscene but was extremely divided on

a

rationale,

with Brennan and Goldberg claiming that it did not meet the
^oth test; Black and Douglas arguing that no book could be

reached by injunctive proceedings (or any other); and
Stewart arguing that obscenity is limited to hard-core

pornography,^
The ACLU's response to the Roth case took the form

°' a policy formulation by
the national
Board in 1957
in their view all
expression shoula .e
protected by constitutional guarantees
of free speech a„^
and press and there
should be no special
cateaorv of «v
category
obscenity or pornography
to Which different
constitutional
tests apply.

-

statute
It ^ne
the':::"I:*L°"^^'
very least, must meet
the reani,-*

re"?r:"that Vf'^'"'*^"^^^'
obs';„e
^« "^1'' *o be
Obscene, if^'T
it must r'"'''
be established
beyond
a reasonable doubt
that the material
presents a clear and present
danger of
normally inducing behavior
which validly
has been made criminal
by statute. 8

^

in-plicit in the Union's
approach to this problem is

that the relationship
between allegedly obscene
literature
and anti-social conduct
is tenuous; that
standards designed
primarily to protect youthful
persons should not be Imposed
on literature or entertainment
available to adults; and

that the problem (what little
of it is left) should be
handled by individual prosecutions
in which obscenity would
be a judicial determination
rather than "advice" from a
public or private board,
The ACLU's claim that obscenity
statutes should

"nly be applied to material which
demonstrably incites
anti-social action, while never embraced
by the Supreme

court, was on occasion, succeasful
on the local level.
In 1958,

for example, the ACLU of
Northern California,

while handling the defense of
Howl and Other

Pgenis,

a

bookstore owner who sold

by Allen Ginsberg, convinced San

Francisco M^^nicipal Judge Clayton Horn
that the proper
test of obscenity was whether the
material "presented

a

clear and present danger of inciting
anti-social action.
"

Patent Of fensiveness "

While the Roth holding was "liberal" in the sense
that serious works of art could no longer be judged
by the
effect of isolated passages on the most easily corruptible

person legal minds could imagine, it also tended to raise

more questions than it answered.

The most immediate effect

was to impose a national standard, which, among other things

would make state statutes aimed at "portraying sexual
immorality in a favorable light" (New York's rationale for

banning the film version of

Lady Chatter ley's Lover

)

unconstitutional because such legislation restricted an'
'Idea."

11

But the exact meaning of Roth became the issue

in Manual Enterprises v. Day in 1962?

bution of

a

12

the mail distri-

magazine designed to appeal primarily to

homosexuals was stopped when the Postmaster General barred

it from the .ails.

The court, in this case,
granted

in:)unctive relief to the
publishers, but once again
could

not form a majority agreement
on the rationale.

The

separate opinion of Justices
Harlan and Stewart argued
that While Roth made "prurient
interest" the key test for
obscenity, it was not the sole test,
and in keeping with
what they believed to be the
purpose of Roth, i.e., to
tighten obscenity standards, they
urged that before

material could be adjudged obscene it
must also be "patently
offensive."

Patent of f ensiveness was reauired,
according

to Harlan, because without it many
worthwhile works could

be deemed prurient and withheld from
the public.

The

particular work in question, even with nude
photographs of

male models, was "dismally unpleasant, uncouth,
and tawdry,"
but not "patently offensive," because it did not
clearly
affront current community standards of decency.
"

Social Value "

The meaning of "socially redeeming importance" as

well as the relevant community in the phrase "contemporary
community standards" was "clarified" by the Supreme Court
(and in the process greatly altered) in Jacobellis v. Ohio
in 1964 when a state obscenity conviction for the showing
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the

HI.

contusion i„

reverse..l3

^

„^^^^^^ ^^^^^^

^^^^^^^^

was , test for obscenity
or si»ply

explanation of why
Obscenity was not
constitutionally protected.
i„ which
case something ™ight have
so.e
social value but still
be

Obscene,

xn this case, however,

a wor. had literary,

Brennan ™aae it clear that

scientific, artistic or
other social

importance, it was protected
by the First A,„end™ent.
Courts
could not weigh something's
social utility against it,

prurient appeal because if it
had
not be obscene.

an^,

social value, it could

The majority also indicated
that cor«unity

standards implied the "society at
large."
Stewart, in his concurrence,
again insisted that

Obscenity statutes can only ban
"hard-core pornography,
and in a rare instance of total

judicial candor, said he

probably could not define "hard-core
pornography,

know it when

I

see it.

.

.

"

"but

I

,

In 1966 the Supreme Court turned
its attention to

clarifying what it meant in its various
judicial elaborations
on the Roth standard,

in a case involving civil proceedings

aoainst the book Memoirs of

a

Woman of Pleasure in Massachusetts

in which the state supreme court conceded
that the book may
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have haa so., literar.
val.e

that this .la not

it

sufficient social
i^po.tance to .e p.otectea
speech, the
supreme court reiteratea
formally three inaepenaent
atanaaras for obscenity.
..,tiee Brennan, spea.i„,
the .a^ority, explained
that before material
could be
labelled obscene it mast
be (1.;
(l) witnout
witho,,^ any
=^
socially
redeeming value (from
Jacobellis , (2) must appeal
to
prurient interest (as explained
and qualified in Roth),
and (3) must be patently
offensive (from Manual
Enterprises).
These criteria are to be
applied independently, not
with
reference to one another,
according to Brennan, and even
a -modicum of social
value" prevents a work from
being
obscene. The work also must be
judged in terms of the
)

audience to which it is expected
to appeal.

Justices Clark and White, in dissent,
felt that

the social value test was not an
independent criterion, and
Clark even quipped that such a standard
protects "well-

written" obscenity and intercepts only
poorly-written filth.
"

Average "

On the same day the Court rendered a
short clari-

fication of what "average person" meant in the
attempt to

establish prurient appeal.

Mishkin v. New York involved

the conviction

a

publisher of a .aga.ino
catering to

publication wouia not have
prurient appeal to the
"averageperson because it was
designed for those with
™re bizarre
and morbid tastes.
Justice Brennan and four
other Justices
sin-ply qualified Roth
to include the prurient
interest of
the group „K>st likely to
receive then,, and the
conviction
was sustained.
"

Pandering "

The third and most spectacular
of the Supreme

court's 1966 rulings was the
affirmation of the conviction
Of Ralph Gin.burg, publisher
of Eros magazine for using the
U. S. mails to distribute
obscene material. 15

Gi^burg

engaged in several sales gimmicks,
such as seeking mailing
privileges from the postmasters of
Intercourse and Blue
Ball, Pa., and a "money-back-guarantee"
if one of his

publications - The Housewife's Handbook on
Selective

Promiscuity - failed to reach

a

purchaser because of

Post

Office censorship— none of which helped
establish his
serious artistic purpose, in the minds of the
federal
judiciary.

Even the government admitted that the magazine,

as well as the books advertised in it, were not
clearly
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Obscene under the Court

previous standards, but

a

five-

majority held that in close
cases evidence of con».ercial
exploitation of non-obscene material
could substantiate
the charge,
n-an

Jastice Brennan, speaking for the
majority, found
Ginzburg's advertising approach
permeated with the "leer
of the sensualist;" this was sufficient
to establish an

intent to sell material based on its
salacious appeal, and
this "sordid business of pandering" enjoyed
no First Amend-

ment guarantees.

By adding the criterion of pandering,

Brennan took a large step toward negating the
restrictive
scope of obscenity laws which he and the Court had
pains-

takingly tried to establish with its "prurient,"
"patently
offensive," and "no social value" rules.
Pandering became not only the fourth test, but by

implication overrode the other three.

The concept emerged

in an entirely new context where the heart of the offense
is not producing a particular thing which is obscene, but

selling any material by implying it has prurient reward.
As a criminal offense obscenity moves from corrupting minds

to specialized kinds of false advertising.

The clear intent

of the majority, which received considerable support from
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such venerable opinion
producers as the New YorK
editorial board, was to get

Tin^

at the "business" of
pornography,

They were much less concerned
with the material itself,
and more interested in the
profiteering, which most agree
is considerable, which
results in attempts or promises
to

satiate the prurient interests
of those willing to be, or
already, corrupted.
The ACLU Of Pennsylvania, in its
amicus brief before

the u. s. Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Ginzburg case, did
not argue with the finding that Eros
was obscene (i.e., that
it did pander) but challenged
the conviction on the ground

that Ginsburg's various enterprises had
some socially

redeeming importance and that the severity
of the sentence,
five years' imprisonment and a $28,000 fine,
would inhibit

other publishers of material dealing with love and
sex to
an extent which woiiia eremite de facto hostility
to the

First Amendment.

Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan and Stewart all

wrote separate dissents, with Harlan arguing that the
federal government can ban only "hard-core ^ronography .

The dissents of Douglas and Stewart were extensions of
some of the points made in one of the angriest dissents
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Justice Black, who authored many,
ever penned. Even
if one is prepared to
overlook the fact that the federal
government is not constitutionally
empowered to prohibit
any expression of speech or
ideas (which, according to
Black should have been enough to
reverse this case), the
fact still remains that "neither
Ginsburg nor anyone else-

could possibly have known pandering
to be a federal offense
since there was no such crime until
the majority of his

brethren created one in disposing of this
case.

Brennan

had cited united States v. Rebhuhn (1940)17
a case involving pandering by authors of works describing
sexual

aberrations designed for psychiatric and anthropological
scholars.

Even that prosecution was unsuccessful.

For

Black the introduction of a new, hopelessly vague standard,
in an area where government has no business anyway, gave

unbridled discretion to the judge or jury which tries an
individual for obscenity; the fourteen separate opinions
handed down in the cases of Ginaburg , Mishkin , and Fanny Hill
should make it abundantly clear that "not even the most
learned judge, much less a layman, is capable of knowing
in advance.

.

.whether certain material comes within the

area of "obscenity" as that term is confused by the
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Court today."
Black,

in an apparent attempt to deal with an

exasperating situation, even suggested that the lack
of

certitude in this aspect of criminal law was great
enough to warrant clear censorship to avoid compounding

constitutional transgressions.
As bad and obnoxious as I believe
governmental cenr.'^rship is in a Nation
that has accepted the First Amendment
as its basic ideal of freedom, I am
compelled to say that censorship that
would stamp certain books and literature
as illegal in advance of publication or
conviction would in some ways be preferable to the unpredictable book -by-book
censorship into which we have now drifted.

Variable Obscenity
Even when one puts to use the four parts of the

Court's complex formula for obscenity, one question still

unanswered is: "Can a state set more restrictive standards
for minors by prohibiting the sale to persons under 17

years of age of material >7hich appeals to the prurient
interest of minors; is patently offensive to the prevailing standards in the adult community as to what is suitable

material for minors; and is utterly without redeeming
importance for minors

New York State, which had such

a "variable obscenity" statute, received approval from the
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Supreme Court in Ginsbexa v. New
York in 1968.18

^he

issue in this case was not the
fact of obscenity, since

the defendants made no challenge
on this ground, but simply
whether a citizen's freedom to read
can be made to depend
upon age.

Such an adjustment of the definition
of obscenity,

according to Brennan and the majority,
simply brings the

concept in line with "social realities"
by permitting
assessment of the material

U

terms of a specific age group.

That the well-being of children is within a
state's constitutional power cannot be questioned, and while
parents
are primarily responsible for their children, they
are also

entitled to the support of laws "designed to aid in the

discharge of that responsibility."
In a separate concurrence. Justice Stewart warned

against a "doctrinaire, knee-jerk application of the First

Amendment."

The basic value of the First Amendment is

that it guarantees a society of free choice, bat such a

society presupposes the capacity of its members to choose.
A juvenile audience, because of lack of development, is
like a captive audience, i.e., not possessed of that full

capacity for choice which the First Amendment presumes,
and che same rationale which permits government to regulate
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-oand truces can sustain
the regulation of
the reaain,
matter of minors.
Douglas and Black dissented,
with their traditional
Objection to the notion that
obscenity is unprotected
by
the First Amendment, and
Fortas dissented on the
ground
that the court should have
tackled the question on
whether
the n,aga.ines were in fact
obscene. Obscenity ,^y be
variable, but so ™ay abridgement
of constitutional rights.
Fortas warned.
It was unfortunate that
neither the defendants

nor the judges decided to challenge
the fact of obscenity,
because New York had a concrete and
reasonably clear
(as

these things go) statutory definition
of obscenity which

made it an offense to depict,

.

.female.

.

.buttocks

with less than a full opaque covering,
or the showing of the
female breast with less than a fully
opaque covering of
any portion thereof below the top of
the nipple.

.

.

Such precision gets away from the Court's
attempts to make

prurient relate to the total milieu of sexuality,
and if
reviewed by the Supreme Court would have led either
to a

reassertion of the basically "attitudinal " as opposed to

the anatomical approach to prurience, or at least have

called forth Justice Brennan's views on the
exact status
of the areola.
Some interpret Ginzburg and Ginsberg to be judicial

reactions

attacks on the "permissiveness" of the

warren Court, but in the 1967 term, for example, the Court
reversed thirteen state and federal obscenity convictions one of which concerned a ten-year sentence for sending

obscene material through the u.ails.

But the court also

sustained a ban of a film which it viewed as hard-core

pornography and the conviction of a sculptor who displayed life-sized erotic sculpture in his yard.^^
"variable obscenity,

"

Even

the Court insisted, must not be so

vague as to give unfettered discretion to local authorities to determine what minors shall think.

In 1968 the

court struck down a city ordinance which empowered a motion

picture licensing board to ban exhibition of films to minors
in which the portrayal of brutality and sex would tend to

incite crime and encourage sexual promiscuity among youths.
Such undefined terms as "sacrilegious" and "sexual promis-

cuity," the Court held, made the ordinance defective because
on

of vagueness,^
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Possesaion
In Mann v. Ohio ^^ the Ohio affiliate of the ACLU

submitted a brief which sought to have the case overturned

by strikinr as unconstitutional the state statute prohibiting possession of obscene material.

Although some

of the justices indicated skepticism about the law's broad
scope, the Court disposed of the case on Fourth Amendment

grounds.

22

But in 1969 the Supreme Court, in Stanley v.

Georgia , reviewed a state statute which punished possession
of obscene matter.

23

This attempt to get at the problem

through the consumer was found unconstitutional becavise
the Fourteerth Amendment prohibits the making of mere

private possession

a

crime.

The material in this case con-

sisted of films which state officers seized after federal
and state agents had found them in the defendant's home

which they searched pursuant to

a search

warrant issued

to investigate the defendant's alleged bookmaking activities

There were no dissents in this case, and the concurrences
of Stewart, Brennan, and

\<Jhite

were based on illegal search

and seizure and inadmissible evidence considerations.

Justice Marshall, however, expressing the view of six
members of the court, claimed that while Roth did declare
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that obscenity is not protected speech, it meant this
in the context of government's "important interest"
in

regulating commercial distribution of obscene material.

Without really explaining why government's interest, if
that substantial when dealing with commercial distribution,

could not also extend to private possession (since the

material still lacks social value, etc.),

Marshall simply

asserted that the First TUnendment guarantees the right to
receive information and ideas regardless of their social
worth.

While it could easily be argued that preventing

a

citizen from being sold such material would also violate
the First Amendment, Marshall indicated that the basic right

of privacy was also involved and quoted Justice Brandeis'

dissent of 1928 which claimed that the "right to be let alone"
was "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most

valued by civilii'ed man."
Stanley was an interesting case because there were
"dicta" which indicated that the Court looked at this

question the way Black and Douglas would have handled all
obscenity cases.

Marshall asserted, for example, that the

state had no right to control the moral content of a person's
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thoight, and Georgia's claim that exposure to obscene
ir.aterial

could lead to deviant sexual behavior

crimes

^x\6

of sexual violence had "little empirical basis."

Marshall

also reintroduced the clear and present danger test to the

discussion by claiming that although Roth had made such
considerations clearly irrelevant, if the issue involved
private possession the state must establish

probability of anti-social conduct.
requiring different

r 'les

a

clear

The rationale for

for private possession as opposed

to distribution and sale was that in the latter case there

was the risk that material might fall into the hands of minors
or that the "material might intrude upon tho sensibilities
or privacy of the general public."

The argument here,

which Marshall implied but did not spell out,

is

presumably

that distribution, sale, and all related advertising are
"public" dimensions and therefore fall under public regulation,
if not public taste; whereas obscene material in the home

effects only individuals, not the general public.

While

this is a quite reasonable distinction, since even a liber-

tarian with the most libertine of tastes should not object
to such things as regulation of advertisements outside movie

theaters where the public is

n.-?.r^

of the semi-captive street
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audience, it is an interesting development because it ia

almost a total reversal of the original motivation of

obscenity statites.

As Louis Henkin has pointed out,

"obscenity is not suppressed primarily for the protection
of others.

Much of it is suppressed for.

and welfare of the 'consumer.'
a

crime.

Obscenity is sin."^^

.

.the salvation

Obscenity at bottom is not
The holding in Stanley

would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court has divorced
the concept from its luasi-religious basis and made it a

crime directed at a partic ilar form of public interaction,
most generally described as pandering.

Just as in English

law, where the activity of corrupting is considered criminal

even if being corrupted isn't, the American concept is

directed at exploitation of

pruriejnit

material rather than

prurient material itself.

Methods of Control

While always reaffirming the validity of the concept of obscenity, the Supreme Court has made numerous

rulings about the methods authorities may use to combat
that which is patently offensive.

It insisted,

for example,

that a state cannot prohibit the selling of works to the
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general pablic on the grounds that the works would be
harmful to minors. ^5

In the same year, however,

it approved

the use of injunctive proceedings against the sale of

obscene material. 26

^

smith v. California

(1957) the

Court struck down a city ordinance because it did not

clearly specify that a bookseller must knowingly sell
obscene material and therefore it failed to meet the proper
"scienter" requirements.'^^

Requiring a bookseller to inspect

personally all the works he sold, the Court reasoned, placed
an unrealistic restriction on the free flow of ideas.

In

this case the Court also scolded the trial court judge for

refusing to allow expert testimony as to the fact of obscenity.

Since the offense is dependent upon an assessment

of prevailing community standards, etc., this question cannot be answered without expert testimony, and a denial of

such testimony, according to Justice Frankfurter, violated

due process.
In 1963 the Court dealt with one example of the

numerous "infoinmal" sanctions applied by various pressure

groups on booksellers to discourage them from handling

certain publications.

In Bantam Books ,

Inc. v. Sullivan ,

the issue was the propriety of Rhode Island's Commission
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to Encourage Morality in Youth,

a

legislative invention

charged with "educating" the public about obscene publications.

Part of the curriculum in this educational

endeavor consisted of notifying book distributors that

certain material handled by them had been found objectionable for sale to minors.

The notification, on official

stationery, thanked the distributors for their cooperation
in this matter and reminded the recipient that the commission

had a duty to recommend prosecution of the sellers of obscene
material.

The Commission claimed that it was merely advising

distributors, not engaging in censorship, but

a

majority of

the Supreme Court found that such "advisement" was motivated

by a desire to use the threat of criminal sanctions to
achieve what probably could not be achieved by the criminal

sanctions themselves and avoided any of the procedural

safeguards of criminal proceedings.
Even though the Court had approved of injunctive

proceedings when a trial quickly followed the seizure of
material, it was quick to declare defective proceedings
in Missouri which gave police the power to seize publications

with warrants based simply on complaints rather than any
29
specific description of the material to be seized.
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In 1964 injunctive proceedings were again reaffirmed

when they involved genuine judicial supervision of specific
material to be seized, but the Supreme Court also required
the hearing on the question of obscenity to take place

before warrants were issued rather than after

«

thus tighten-

ing the restrictions on confiscation of material.

Obscenity and Movies

The status of motion pictures in American law differs
somewhat from other modes of expression because of an early

constitutional history, dating back to 1915, in which they

were not viewed as either the "press" or as "organs of
public opinion."

31

This insistence that movies were more

entertainment, but also entertainment "capable of evil,"

withdrew the cinema from First Amendment considerations and
was the basis of prior restraint in this area.

Some dicta

by Justice Douglas in a 1947 decision, however, indicated
a willingness of at least some of the justices to consider

movies as equal to newspapers and radio as protected media
of thought.
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In Burstyn v. Wilson (supra) the Court was

willing to call movies a "significant medium for the communication of ideas," but the holding was restricted to the negation
of censorship based on the belief that the material is

"sacreligioas."
Court,

But in 1961 a narrow majority of the

in Times Film Corporation v. city
of Chicago ,

reaffirmed by implication the unequal status
of films by

holding that prior censorship per se was
not unconstitutional.
This was not

a

clear ruling, since the defendant sought an

injunction to prevent a Chicago censorship board from

preventing him from showing films which he refused to
submit to the board for approval, and the majority seemed to

rely partially on the notion that no abridgement of a right

would be clear until pictures had been submitted to the
board.

Such a rationale presumed, however, that a state

has some legitimate interest in reviewing motion pictures,
and the majority alluded to obscenity as perhaps the only

proper object of prior restraint.

Justice Clark, writing

for the majority, seemed to justify the holding in the case

by invoking the doctrine that films were not subject to the
same rules as other methods of expression and

that have

some latitude as to how they shall deal with films.

Chief

Justice Warren, joined by Black, Douglas and Brennan, did
not agree that the distinction between film and other media

rose to the dignity of a constitutional matter; they viewed

the majority's holding as an endorsement of censorship.
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The Times Film ruling was upheld in theory but

greatly limited in practice when the Supreme Court established
elaborate procedural requirements for film censorship in
Freedman v. Maryland in 1965.^"^

Since refusal to submit

films to censorship boards had failed to force the issue of

prior restraint of films squarely before the Court, the

tactic this time was to show the movie anyway.

This

con-

viction was overturned because, on the appellate level at
least, the argument of the defense was not that there could

exist no prior restraints on movies, but that the particular

Maryland procedure was an invalid prior restraint because it
presented "a danger of unduly suppressing protected expression,"

Justice Brennan, for the majority, found the Maryland system

defective because it contained no time limit for completion

of review and the elimination order did not provide for
judicial participation or the assurance of prompt judicial
review.
stated,

"Unlike a prosecution for obscenity," Brennan
"A censorship proceeding puts the initial burden

on the exhibitor or distributor," and the burden actually
is on the censor to prove that a film is unprotected.

The Court also required censors to seek

a

restraining

order if they wished a film banned, so that their actions
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would not, even in

a de facto sense,
have the effect of

finality, and the procedure
must assure a quick
judicial
decision. Justices Douglas
and Black concurred,
but argued
that no type of censorship,
"speedy or prolonged," is

permissible in a nation guided by
the First Amendment.
Chicago's attempt to enjoin
the showing of such

epics as "Rent-A-Girl" and "Bod^

o_f a_

Female" with a censor-

ship ordinance it felt was written
in accordance with the
Preedman rules was overturned in
1968 when the s ipreme Court
found the procedure to lack the
necessary promptness or

guarantee of a final judicial decision. ^5
Even though a majority of the
justices have been

unwilling to move against a state's
power to censor motion
pictures, they have done things which
greatly weaken it.

For example, they have consistently stated
that the con-

stitutionality of laws imposing prior restraint
is more
°^^P®^^

that of laws which simply provide for subsequent

punishment on grounds of obscenity.

The burden is heavy in

normal obscenity prosecutions, and the same standards
for
"what is obscene" apply to movies, and the procedural
require-

ments laid down in Freedman increase the load on the state's

machinery to justify its intervention.
There is some judicial authority
stemming from
lower federal courts indicating that
Taws seeking to

regulate motion pictures may distinguish
between what

acceptable to adults and to children.
Court in 1968 struck down

a

is
LS

But the Supreme

city ordinance which classified

films as "suitable for young persons" (under
16) and "not

suitable for young persons" and required
for the "not suitable" films.

a

special license

The definitions of what

constituted "not suitable" things was unconstitutionally
vague, according to the Court, and having the vagueness

divided into two categories did not make it less objectionable.

If a statute is not otherwise vague, variable

obscenity would also apply to attempts to regulate films
prior to showing.

Reaction to the Judicial Approach to Obscenity

Congress
Reactions to the Court

Congress gave forth occasional rumblings of protest
about the number of obscenity decisions overturned by the
Court.

Senator Everett M. Dirksen, in the context of the
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battle over the nomination
of Abe rortas for Chief
Justice,
proposed an amendment to
legislation ,to ban the
interstate
»ail order of firearms,
which would hav. stripped
the

Supreme
court Of the authority to
review ^ury findings in
federal
and state obscenity
prosecutions. This move was
unsuccessful
but received enthusiastic
support from such notables
as
Ohio-s Prank Lausche. who claimed
that he had not seen any
Of the material the Court had
held not to be obscene, but
"senators have told me about them
and what they say is

unbelievable. "^^
In 1967, however. Congress
enacted legislation

designed to give members of the
public who received un-

solicited "pandering advertisements"
specific delivery.

a

recourse to enjoin

Under this act if a person receives

material he believes to be obscene or
advertisements based
on an obscene appeal, he may request
the local postmaster
to direct the advertiser to stop sending
him the material.
If the sender continues to send the material,
procedures

for obtaining an injunction to stop delivery to
the pro-

testing individual were established.

Proponents of this

legislation argued that the act imposed no censorship
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since it deals only with unsolicited mails
and enhances
the individual righ-. of privacy.

The ACLU opposed the

act on the grounds that it gave the addressee the
power

to make the decision about what is obscene and what he
shall receive.

Lawrence Speiser, director of the Washington

office of the ACLU, justified his attack on the law by
making a clumsy analogy to the danger to freedom of speech
if an addressee could take action to prevent the delivery

of offensive circulars.

In addition to the fact that

that was not the issue with this law, it is extremely

dubious that the First Amendment requires citizens to un-

conditionally accept the presentation of all points of view.
The right to speak may in

a

general sense imply a right

to be heard, but it is not necessarily illiberal to suggest

that this obligation is moral in nature, not legal, 38
and that it does not involve the right to a captive

audience

Pornography Commission
The Federal Commission on Obscenity and Pornography

appointed by the Johnson Administration had some volatile

hearings during the process of drawing up its report, such
as when a leader of the "Underground Press Syndicate"
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dumped a cheese pie on the head of
Commission member
Professor Otto N. Lar8en;39

was the report itself.

^he most spectacular event

The majority of the Commission,

led by William B. Lockhart, Dean of the
University of

Minnesota Law School, concluded that pornography was
not
harmful to individuals and that legal controls for adults

were unnecessary.

It recommended the repeal of all Federal,

state, and local laws pertaining to "consenting adults"

who wished to obtain a prurient experience, but voted to
retain legal restrictions on public displays, unsolicited

mailings and distribution to minors.

Charles H. Keating,

Jr., a Cincinnati attorney, founder of the Catholic Legion

of Decency and President Nixon's only appointee to the
Commission, led the six dissenting members and even obtained
a

temporary injunction preventing publication of the major-

ity report.

The majority report, however, was "leaked" to

the press anyhow, and Keating 's rebuttal consisted of the
charge that the Commission's reconanendations could lead to
"paganism and animalism."

41

Keating also happened to

mention that he believed himsejf to be the "only ordinary
citizen" on the Commission, and Attorney General Mitchell
and Robert Finch joined in condemning "counsels of
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irresponsibility."
y.

vice
Vice Pre«i-r?*.r.4.
a
President Agnew
chalked the

report up to the "radical
liberals," who
''-'^'''''^^^^^^^^^^^^irito a lather over
shortage of nutrients in a

child s box of Wheat ies-but
who cannot
get exercised at all over
the same child's
constant exposure to a flood
of hard core
pornography that could warp his
moral outlook for a lifetime. 42

Herbert L. Packer, writing in
Commentary

,

found the

Report to be of little value to
either aide in the control
Of pornography controversy .^3
The dissenters, he claimed,

based their case on anecdotal reports
by police about the
danger of pornography, and the majority
invoked lengthy,

but frivolous, behavioral data which
tried to establish
such irrelevant facts as:

(1)

only two per cent of those

interviewed found erotica to be an important
national
problem;

others;
(4)

most Americans believe erotica harmful to

(2)
(3)

most believe erotica is not harmful to them;

the attitude about the harm of erotica correlated

positively to age (older), low education, and political
conservatism.

The behavioral responses to erotica were

based primarily on second-hand data in that people were
asked their recollections of their reactions to pornography.

Another study compared a group of convicted rapists with
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group of non-criirinals and concluded that the mean age

of first-exposure-to-erotica is slightly higher for rapists
than for college students and members of men's clubs,

which Packer thought not very relevant to anything.
One study actually sponsored by the Commission

caused a row when some Congressmen learned that funds they

had allocated were financing an experiment at the University

of North Carolina in which 23 male

erotic

udents were exposed to

material while hooked up to a device which measured

heart rate, urinary acid phosphates, and condition of the
subject's penis.

This particular data indicated, according

to the researchers, that physiological reaction to erotica
decreased as subjects became satisfied with erotica.

In

short, neither side proved anything, but the liberals were

the more sophisticated about not proving anything.
Pressure Groups

The best known, and perhaps most highly organized,

group supporting government restriction on grounds of
sexual (and sometimes when coupled with the concept
sacrilege, religious /political) impropriety is probably

the Catholic community.

However, the pressure in this

direction is by no means confined to
Catholics.

Numerous

Protestant groups, local Councils for
Decent Literature
(which can have a secular base),
pta's, women's clubs,

and fraternal orders combine with
the formal mechanisms

of state legislatures, courts, license
commissions, censor-

ship boards, as well as internal industrial
codes, indirect
pressure upon theaters, bookstore owners which,
together

with picketing and boycotts, all coalesce in an
attempt
to condition American sexual mores.

Pressure from private groups which can have the
same effect on authors and filmmakers as governmental

censorship posed a delicate problem for the

ACLTJ.

When

cardinal Spellman, for example, not only urged Catholics
to refrain from attending The Moon

is^

a continuing boycott of the theatres

Blue

,

but also urged

where the film was

shown in 1951, the Union expressed concern.

The simple

expression by any individual or group of disapproval of
any film or book or any attempt simply to dissuade others
from buying it was defended by the Union as being within

both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.
The ACLU also recognizes, as far as
legal right is concerned, the use of such
orderly and lawful means as peaceful and
unobstructive picketing and the organization
of a specific and primary boycott, even when
they imply some degree of coercion. How-
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m

ever,
view of the fact that the
field of communication differs
significantly from the general
field of
industry and commerce, the rjnion
actively
opposes, as being especially
contrary to
the spirit of the Constitution,
the use
of such means in the following
ways(1)
as pressure, or explicit
threat thereof, at
any time prior to the actual
offering of a
motion picture, etc., to the
public; and
(2) even after the actual offering
to the
public, in the form of a general
or secondary boycott— designed, for example
to close
a theatre entirely or close
other theatres
whose proprietors ally themselves
with the
proprietor of the first theatre. The
ACLU
believes that intimidation and reprisal
have no place in the field of ideas. '^'^
In November of 1955, after the

Rom^-^n

Catholic

Bishops announced an intent to revive
the Church's campaign

against indecent pictures, some segments
of the movie
industry reacted to the Catholic Bishops in
an attempt to

counter their impact on public opinion.

Dore Schary, then

executive head of Metro-Go Idwyn-Mayer (also a
member of
the advisory council of the Southern California
ACLU), while

emphasizing the right of the Bishops to crusade against
the

morally objectionable, expressed

a hope that

they would

respect the rights of others to make movies as they saw
fit.

Variety , the weekly show business publication, did

an extensive series of articles on local Motion Picture
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Councils, whose original function was to make positive

recommendations about films which they regarded as

especially edifying or entertaining, which claimed that
Catholic members of the Councils were trying to persuade
the group to issue condemnations of films judged unworthy

by the Legion of Decency.
In some communities the Legion of Decency effectively

organized parts of other associations to apply pressure on

both law enforcement officials for more stringent application of obscenity laws and against boo^ .sellers and movie

theater owners to stop the sale of material they considered
objectionable.

Many Parent-Teachers Associations, for

example, delegated this sort of function to "Catholic Mothers
Clubs.

""^^

The Legion of Decency characterized the film
B aby Doll as "morally repellent both in theme and treat-

ment" and placed it on its "condemned" list in 1956.

Cardinal

Spellman gave the effort a boost by personally appearing in
the pulpit to warn Roman Catholics in his diocese that tho

viewing of such a film would constitute the commission of
a sin.

In Albany, New York, there was a 6-month ban on

attendance by Catholics to all films in all local theaters
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which had shown Baby Doll

?

Connecticut Catholics were for-

bidden to attend showings

r

newspapers in Syracuse and

Troy, New York refused advertisements for the film?
a

New England theater chain refused to book the film?

in

Jackson, Tennessee the distributor was warned by the city

council and Gary, Indiana, refused to allow the film to
be shown.

The ACLU, in several statements daring this

episode, enjoyed pointing out that attendance at the same

film was only restricted to adults by Bishops in France
and England-^^
In the 1950 's cities such as Baltimore and Chicago

used the 500-title list of the National Organization for

Decent Literature as a guide for book and magazine dealers

when the communities began drives to eliminate the causes
of juvenile delinquency.
The "unremitting war" of the American Roman

Catholic Bishops against obscenity was expanded when the
Catholic

V7ar

Veterans joined with the NODL, the Legion of

Decency and the catholic Mothers Clubs in 1957.
particular assigrraejat

The

cm* a

included a nationwide campaign

to banish books by more than 40 writers from public school
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libraries which led to numerous local
incidents.
In 1957 the Union issued a statement
charging the

NODL with attempting to institute de facto
censorship in the
United States and taking actions "seriously
violative of the
principle of freedom."
"presiame

The ACLU emphasized that it did not

to object to the NODL advising communicants
of

the Roman Catholic Church about any publication,
but the
1957 statement which was also signed by 150 persons promin-

ent in the fields of publishing, literature, education and

the arts, charged that NODL black lists, general boycotts
and its "certificates of compliance" to local booksellers

resulted in "the judgment of a particular group.

.

.being

imposed on the freedom of choice of the whole community. "^°

Not all of the tactics of the Legion of Decency and
the NODL are accepted by the Catholic community, however.

John E. Fitzgerald, an editor of a Catholic weekly, has
long insisted that film classification schemes should be

binding only on those who wish to be so bound; i.e.. Catholic
classifications for Catholics.

Another C?*tholic spokesman,

J. D. Nicola, a lay member of the Legion's board of con-

sultants, publicly stated in 1959 that he felt that
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classifications which went beyond simply
attempts to
separate films not suitable for minors
"may create more
problems than they solve,

"''^

The catholic Church of course has no
monopoly on

the concern for things decent.

The Churchmen's Commission

on Decent Literature, a national Protestant
group organized
to combat objectionaEj'ie literature, proposed the
establish-

ment of "voluntary review boards" along with a
published

checklist naming specific publications it viewed as obscene
in order to combat newstand obscenity.

Most of the Commission

members were associated with evangelical churches and,
according to the ACLU, the National Council of Churches
had not given the group its endorsement.^^
The Citizens for Decent Literature, a secular group

favoring stronger measures against obscentiy, was formed
in Cincinnati in 1958 and inspired more than 100 similar

groups in all 50 states.
in Ohio,

Illinois.

14 in California,

The organization has 17 units
and eight each in Indiana and

Prominent religious and political leaders are

frequently listed as local sponsors, as in Portland,
Oregon, where the group was called the Mayor's Committee
for Decent Literature.
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The CDL does not view itself as
engaging in

censorship,

"merely the exercise of every
citizen's right

to stand up and be counted, to
state his belief in what should
be allowed and prohibited in society."
Publication of lists

of "objectionable" works, with the
plea that police ,se such
lists in local clean-up campaigns,

spread technique.

is the groups most wide-

Letter-writing campaigns to public

officials and trial judges as well as attendance
at obscenity
trials are also sometimes used.

The latter brought about

judicial rebukes and threats of contempt citations
in

Cincinnati and Indianapolis.

The Buffalo Youth Board's

Salacious Publications Committee reportedly contained
two

policemen who "sugg-sted" to retailers that they remove

offending magazines and books to avoid "running into
trouble.
In 1958 the ACLU complained of private pressure

group tactics in Oklahoma City, where the chairmm of

a

citizens' volunteer committee said his group would ask

retailers to sign a public pledge refusing to soli "indecent"

magazines.

He proposed to turn over the names of those

declining to sign to the county attorney for "whatever
action he deems proper."

The Union also expressed concern
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over a massive letter-writing campaign to
trial judges

while hearing obscenity cases in Cincinnati.

One judge,

the ACLU reported, withdrew from hearing three
scheduled

obscenity trials because of the amount and nature
of his
raail.^'*

The ACLU and the NYCLU successfully countered

a

tactic of the Post Office Department in 1959 when all post
offices in New York's Nassau County had posted reprints of
an editorial by the Rev. Daniel Poling, editor of The

Christian Herald , which opposed the circulation of the
unexpurgated version of Lady Chatterley' s Lover .

The

response to the protest was an order removing the Poling
reprint as "not in accord with postal regulations" and the

pledge that "henceforth (officials) should not post statements by private individuals." 55

Although the ACLU is opposed to pre-censorship in
any form, in 1960 it considered

a

new law, which limited the

power of the Postmaster General to impound mail allegedly

connected with the sending of obscene materials by requiring him first to sed< authority from a Federal District Court,

as a "qualified victory."

In the Union's view the measure
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thwarted attempts by the Postmaster General to "Increase
his vast and often abused powers and deprived him of his

previous power to impound mail by his own fiat."^^
One interesting example of the determination of

groups interested in controlling the flow of "smut," as

well as their power to translate their wishes into formal
community sanctions, was a case decided by

a

federal

District Court which sought to use the letter of the law
to harpoon any First Amendment "spirit."

Lower federal

court rulings had voided any ordinances which expressly
prohibited the showing to adult audiences of films which

were not suitable for children.
was asked, in 1968, to review

a

A federal District Court

city ordinance which got

around these rulings by simply making it illegal for any

theater to show "adult" movies to minors and then making
it illegal for any theater to deny admittance to minors.
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The city argued that such a denial was "discrimi.iating and

against public policy and good morals."

The Court, comment-

ing that the "adult moviegoer may not be re8tri::ted to

the pablum in Mary Poppins ,
in addition to being vague,

"

reasoned that such legislation,
tried to achieve a result which

went beyond the child and reached into the protected realm
of adult ideas.

58
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Philadelphia was the site of a literal "bookbarning"
in 1963 when a group of concerned clergymen
burned some

magazines they found offensive in order to dramatize
the

beginning of a local boycott against the sellers of
indecent
literature.

The ceremonial fire, attended by the local

police commissioner and the superintendent of schools,

was denounced by the ACLU as "an obnoxious symbol of in-

tolerance and bigotry, reminiscent of Hitler and
Savonarola, "^^

A Texas community had a law which penalized both
the owners of movie theaters who admitted minors to certain

classes of films and the parents of the minors.

In 1959

six large bookstores in San Francisco received bomb threats

from a group dubbing itself the Vigilante Committee for

Decent Literature, but usually the pressure to clamp down
on the flow of obscenity is less flamboyant.

All sorts of private groups which are organized to
protect and further other interests can become involved in
the struggle over obscenity.

The American Book Pviblishers

Council is a trade association which has

a

vested as well

as libertarian interest in reducing controls over published

material.

In 1957,

for example, the Council issued a public
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warning to the chief of Police in Springfield,
Vermont,
that his reported circulation of the NODL
list to book-

dealers with instructions to stop selling listed
volumes

was illegal.
A proposal in 1963 by a Maryland Junior Chamber
of

Commerce group to establish a national Jaycee "seal of
approval" to drug stores which do not
people to pornography,

.

.expose young

established a dialogue between the

"

National Junior Chamber of Commerce and the ACLU.

The

ACLU stated that it felt "a seal of approval for books.

.

.

particularly obnoxious because it is a weapon that leads to

widespread censorship.

.

.

.

Thus the will of a private

organization by means of economic sanctions, is imposed
in the highly sensitive field of communication."

The MJCC eventually decided against issuing any
list of undesirable magazines.
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Obscenity and Social Reality
Part of the reason obscenity is taken so seriously,

of course. Is that it deals with sex, and sex is taken

very seriously, at least in legal codes.
once slightly over-stated the case:

As Fred P. Graham
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.it Is only a slight exaggeration to
.
.
say that currently all sex but face-to- face
relations between spouses is criminal in
this country. Non-connubial hanky-panky
is outlawed 'inder fornication and adultry
statutes in 48 states. The two holdouts
are Louisiana and Tennessee.
(The presumably
wider opportunities for lechery in these two
states, however, are dimmed somewhat by the
fact that the age of consent for females is
set at 21.)
.The situation is particularly critical
.
.
in Kansas, where an overzealous swain can get
one to five years at hard labor for enticing
a woman for thr purpose of fornication even
if the enticement is not successful .^-^

—

But anyone who has been in the central part of almost

any American metropolitan area should be aware that probably
no aspect of American life has changed as radically as the

apparent decline in the de facto concern over obscenity,

A cursory glimpse of some bookstores and movie theaters
which not only "pander" but try very hard to deliver on
their promises makes the issue of obscenity in courts and
legislatures seem largely academic.

Maryland is the only state still to have

a

movie

censorship board, but six states had such boards until the
1950* s, and over 200 cities had review boards.

Frequently

these boards required fees from the movie industry itself
to sustain their operation, and in 1950, for example, the

industry paid about $1,800,000
in fees and expenses
to
comply with state and local
censorship boards.
The application of obscenity
statutes is highly

sporadic and seen,s to be largely a
periodic gesture on the
part of Officials to remind society
that it is still viewed
as a legitimate target of legal
action.

Occasionally the

gestures are successful, as when customs
officials seized
I

am curious

(Yellow)

the end of 1967.

when first imported from Sweden at

A federal appellate court ordered it

released in November of 1968.

But the Supreme Court sus-

tained a state holding that the filrwas
obscene.

Warhol's

31ue Movie,

Andy

labelled by Vincent Canby as the film

version of Warhol's boredom with life, was not
only seized

by the New York city police, but the theater manager, the
projectionist and the ticket seller were arrested for
possession of obscene material.
The live theater has probably been the recipient
of the most "change" in the spectacular shift in conventions

about sexual candor and nudity.

But along with this new

mode of "expressiveness" came some degree of consensus that
theatrical nudity was not only not prurient, but even antierotic .

For example, Walter Kerr's unfriendly review of
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"Oh Calcutta" concluded that Kenneth Tynan's attempt
to

explore the "trick wonderland of sex" was a disastrous
failure because the medium of the live theater is itself

hostile to nudity and simulated sex play because it places

what ar3 almost inherently private acts in a public context.
Even if the only goal of "Oh Calcutta" was to be pornographic,
it must fail,

according to Kerr, because it is anti-erotic.

It is anti-erotic because the sexual act itself possesses

an autonomous quality which cannot tolerate even partial

inattentiveness .

On stage an actor is always doing some-

thing else (acting), and the totally open confrontation

which is the glory and distinguishing mark of the live
theater means that when sex is introduced, it "Asserts
itself for what it is, exclusive, and thereby ruptures the

nature of the event."

In literature, Kerr claims, sex

is only described by words,

exclasiveness.

and

thie

words protect this

Film is much less exclusive but still more

so than the live theater, which may be Incapable of producing erotica,

Legitimacy of the Concept

"

Obscene "

Argument of "Democratic Will "
Those who argue that the state has no interest in

relating anything, including prurient material, unless
it can be demonstrated that some overt, harmful con-

sequences will occur if action is not taken fsuch as

Justice Douglas) are simply enunciating the central tenet
of classical liberalism.

The charge that this same formula

is not applied to economic regulation overlooks the point

that this exception is usually made in the name of some

egalitarian principle, and the rationale for making obscenity part of the list of exceptions can hardly be related

to egalitarianism.
Some

vrtio

are opposed to any attempt to regulate

pornography are still opposed to the apologetics for
pornography, either in the form of arguments that it is a

beneficial "escape valve" for the lonely and alienated
(which is just as unprovable as assertions about its harm)

or "aesthetic" defenses of pornography.

Stanley Kauffmann

argues that when true pornography (as opposed to erotic
material) is stripped of its intellectual cant and the

veneer of education which it frequently uses to establish
its credentials to be explicit,

it emerges as an exclusively

masculine form of vindictiveness.

It is

".

.

.a

species

of male revenge on our social systems of courtship and
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monogamy

.

.

.

time out from civilization .... brutal.

.

.

But the conventional view of most libertarians
is

that while the concept may have some utility
as an aesthetic

term it is not a valid legal concept.

Not liking the

concept and deciding who can authoritatively get
rid of the

concept are different questions, however, and some
fall
short of calling the concept constitutionally invalid
on

the grounds that the redress should be legislative rather

than judicial.

Alexander M. Bickel, for example, would

agree that the American law of obscenity is in shambles,

but finds the cause of this condition to be in the willingness of the Supreme Court to intervene in a policy area.

What the judges have managed to do in the obscenity cases,
according to Bickel is to substitute their subjective
reaction to salacious material for that of the legislators,
prosecutors, police or jury.

Since obscenity is not and

should not be protected speech in Bickel *s view, invoking
the First Amendment is misplaced, and without such

invocation the Court has no grounds for claiming jurisdiction
over such questions.

Bickel does think that criminal

obscenity statutes are sufficiently vague for the Supreme
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Court to declare them unconstitutional on due process
grounds, because to dispense criminal punishment consti-

tutionally the offense must be clear.

But other attempts

to control the flow and direction of obscene material in
a society, while unwise and probably ineffective, are,

for Bickel, constitutional.
.1 do not argue for censorship.
would wish
I think I would wish
•

.

I

anyone to have the right to publish or
show anything that anyone else may want
to read or see, and we would take our
chances. But I don't know where to find
reasons convincing enough to be enshrined
as constitutional law for compelling others,
who may be in a majority, to wish as I do.
I should hope a majority could be persuaded
on prudential grounds that a lot of censorship is unwise, and ineffective to boot,
and that a little goes a long way. But the
constitutional problem of obscenity, the
question of whether and how judges are to
decide what a community must tolerate and
what it may censor is, I maintain, a
baffling one, to which the solution escapes
me. 69

The viewpoint that literature and films ought to be

beyond governmental regulation because no clear relationship to anti-social conduct can be proved, is, for Bickel,
slightly beside the point because many other people believe

there is a connection between crime and obscenity.

They

cannot prove it, but "libertarians" can't prove their case
either.

Many people, including those who resent regulation
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in the name of obscenity, are in favor of
intervention

to curb the portrayal of violence in movies and comic
strips, which Bickel feels reflects a curious one-sided

anxiety about crime.

Richard Oilman's defense of this

apparent inconsistency on the grounds that witnessing
aggressive acts has no sublimated manifestation short
of violent acts, whereas sexual tension, because of

masturbation, is capable of expression without injuring

others is, to Bickel, "a hilariously solemn explanation."'^^
Bickel suspects that some may find such sublimation "not
fully satisfying," and that Gilroan's point of view reflects
a quite widespread belief,

shared by those who are con-

cerned about obscenity, that mankind learns from what he
reads and now and then acts upon what he learns.
concern, he argues, is the
.

.

same— a concern

The

for the "aesthetic

.style and tone of society," which is not very different

than the concern with pollution, traffic jams, national
forests and open seashores.

The mores of a community,

where they concern the entire commun ity
circulated material

does— are

^which publicly

frequently regulated by law.

While too much regulation is bad, and we should learn to
tolerate the deviant and eccentric, to regulate taste is

not unconstitutional, and in a democracy, Bickel implies,
is even to be expected.

To the more pristine libertarians, who would argue
that ^o type of expression, be it aggressive or prurient,

should be subject to regulation because it is not conduct,
Bickel argues that distinctions between conduct and speech
are convenient but also arbitrary.

Regulations of many

sorts which regulate "aesthetic" things treat expression
and conduct as synonomous, and the only democratic

con-

stitutional grounds for interfering with the community's

desire to establish such standards is when the speech is
"political" in the sense of being essential to the

communication of ideas.

"Quality of Life " Argument

Not all defenses of the concept "obscenity" by
liberals take the form of deference to majority will.

Arguments such as Bickel 's usually assume that obscenity
statutes are unwise, but allowable, in a democracy, and
are usually bolstered by a defense of judicial review
(interference) related to an essentially democratic

rationale, such as the maintenance of an open political

process,

Irving Kristol has defended the concept of
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obscenity and its legal sanctions by claiming
that total
sexual candor is not merely a convention
of puritanical

societies but a reflection of a "unique sense
of privacy"

which characterizes all cultures and is indigenous
to the
human race.^^
Kristol, after noting that genuine obscenity is
"sexism" and dehuraanization of sex into simple
copulation

rather than an emotional relationship, hypothesizes a

situation in which a well-known man had an excruciating and
ignominious death which was televised for our enjoyment.
Our reaction, Kristol hopes, would be that such a perform-

ance would be an undefensible invasion of privacy

would be obscene.

that it

The same is true of sex, according to

Kristol, but he neglects to mention the rather critical
fact which helps to make his hypothetical analogy irrelevant;

namely, that neither the performer or the performance is

voluntary.

This point doesn't especially bother Kristol,

however, because the root of the problem (for the liberals

opposed to obscenity legislation) is a misunderstanding
of the true nature of democracy.

Any conception of democracy,

he asserts, which views the ideal government as nothing

but a set of rules and procedures fails to see that the
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purpose of any political regime is to
achieve some version

of the "good life" and the "good society."

While such a

statement fails to distinguish between a
political regime
and a political system. Kristol would
reject such distinctions
as an example of what he calls the "managerial"
conception

of democracy; i.e., one void of non-procedural
content."

The older, truer (and more Greek, even) meaning
of democracy
is self-rule.

This presumes, Kristol says, that the "self

is worthy of governing,

"

and requires an obligation not only

to educate the individual self in "republican virtue," but

that the public not be governed by "the more infantile and
irrational parts of themselves."

Those who desire the

good life and not simply a system which has as its goal
.

.the endless functioning of its own machinery," must

favor censorship.

It has not been impossible for liberals

to accept the notion that consideration for the "quality
of life" necessitate restrictions on individual freedom

ranging from economic restrictions to abolition of cigarette

advertising on television.

The issue, he insists, is not

censorship, but whether the proposed censorship is "liberal"

or "repressive."

Censorship of pornography is essential.
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Kristol holds, for two different
kinds of reasons; the
first relates to the protection of
the individual and the

second to the preservation of art.

The danger to the

individual, according to Kristol, is
that there might be

something as well as total boredom

vrtiich

characterize, the

condition of those saturated with pornographic
experiences.
The basic psychological fact about pornography and obscenity is that it appeals to
and provokes a kind of sexual regression.
The sexual pleasure. . .is auto-erotic and
infantile. , .a masturbatory exercise of
the imagination, when it is not masturbation
pure and simple.
.infantile sexuality is not only a
.
.
permanent temptation for the adolescent or
even the adult it can quite easily become
a permanent, self-re in forcing neurosis.
It
is because of an awareness of this possibility
of regression toward the infantile condition,
a regression which is always open to us, that
all the codes of sexual conduct ever devised by
the human race take such a dim view of autoerotic activities and try to discourage autoerotic fantasies. Masturbation is indeed a
perfectly natural autoerotic activity, as so
many sexologists blandly assure us today. And
it is precisely because it is so perfectly
natural that it can be so dangerous to the
mature or maturing person, if it is not controlled or sublimated in some way.72

—

Kriatol goes on to indicate that he thinks the

basic question about obscenity involves "civilization itself"
and briefly alludes to Nietzsche,

"everything is permitted
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..." and the struggle between nihilism and
.
civilization,
such a detour into philosophy
need not concern us,
save to
point out that "nihilism"
is frequently a
philosophical
counterpart to the "international
communist conspiracy"
argument. The danger is usually
over-rated, and the prou
ponent argues from ad hominem
to ad
horrendun,

.

Kristol's second practical
argument is designed to
turn the tables on those whose
opposition to obscenity
legislation stems from a consideration
of art and the free
development of better art. This
argument usually claims

that much significant literature
has been or would have
been lost to the censor's pen, but
Kristol thinks very few

works of "genuine" literary merit were
ever suppressed
(although he doesn't explain how he would
know about the

ones that were suppressed).

Good literature can even be at

a competitive disadvantage in a
society where everything
is permitted, and the desire to curb
Gresham's Law in the

interest of good art leads Kristol to justify
penalties for

obscenity and censorship in certain areas.

The censor ship-in-

the-interest-of-art argument is taken less seriously by
Kristol than it might appear, because he concludes with
the statement that he thinks that pornography should be
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illegal and available to those who want it badly
enough.

Liberal enforcement, together with the fact that
it is

difficult to enforce anyway, will, according to
Kristol,
perpetuate the existing under-the-counter pornography
trade

which has gone on for centuries.

The dichotomy between the

ideal and the real is beneficial to the ideal

—

this seems

to be Kristol 's argument.

Other Attacks and Defenses
Milton Konvitz, rejecting the point of view of
judicial "absolutists," claims that "some censorship there

must be,

"

and would prefer that this function ultimately

be performed by the Supreme Court, ^-^

Konvitz sees the

greatest difficulty with the concept as the assumptions about
the effects of obscene material on those who are exposed

to them, and he recommends further research.

While it is

certainly desirsQ^le to have constitutional law as well as
less basic public policy based on carefully evaluated data,

the argument that effects of salacious material cannot

be proven and that we should defer to the judgments of
legislatures contains several flaws.

First it not only

assumes that legislatures are engaging in vigorous quest

401

for data (which is rarely the case),
but also that parties
to the dispute are really interested in
theissue of con-

sequences.

To assert that they should be interested
in

this issue has an aura of scholastic responsibility
and
a connotation that one is above
metaphysical first principles

but is also to wait for perfect information in an
area where
it cannot be obtained, and even if obtained would
not solve

the problem.

Scientifically, as has often been noted,

if one has all the results the decision makes itself?

imperfect information calls for a judgment about what to do
in the interim: a simple desire for more knowledge does not

solve this problem.

As we have asserted elsewhere, there

is a problem among American libertarians because of their

doctrinal rigidity.

This bad habit does not make them

invariably wrong, however (which can be a kind of rigidity

parading as pragmatism)

.

With the problem of obscenity

the issue goes deeper than simple "absolutism,

"

regardless

of which side invokes the procrustian formulas.

Many critics of the Court's obscenity rulings are
upset not only with the vagueness of the concept itself but

with some of the tests the court has established to determine obscenity,

Gerhard Falk, for example, finds the
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"coinmunity standard- aspect of the Roth test an unworkable

fiction in a pluralistic society where there is rarely a

community standard about anything, let alone consensus about
sexual candor. 74

Konvitz would argue that while there may

not be community standards before the Court announces some,

after the announcement there are, and the simple fact that

they are judicially created doesn't mean they are inaccurate.
Konvitz believes it would be more honest for the Court not

to pretend to find "a mysterious community standard of the

morally tolerable," but that the Court should not ignore
its duty to create such standards.

Konvitz shields the concept from the

of undue

cheooge

vagueness by comparing "obscenity" to "negligence,

"

claiming

that both are terms of "legal art" which are summations of
a jury's judgment about something and expressed as a "fact,"

Obscenity as distinguished from the seditious or the libelous is an attempt, in Konvitz 's words, to work not from

toward a definition.
.the definition is found not in a
verbal formula abstract from the obscene
material, but in the material itself;
the configuration, the Gestalt , that is
•obscene' 'defines' the 'obscene' just
as the facts of an automobile collision
•define' 'negligence,' and just as the facts
of a fair trial 'define' 'due process of law.'
.

.

403

Another frequent criticiain of the Court's practices
in the area of obscene speech, even by those
who do not

believe that obscenity deserves constitutional protection,
is that the complex Roth formula, especially the insistence

that prurience be based on the impact of the work as a whole
on an average person, means that supervision of the formula

makes the Supreme Court a "Super Censor."

It was this

inherited role of the Court which greatly bothered Chief

Justice Wp»rren in Jacobellis and led him to suggest that the
Court should require only "sufficient evidence" in the trial
court record rather than the requirement of "substantial

evidence" which would require the Supreme Court to reassess

entirely and evaluate material which had already been
evaluated by either trial judge or jury.

Not

only can this

lead to substitution of the Supreme Court's judgment for

that of the trial judge or jury and thereby erode the

appellate nature of the Supreme Court's function, but it
is an horribly Inefficient use of the judiciary.

Konvitz,

among others, has argued that any "sufficient evidence" rule

would have to forego any review of whether the material was,
for example, really evaluated as a whole, etc.

77

Since

Konvitz is convinced that there must be censorship, his
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argument is reduced to the question of who
can best perform
this function, and his conclusion is that
t^e Supreme Court
is better suited to this purpose because
it is less sus-

ceptible to pressure groups than states or municipalities.
One of the prices of justifying the concept of

obscenity theoretically is that someone is going to have
to
apply it, and while it probably is preferable to have the
Supreme Court make this decision rather than a Chicago

board of censors, it gives to the Court a role which, even
if constitutionally justifiable, is almost impossible to

perform adequately.

The Roth standard has the practical

effect of making either obscenity unworkable or the Roth
standard unworkable, because the court cannot supervise its

application in all cases.

Konvitz's desire to keep the

ultimate decision with the Supreme Court, and the desire of
others for national application rather than local, has a

similarity to Justice Black's argument for systematic
prior censorship on the "if you must.

.

.then.

.

grounds.

The basic question is still "if," and keeping a concept

under control, while certainly not a frivolous consideration, is not a problem if the concept itself is attacked.
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Cone lu a ion

The Legitimate Concern

Obscenity and Ideas

Arguments about the harmful consequences of obscene

material usually include assertions about harmful ideas
as part of the consequences.

Kristol's fear of the con-

sequences is not only that it will lead to infantile behavior,

but that it will enhance the notion that infantile behavior
is acceptable.

Even though the argument is usually phrased

in terms which apparently restrict only behavior, this

"behavior" is highly ideational.

fundamental distinction

—

Justice Brennan's most

the distinction between those

things with socially redeeming importance and those with
none

—

contains a basic aversion to a particular type of

idea which the court has found difficult to express, but

which probably corresponds most closely with what Kristol
and others label the "dehumzmization" of sex.

The exact

content of the "idea" is as elusive as the notion of
prurience, but Stanley Kauffraan has probably come closest
to describing the ideational content of pornography when

he claimed that the complaint that pornography distorts
sex by depersonalizing it is inaccurate because pornography
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(especially performed) tells the truth about sex.

vjhat

is this truth, this idea, communicated by pornography?

The unnerving accuracy of pornography, Kauff roan .states, is
its perception that sex

.

.is impersonal, that the

complete identification of love with sex is a romantic
fabrication,

Many people, especially women, could not
begin the sex act with partners to whom
they feel no specific attraction, but the
specifics fade as the act progresses, and
it ends in the greatest commonality of
the human race. Porno is ruthless. It
proves that love, or anything remotely like
it is not essential to sex, that love is
an invention and has a limited congruence
with sex.
But my own view is that love is a good
invention, the best idea yet devised for
getting through life with minimal loneI suppose that plenty of loved
liness.
and loving people go to porno shows
occasionally, but still it can be said
that porno is implicitly an attack on love
by an audience of the insufficiently loved,
who get their revenge by insisting that a
screw is only a screw. 78
Kauffman is quick to add that he does not like to
see the "love- in vent ion" attacked, but he would not invoke

the sword of the state to protect it.

Even though the

members of the Court and others have more difficulty than

Kauffman in putting their objections to pornography into
words, their fear, like Kauffman'

s,

is that obscenity is an
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attack on some root ideas of "civilization."

The usual

rationale declaring obscenity not to be apc2ch is that it
is devoid of idea content

—that

it is the form rather than

the content which is being suppressed, just as political

speeches by sound truck can be regulated because of the
mode, not the content.

Tha Roth test's insistence that obscenity is not

anatomical bat attitudinal belies the theory that censorship
is an objection to an idea.
roust

To caution communities that they

consider the work as a whole and that sex by itself

is not obscene reflects less of a concern for biology than

for psychology and ethics.

It is not actions themselves

which are offensive but the way in which they are treated.
The more removed sex is from the "love- invent ion" to use
Kauffraan's phrase, the more objectionable.

The Roth test

may not strike at sex itself , but it does strike at sex
all

bjr

itself .

Because obscenity statutes are aimed at an idea
and because they are attempts to protect a particular

perception of sex, the argument that they are not speech

oust fail; and the notion that the idea is not socially
redeeming is to be very heavy-handed in the delicate, if
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not always subtle, debate about sexual
mores.

To state

that pornograj^y, to be pornography rather
than something
else, expresses an idea (because it is an
idea) is to

recognize that it should be protected speech, but
is not

necessarily to wish the particular idea success.

One can

hope that it loses favor or simply bores most people and
joins the ranks of numerous ideas which democrats allow
to germinate but hope will die out naturally.

This is of

course an "act of faith" of sorts, especially in a time

when there is little evidence to indicate that Gresham's
law bends to qualitative considerations.

Whether this

faith negates the "good life" which is the source of that
faith is a question that ranges far beyond the simple issue

of obscenity legislation and into the very heart of demo-

cratic theory.

Without exploring the philosophical base,

we can simply say that a Court charged with preserving a
democracy and a democrat could find constitutional, or
if you will, constitutional-democratic grounds for objecting

to obscenity laws.
"

Public Privacy "

Those who argue that we should curb attacks on the
"love invention" are mistaken in calling that plea "VJemocratic,

but they are correct in calling it "popular,

"

and it is

"
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"popular" for reasons which go beyond a
puritan heritage

and aelf-righteous prudery.

What moat people recognize,

and in a curious way what the doctrine
of the Supreme Court
in the area of obscenity has come to
recognize, is that

the fundamental problem is not "obscenity" however
defined,

but an invasion of personal privacy which most
people feel

when confronted with pornography.

This is not sufficient to

apply legal sanctions against those who want to feel this;
those

who want, and often pay outrageous prices, to attack the concept of sex as related to emotion

—

but it is the best of

reasons to be concerned about the unsolicited invasion of

personal privacy.
One argument sometimes heard for the preservation
of obscenity as a legal concept is formulated in the

question,

"If there is no concept of obscenity, what is the

legal charge to be used against those who fornicate in

public parks at noon or who display »pomographic statuses
on their lawn or who display pornography frcm windows,
,

marquees, etc.?"

An eighteenth-century libertarian

could probably assume that there could be much behavior
that wasn't illegal and people still wouldn't do it, but

twentieth-ctntury man is better off assuming not only that
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some people will do anything, but that they will
do it

regardless of the state of jurisprudence.

Punishment

and control (which at least for this problem should be

enhanced by punishment) should be attempted, and the rationale
is that such behavior invades the "public privacy."

"Pablic:

and -private" are in ordinary language used as antonyms, but

the notion "public tranquility" connotes "privacy."

The

sense of public privacy which leads us to be concerned about

billboards, ostentatious neon signs, and the location of jet

airports and superhighways is a concern for the "quality

of life,

"

but the quality as it affects the community,

not simply individuals.

What material a person reads or whether he receives
it through the mails is a private matter.

Unsolicited

pornography arriving through the mai Is is an invasion,
and not the only one to arrive by post, of personal privacy.

Salacious advertising, be it from a film or a prostitute,
is an invasion of p .blic privacy because th3 individual

who feels his privacy is invaded doesn't have the same
recourse that he would have if his personal privacy ware
invaded} i.e., not admitting the intruder.
in public,

Since he is

uhe law invokes what the public defines as its
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Standards of privacy.

Regulation of material which

goes to minors could be
handled under the s.me concept.
The complaint i. really
not that minors win be
corrupted
by certain material, but
that they might be corrupted
without their parents' permission.
Presumably if someone
wants his children exposed to
pornography he should be
allowed to do so, because it is
basically a private matter.
But to have others solicit a
juvenile audience to sell
pornography is to interfere with the
personal privacy of
others to rear their children in
their own wa^r. when the
"others" are diffuse but numerous,
the concept which protects

them could be "public privacy" which
is simply applying what
are felt to be the community's
standards for behavior in
public places.

This is almost the net effect of the
Court's

rulings in the area of obscenity since
Stanley .

This aspect

of public policy would have more credibility,
as well as
being more accurate and less capable therefore
of abuse,
if it were redesignated "public privacy,

"

and the ponderous

notion of "obscenity," along with all of its intricate
reformulations, went the way of other legal concepts designed

basically for our theocratic and pre-constitutional past.
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Obscenit:^ in the American Political
Culture

.

The Suspicious Polity
one feature of Ainerican law on
obscenity which

should not be overlooked is that the
concept is, unlike the
English notion, restricted to sex.
Besides this obvious
difference, it would appear that the
American approach to
the problem has traditionally been
restrained by the

hostility to the use of political power per ae.
which in
this case is manifested in the Court's
greater suspicion of
laws imposing prior restraint than of laws
providing sub-

sequent punishment*
Fights over the regulation of obscenity as well as

the legitimacy of the concept itself tend to take on a
highly ritualistic quality.

Both those who desire govern-

ment to regulate sexual mores and those who believe that
it is not a legitimate area of public control are frequently

more interested in the "symbolic gesture" (either in the
name of "moral integrity" or "liberty") than in concrete

control of certain forms of social Interaction.

It is this

symbolic nature of the conflict which brings out ^o much
self -righteousness on both sides.

On the local leVel in

\
\
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particular, it is sometixnes less of a battle over
specific

legislation than it is an opportunity for the
guardians of

morality and perhaps a traditional life style to
square
off against the champions of personal autonoxny and
holders
of "modern" belief systems.

Similarly to the polarization and "set response"

which characterizes the conflict about seditious speech,
the American dialogue about

tt\e

control of obscenity also

reflects a delight in the competition of the struggle.

Adversary role-playing is perhaps even more intense in the
battles over obscenity because both sides have the oppor-

tunity to demonstrate that the other side is either totally
evil or totally silly.
The adversary role-playing in the dispute over the

seriousness of obscenity as a problem and the propriety of

punishment was made especially evident when Lawrence Speiaer,

director of the Washington office of the ACLU, in urging
opposition before Congress to the proposed bill to give a

citizen the option to seek an injunction to stop unsolicited

advertising for pornography, stated:

...

we can' t pass laws which could be demgerous
when administered by men of little understanding,
or hostility to liberty, anu trust that no such
men will appear.
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This comnient seemed hardly applicable
to the
proposed legislation, but it was a clear
indication of the
traditional assumption made by Ar.ierican
iiberarians that in
a -suspicious culture "—steeped in a
tradition which is

enthusiastic abaat

tlie

utility of adversary proceed ings—

if government has powers it will abuse

thero.

CHAPTER VII

PROTECTION OP CIVIL LIBERTIES IN

TWO CULTURES
Two Aspects of a General Problem

The Legitimate Scope
of Social Control
We have explored the general problem of what forms
of individual behavior constitute the legitimate concern

of government in a democracy by analyzing how two

different societies approach two different problems.

While the problems of seditious and obscene speech do not
exhaust the types of civil liberties problems a society

may have

— any

more than the United States and the United

Kingdom complete the possible scope of political arrangements in the world

— the

two problems are central enough

to the theoretical heart of all civil liberties problems

and the two nations are typical enough of advanced demo-

cratic nations, to make some general statements about

comparative civil liberties possible.

Both of the problems

can be viewed as "demands" upon government to inhibit
speech on grounds of a particular rationale.

This demand
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can stem primarily from public opinion, with government

being more of a recipient than an initiator of such
demands.

Other demands can be largely the product of

government's perception of a problem.

The policy posi-

tions of government, interested pressure groups, etc.,

on these problems indicate their proposed "solutions."
Secur ity and
Propr ietv
Sedit ious Speech

Seditious speech is a demand emanating from what
is perceived as a threat to national security or public

order.

Actually the rationale is the same, i.e., preserva-

tion of order

— except

that, when applied to such things

as "subversive" groups, the fear of disorder either takes

on the cosmic proportions of revolution, the "disorder"
of illegitimate government, or the disaster of foreign

domination.

Obscene Speech

Obscenity is a demand for restraint on individual
expression with a rationale related to sexual impropriety.
While in Britain the obscene is technically more inclusive,
it is still primarily a desire to punish those who trans-

gress on conventions about sexual candor.
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The English and American approaches to
these

problems reflect many common features, because
they are

common problems and because the societies are
somewhat
alike, but within certain contexts different
patterns

seem to emerge in the way the two societies
respond to
the common stimuli found in all political orders—
the

tension between the establishment of collective
goals
and the maintenance of individual autonomy.
vt

Norroat ive Standards

Sedit ion

United Kingdom

From a comparative perspective, probably the most
noteworthy feature of English attitudes about seditious
speech is the low salience of concerns about domestic

subversion and loyalty along with the acceptance of the
idea that "insulting speech"

is

behavior onot deserving

legal protection.

Formulated as a normative proposition, the low-

key reaction of the English public and the government to
the tensions of the cold war indicates a belief that

nationality is not primarily a belief system, but an
accident (or fortune) of birth.

This belief made it
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difficult for fears about an "enemy within"
to be translated into a political credo.

Having the concept "alien"

connote geography (or color) rather than a political

philosophy helped to sever the notion of "subversive"
from nationality and tended to narrow the scope of
fears

about insidious internal forces to matters of conduct

rather than ideas.
The acceptance of punishment for "insulting" and
"provocative" speech, on the other hand, not only on the

part of courts but also on the part of English libertarians

emerges as another major value pattern in the English

approach to liberty.

The Britton and Malik cases, which

did not involve the outbreak of violence or disruption,
indicate that the pivotal consideration was the content
of remarks rather that the situation in which they were
made.

Lord Parker, in the Br itton case, did talk about

the importance of "circumstances" to the proper framing of
the offense, but his concern was not with the danger the

speech presented (which he assumed from the content) but

whether the speech was sufficiently public to be considered "speech."

Since Parker's attempt to restrict the

concept "insult" to circumstances where there are likely
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to be some people who are actually insulted
drew a negative reaction from Parliament (and he was only
trying to
formulate an evidentiary rule for evaluating circumstances),
it would appear that English law is more than
willing to

evaluate the danger of the idea rather than
^<^ea

in a certain context .

tlie

danger of

Lord Parker's defense of

the legitimacy of punishment for "insulting words" was

based on the analogy to physical assault in which, as he
explained in Jordan

v.

Burgoyne

"verbal hits" provoke

,

"revenge" and thereby threaten breaches of the peace.

The

"threat" on the public order is not evaluated in terms of

the context of the words but of the effect the judges

think the words would have on individuals in the abstract.

Since the holding in Jordan did not even require that
"insult" be defined with reference to an average, reason-

able man (because the particular audience showed signs of

being atypical and unreasonable)

,

it appears that the only

time an evaluation of the circumstances in which the words

were spoken becomes germane is when the insult threshold
of the audience is below average.

This approach in a

curious way becomes an intricate combination of the

American "gravity of the evil" formula (i.e., evil =
insulting)

,

with the Holraesian assessment of circumstances

(in terms of their "clear and present
danger"), but

the latter is a rule which can only roitigate
the amount
of what is already determined to be a grave
danger.

Translated into the American vernacular the
English judicial formula for determining the proper scope
of per-

missible speech could best be called the "evil words
com-

pounded by circumstances" test.

As a theoretical frame-

work, merging as it does the most restrictive parts
of the

"clear and present danger" test and the "gravity of the
evil" formula, this test is a much less libertarian

approach to freedom of speech than that found in America,
if for no other reason than that the American judiciary

tends to use only one restrictive formula at a time.

English libertarians' love-hate relationship with
"insulting words" and the Race Relations Act of 1965,
and their desire to see such charges involed against antisemites, fascists and white racists, but not against

equally volatile speakers on the Left, has already been
noted.

Such a position by English libertarians indicates

a certain lack of even-handedness, but more important for

our purposes, it reflects the importance of the norm that
speech should be restricted by considerations of "defamation."
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It is irnpcrtant to note, too, that
the "compounded evil-

formula was motivated by the same kind of
consideration,
and reflects the English emphasis on protecting
individuals

from insults and abuse by others.

This can be viewed, as

we have stated, as a weighing of competing
concerns about

the rights of individuals, with the right to propagate

being subordinate to the right to personal tranquility—
a very specialized variety of the right to privacy.

United States
The very number of loyalty oaths, loyalty- security
programs and the history of the Smith Act, Communist

Control Act, and other federal legislation, as well as
the careers of Joseph McCarthy and the members of the

Subversive Activities Control Board, indicate that

Americans .took the problem of domestic subversion much
more seriously than the English during the same Cold War
period.
In the 1950 's, the absolutist interpretation of

the First Amendment was unsuccessfully to compete with a

judicial theory which held that the extent of governmental

power to limit expression was to be determined in every
case by balancing freedom against the case for order or
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security.

This position, initially enunciated by Chief

Justice Vinson in Americen Communications Association v.
Douds, probably received fullest treatment by Justice

Harlan in Barenblatt

v.

United States and tends to put

society's interest in freedom of speech, press and assembly
on no higher a plane than any other social interest.

basic notion of the doctrine, as expressed by Thomas
Emerson,

is,

The
i.

"that the Court must, in each case, balance

the individual and social interest in freedom of expression

against the social interest sought by the regulation which

restricts expression."

obviously most criteria the judges

use in evaluating any type of case involve some sort of
"balancing."

The clear and present danger doctrine asked

the judges to balance a community's interest in protecting

itself with the constitutional guarantees of freedom of

expression, but at least as the doctrine historically
unfolded, the assumption was that statutes which interfere with First Amendment freedoms are what need justification.

So the balance, under the clear and present danger

doctrine, and also its surrogate, the preferred position
doctrine, began with the scales tilted in favor of

individual expression.

The Vinson Court wished to begin

inquiry into free speech cases with the scales empty.
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But while the "balancing of interests" formula
and the "gravity of the evil" test were to dominate

judicial thinking in the early 1950 's, the late 40 's and
the 1960

's

were less rigid periods, and the judicial

standards reflected a desire to discover imminent dangers
rather than probable evils before interference with speech

could be allowed.
Cases such as Saia

,

Terrriiniello ,

and even Feiner

were far different in result and logic from Jordan
Burqoyne

v.

With the exception of the decision on group

.

libel and the symbolic speech cases, the American bench

has been fairly consistent in insisting that some concrete

evidence of probable disorder (beyond simple apprehension

by authorities that the particular event could lead to
disorder)

,

is necessary to sustain criminal punishment.

It seems fairly certain,

for example, that the events which

brought about the charges in Gregory v. Chicago , or pro-

bably even Edwards

v. Simtll C.arolina.

wotil<5

not have been

viewed lightly by Lord Parker.

Justice Frankfurter's fear, expressed in Kovacs v.
Cooper, that constitutional doctrine would view any law

touching communication as "infected with presumptive
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invalidity/' seemed to be the operating principle of the

Warren Court.
Implicit in the Dombrowsk

decision, for exaniple,

was the warning that the Supreme Court would take judicial
notice of the "chilling effect" caused by threats to

enforce an overly broad criminal statute regulating
expression.

The Supreme Court has apparently recognized that
the statutes which are unconstitutional on their
face or as applied have the potential to generate
fear; to the extent that First Amendment freedom
of expression is involved, the Court will presume
the existence of the fear and the result that
necessarily flows therefrom the citizente selfcurtailment of his freedom of expression.

—

Dombrowsk

,

since it validates in a general way

the proposition that inquiry into the good or bad faith
of a state prosecutor is permissible, lays the groundwork

for an evaluation of the motive behind those Congressional

investigating committees whose inquiries appear to be

geared primarily to gaining the attention of media and

demonstrating to the public the importance of committee
members, rather than the less spectacular toil of legisla-

tive research.

The burden of proof to establish bad faith would
presumably always remain with the plaintiff, but the
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"chilling effect" rationale in Dombrowski represents a
major constitutional decision which could lay do%m the

groundwork for major changes in the Court's approach to
the First Amendment.

Most important, the decision repre-

sents a shift in the role of the constitutional litigator
to a position where he can

"...

take the offensive and

root out all of the unconstitutional portion of the

statute

m

a single proceeding."

2

The decision also arms courts with the power to
deter any governmental action having a chilling effect

which may prevent a large segment of society from exer-

cising First Amendment rights.
This presumptive invalidity has to be counter-

balanced by a demonstration not only of imminent disorder,
but must meet all the standards of due process, especially

avoidance of vagueness, and must be, in the judgment of
the courts, the only way to solve the problem.

If the

threat could have been met with either more narrowly-drawn
statutes or different administrative policy, such as more

police to protect Jehovah's Witnesses, then these alternative courses of action are required because of the high
status of free speech in the constitutional hierarclyof
values.
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While terms such as "clear and present danger," as

Justice Douglas has pointed out, are sometimes used so as
to negate the possibility of any meaning, the doctrine as

formulated by Brandeis as a standard for evaluating the

constitutionality of statutes rather than a simple evi-

dentiary rule would seem to describe the presumptive
invalidity which underlay so many of the Warren Court's
decisions.

England's Race Relations Act of 1965 was pro-

nounced "intolerable" by the American Civil Liberties
Union, and American libertarians generally have supported

some variation of the clear and present danger doctrine
as a criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of legislation

touching on speech, apparently feeling more comfortable

when the onus of justification

is

one the government.

Old Holmesian statements about "all speech being an incitement," and Justice Douglas's insistence in Terroiniello

that the

"...

function of free speech

...

is to

invite dispute," reflect a consensus among American

libertarians that speech is supposed to be provocative.
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Obscenity
United Kingdom

The inclusion of drugs and violence under the
rubric "obscene" makes the notion of obscenity cover all

attempts to deprave and corrupt subjects in the United
Kingdom, and in the final analysis the concept is really
an attempt to pun3

even though the parti-

cu]

not be illegal.

The

theocratic base of the concept is as evident in England
as it is in the United States, and the charge of obscenity

would have greater clarity, if less legitimacy, if it
were labelled "enticement to sin."
As Lord Reed noted in his dissent in the Ladies

Directory Case

,

English judges usually give no help to

the jury in defining such terms as "deprave" and "corrupt,"

and the concept of obscenity in the United Kingdom is not

only more variable than the concept in the United States

because it is more inclusive, but also because the jury is
under the guidance of fewer judicial rules about what the

pivotal terms are supposed to mean.

In this context, the

American Supreme Court may be a "super-censor" because
lower court judges cannot figure out how to apply

th*,-

Roth
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standards, but at least Roth has more
certitude than the

English judges' attempt to clarify the nature
of the
offense by quoting dictionary synonyms.

Another factor

to consider is that the latitude vague
phrases give to

the decision-maker is probably used for more
libertarian
purposes, or is at least used more consistently,
when

handled by a review court rather than by a jury.
United States
The Supreme Court's rulings in Ginsb erg and

Stanley have moved the complex "Roth-plus" formula to cover

primarily what

I

have labelled as invasions of "public

privacy" rather than an attempt to control mere possession
of prurient material.

Even though "pandering" is far

removed from the original definition of obscenity, it is

probably a better concept to indicate the court's feeling
about the true nature of the "problem" of obscenity.

Like

the English concept of corrupting public morals,

"pandering" reflects a displeasure about those who

establish a career out of meeting the unsavory needs of
the community.

Even though the wares of the panderer

might not be connected to illegal behavior, the "sordid
business" emerges as still objectionable.

In the future.
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temptation may not emerge as a greater evil than
the sin,
but the doctrine that temptation must take place
without
intruding on the public sense of privacy will probably

continue far into the future.

Attempts to shut off the

flow of pornography to the consumer will probably
diminish,

but modes of solicitation, since they make use of the
simple existence of a community, will be subject to regulation.

Both the product and the consumer, being basically

private matters, will be less important than the producers'

behavior in the public marketplace with unsolicited
intrusions on the consumer's privacy receiving criminal

penalt ies.

General Approach to
Liberty
The English desire to create an environment in

which minds can meet for purposes of exchange rather than

confrontation and the widespread belief xn legal sanctions
against speech which threatens not only order but decorum,
reflects a commitment which emphasizes communication

through speech.

The desire to keep a minimum of personal

respect present on both sides during an argument is held to
be essential if the speech is to be meaningful.
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Obscenity in England, while a much broader concept than here, is also much more widely accepted as
a

legitimate concept.

English libertarians do not challenge

the basic assumption that pornography can be prohibited.

The attack on the legitimacy of the concept itself, both
judicially and among libertarian pressure groups, is much
more common in the United States.

In the deferential

political culture, criticism tends to concentrate on how
reasonably a particular power is exercised rather than on

government's authority to have such a power at all.
The differences between the British and American

approach as to civil liberties are probably also reflections of more general differences in attitudes toward

criminal law.

These attitudes were contrasted by New York

Times reporter Anthony Lewis who claimed, for example,
that the right to counsel for suspects immediately after

arrest seemed "utterly strange and unacceptable to most
legal authorities" in Britain.

3

Lewis attributes the

differing attitudes to the greater suspicion of police
and the greater diffusion of policy-making power in the
U. S., as well as to the generally more conservative

nature of Britain's legal profession.

These differences
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are also reflected in the disparity in approaches to the

criminal process by libertarians in England and America.

A case in point

is former

Home Secretary Roy Jenkins,

widely respected by libertarian groups for his activities
as a private member of parliament when he pushed through

the reform of the Obscene Publications Act and his acti-

vities in fighting to end capital punishment and encouraging
legal reform in abortion and homosexuality.

But he is

also a supporter of measures which probably would not
be well received by the American Civil Liberties Union.
He was in favor, for example, of eliminating unanimous
jury verdicts for criminal convictions? the fingerprinting
of all Englishmen; and opposed to the privilege against

self-incrimination being used to avoid giving testimony.
Institutional Influences

Written Guarantees
The fact that prior restraint seems to be more

acceptable to legislatures, courts, and libertarian groups
is perhaps a manifestation of not viewing civil liberties

as a matter of "constitutional guarantees."

Having no

written list of constitutional proscriptions, the "challenge"
to authority on grounds of "unconstitutionality" or
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ultimate "illegitimacy" must focus on practices and
irs;.ieroentation of policy,

themselves.

rather than grants of authority

Americans, along with a deep tradition of

viewing government as restrained by a written document,

have constant reference to a convenient decalogue of
things government "can't do."
in the Bill of Rights,

The enumeration of specifics

in conjunction with a written

constitution designed to issue restraints against authority
as well as grants of authority, a historical fear of con-

solidated political power, and a people historically suspicious of the idea of government, acts in a general way
to infect all policy with a presumptive invalidity.

Having written constitutional guarantees of basic rights,
in addition to being an important device in popularizing

the dialogue about civil liberties, is also partly

responsible for the adversary-conflict approach of Americans
to civil liberties.

An early "suspicious polity" tended

to institutionalize measures which helped to sustain and
nurture suspicion of authority.

The English have "expec-

tations" that basic rights will not be abridged by govern-

ment, but a belief that their expectations will be met.

Americans have

written "guarantees" that basic rights
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will not be abused, but fear
that the guarantees will
not be honored.

Fragmented power
Diffusion of political power in the
United States,
while theoretically a device for
restraining the use of
power, in most instances leads to
diversity of legislation
rather than responsible legislation;
and in both the areas
of seditious and obscene speech a
dimension of the Supreme

Court's liberalizing effect has been to
remove control
over these areas from the states.

A unitary form of

government is by no means immune from parochial
influences,
however
In both Britain and the United States, libertarians,

sometimes as a second choice, have sought to centralize

control over obscenity in the hope that national standards

would at least be preferable to numerous provincial criteria.

However, English libertarians also complain about

consolidation of power, accountability, etc.

in 1965

the NCCL suggested that the Home Office was too complex
a body to handle so many problems affecting individual

liberty, and claimed that the Home Secretary's responsi-

bilities were so broad that he was "effectively protected
from a personal review of all his work."^
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Role of the Bench

English courts did not significantly
truncate any
of the legislation we have analyzed,

with the possible

exceptions of the Quarter Sessions'
attempt to formulate
a "reasonable audience" rule
in Jordan, and Judge Stable's

instructions to the jury in the

"

Philanderer's case,"

English courts never made any a Iterations
-by- interpretation
which narrowed the scope of statutes.

Cases such as

Jordan, ward, Shaw and the Chewing

Co. indicate that

Gura

the power to determine the meaning of
legislation rarely

benefited the defense.

Judicial "creativity," which

existed in cases such as Shaw or Jordan, was invariably
a
boost for the prosecution.

Obviously the range within which English courts
can maneuver and exercise judicial will as compared to

governmental will is much more restricted compared to the
United States.

But while the scope for maneuvering is

almost infinitely greater for American courts, the

direction of the movement within which English courts may
operate is the opposite of the American direction.

The

role of English courts as a libertarian influence in the

two problem areas we have examined is almost nil.

English
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courts play a comparatively small role
(in leadership
at least)

in protecting civil liberties in the
United

Kingdom, and given the direction of their isolated
instances of leadership, the fact that they do
play a

small role is probably fortunate,

American courts have not only played an active
role in these civil liberties questions, but generally

speaking the Supreme Court and the entire federal judiciary

have been a libertarian influence.

The Supreme Court's

formulas for defining obscenity, while certainly capable
of criticism on libertarian grounds, had the general

effect of reducing the number of convictions for obscenity

by establishing and tightening national standards for other
courts to apply.

American obscenity law is almost

entirely the product of judicial behavior, and, in cases
such as Ginzburg , the Supreme Court demonstrated its

sovereignty in the area by judicially "legislating"

pandering into American criminal law.
While rarely striking down legislation in areas

touching on Congress's concern over subversion, the distinction between "active" and "mere membership" in the

Smith Act and various loyalty tests and review boards
drastically narrowed the scope of such practices.

The
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government's desire to register members of the
Communist

Party and the State Department's right to establish
restricted travel areas were, in a de facto sense,
judicially negated.

The Court retreated in the face of

reactions to some decisions on abuses of legislative

investigatory power, but even here the net effect was

certainly not to extend the scope of such activity.
Political Elites and
Responsibility
Part of the explanation of the great responsibility

shown by English political leaders dealing with problems
of national security and loyalty is to be found in the

good judgment of the professional civil service.

The

higher status which accrues to the civil service and the

generally higher "respectability" of government employment as well as politics itself helps to create an insti-

tutional self-respect which enhances responsibility.

The existence of an "establishment"
sense)

(in the genuine

in England, when coupled with a professional civil

service, gives the entire English decision-making process

an insular quality which not only acts to limit participa-

tion on specific policy, but also discourages involvement
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of the ordinary citizen in questions of
education,
loyalty, etc., a fact which can have libertarian
conse-

quences when the threat to civil liberties

steins from

inflamed public opinion.

The negative aspect of insular decision-making,
of course, is that tracing accountability for specific

prosecutions and policy becomes very difficult.

Policy

just seems to ooze from the giant amoeba called "the

Government.'

But the insular quality of "establishment"

policy served the English well when confronted with some
localized pockets of hysteria about doinestic subversion.

While the lower temperature of the English people on this
kind of issue is due to cultural factors, some credit must
be given to inter -establishment ethics about the proper

ways to in engage in political warfare, since a political
party, especially the out-party, could have thought it

could have made political gains by "leading" on such an
issue, but did not do so.

Cultural Factors
In the deferential polity democracy is less a

matter of mandate from the public and more a matter of

responsible rule and control.

Freedom of expression in
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this context becomes a value of Bocial interaction
and

basic civility rather than a guarantee to engage in
an

adversary-conflict process.

Civil liberties become rules

of cooperation rather than rules of conflict.

The "deferential" culture apparently has certain

expectations about leadership.

The phlegmatic approach

of the English people to political diversity also makes

them concerned about violations of understood norms of
social propriety and responsibility.

Both a subversive

"witch hunt" and the anti-semitic tirade seem to conflict

with a qualitative political style which the English expect
from both those who lead in official politics and street

corner oratory.

While this would obviously not apply to

the "leaders" of race riots in Blackpool, it is important

to note that even in the increasingly sensitive area of

race relations in the United Kingdom, leaders such as

Enoch Powell may be racists, but they are not in the
"populist" tradition of Lester Maddox or George Wallace,
and attempts in the American press to create this kind of

analogy reflect a subtle desire to punish the English for

past self -righteousness on this subject.

Our point is not

even that such punishment is undeserved, simply that the
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"style" is radically different and reflects a deferential

polity.

"Deference" makes assumptions about responsibility,

and in a curious way the responsibility exists because it
is expected, and the proposition's tendency to be self-

fulfilling strengthens the prediction of responsibility.

Civil liberties criteria in the United States,
because of the culture the governmental structure and the
greater propensity to have these kinds of questions dealt

with in a legal context, emerge as extensions of the
accusatorial legal process .
The resolution of civil liberties problems in the

context of a suspicious polity creates a generally higher
level of surveillance of individual freedoms, but, as we

have noted with reference to the set response of some
libertarians to the "red menace" hysteria of the 1950

's,

the adversary nature of this surveillance can harm the

libertarian case by making it an inaccurate statement of
denials and counter-affirmations about disloyalty to the
Bill of Rights.

Liberty and Authority

Trusting a responsible government to protect
individual freedom may involve the courage of "faith," but
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rigidly adhering to prescriptions which prohibit any
attempts to control behavior touching on expression of

opinion has its own equivalent of a "leap to faith."
The locus of this faith tends to be placed in frail hopes
for a responsible polity rather than a responsible govern-

ment and the assumption that truth will win out in the
competition of the market place.

Thomas I. Cook, in the

course of arguing, in the 1950 's, that the American

Communist Party should be outlawed, attacked the weakest
link in the chain of arguments used by American liber-

tarians.

One does not have to agree with Cook's conclu-

sion about the wisdom of outlawing revolutionary parties
to appreciate his recognition of the "intellectual
absolutism" of traditional American liberals and liber-

tarians which is "as real, if not as sinister, as those
of both heresy-hunters and heretics."

5

The dangers of

close adherence to rules, such as a literal interpretation
of the First Amendment, or even total adherence to the

clear and present danger doctrine, is that observance of
the rule becomes an end itself, rather than an instru-

mental guide to the interests and values those rules were

designed to protect.

Cook argued, for example, that
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liberalism's attempt to defend an open society by pro-

claiming absolute freedoms divorced from the reality of
their achieving an open society, is to argue for empty

secondary principles at the expense of the basic premise
of liberalism.

But his more general criticism of liber-

tarian absolutism is its refusal to take cognizance: of the
non-rational elements in politics, as well as the ability
of all sorts of pressure groups to manipulate and manu-

facture public opinion.

Of such liberals. Cook remarks:

Aware of the non-rational element in man,
and properly hostile to irrationalist politics,
of the possibility of whose triumph they are
perhaps unwarranted ly afraid, they yet cling
stubbornly to the rationalist principle that,
given complete freedom of expression and of
political organization, truth will indeed win
out in the competition of the market place.
Nevertheless, their overall attitude implies
doubts, and their doctrine seems in the event
to mean that freedom must be unconstrained
regardless of the consequences. We must, they
say, collectively confront possible martyrdom
though some might not bear it heroically and
few would relish its fitile suffering.^
For Cook personal self-fulfillment and other

individual conceins transcend the bonds of society, but
the rights necessary to achieve them successfully are
always in a social order which, "is both the place and the

condition of such fulfillments.

'

Constitutional democracy.
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he submits, is a closed system, "secure only within its

related postulates."

Liberalism and democracy require us

to "accept our lack of finality and certainty in knowledge/' as well as the "inescapable imperfection in social

practice.

Cook is pushed to the conclusion that there are
some kinds of advocacy which are "inherently subversive,"

and the standard he would use in distinguishing the

inherently subversive from the dissent which an open

society requires is the advocacy of violence.

Communists

and Fascists, and to update him we would probably have to
include the more strident members of the New Left, have
no commitment to the open political process, and therefore

any attempt to participate reflects only a desire to use
the latitude of the process to undo the process.

Any

standard which, like the clear and present danger doctrine,
emphasizes the immediacy of the threat and the directness
of the danger may have been appropriate when the issue was

simple breaches of the King's peace long ago, but to apply
it to a genuine conspiratorial movement in the twentieth

century is, according to Cook, to "abandon reality."
Cook's argument, it may be noted, takes the same

general form as Korstol's argument for censoring obscenity.
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The form of the argument is that rules designed
to maximize liberty are not ends in themselves but are
means to

achieve the purposes which motivated the rules. ^

The values

behind prescriptions about liberty are sometimes entitled
self-fulfillment, self-government, open society, etc., but
for a broad spectrum of individuals liberty is not the

fundamental goal, but a way of ensuring that other goals

can be met.

For others, liberty becomes an end in itself,

or becomes the operating fundamental value, even though

one may wish that free men will do certain things and not

other things.

The entire English milieu makes the operational
principles of civil liberties controversies come closer
to the approach to democracy which views liberty as an
important, but nonetheless instrumental

,

value.

The

American milieu encourages operational principles which
view liberty as an end in itself.

A full analysis of the things which should be considered in any choice between these two approaches to

democracy would take us deep into the subtleties of democratic theory and liberalism itself (where the

t^isnsion

between those who view liberty as a primary goal and those
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view it as a secondary goal is very pronounced)

,

but the

only point we wish to make here is that these two strands
of democratic thought seem to describe the variance in

the English and American approaches to civil liberties.

Both cultures have rules, formal and informal, to

guide citizen, judge and lawmaker in the area of the
individual's relationship to the state and other individuals.

Both cultures take the problem seriously and, compared to
other cultures, reflect a heavy commitment to the value
of individual autonomy.

But in one culture the rules emerge

as prescriptions about conflict and in the other as pre-

scriptions about consensus .

What is perhaps

roost

unfortunate is that the norma-

tive criteria used to approach civil liberties in both

cultures could not be somehow reversed.

A dysfunctional

anomoly exists between a highly plural istics society
that expounds rules which construe democracy and free
speech as guarantees to arbitrate, and a more homogeneous

society which reflects a concern for its own unity.

The

society with the most unity and common assumptions about
authority does the most worrying about unity and differing
assumptions about authority.

Expectations of abuses in
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one society and expectations about
responsibility in the

other tend to become curiously self-fulfilling.

These two tendencies pushed to extremes, of
course, become untenable.

To oppose power simply because

it is power is a form of paranoia,

just as to defer to

government in all circumstances is to engage in a
dangerous
act of faith.

Both the suspicious polity and the deferen-

tial polity lack a certain perspective on individual
freedom, but along diffeiing dimensions.

If we assume that

cultures and governments, just as men, must err, it is

probably best to err on the side of suspicion.

This is

not to make an error into a virtue, simply to reiterate
the verity of slogans about "eternal vigilance."

What is

frequently misunderstood is that vigilance may be the

price of liberty, and the price may be well worth

it,

like all prices, vigilance can get caught in an infla-

tionary spiral which devalues the currency of thought.

but
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